Headless chicken

Headless chicken
by Lt-Gen Harwant Singh (retd)

AS young children, we once cut a chicken’s head in true “jhatka” style and then released it. For the next few minutes it violently jumped about in all directions, fluttering its wings and splattering blood all over the place. It was at this very exciting moment that mother arrived on the scene and we were severely admonished. 

 

We were reminded of those childhood memories of mischief and mirth by our very capable and able ambassador, Ronnen Sen. He, like us, is probably aware how a headless chicken goes about in its final dance of death and, therefore, seems to discover, during the nuclear debate, some similarity in the behaviour of our Hon’ble members of Parliament, with poultry, and that too when the latter is without its head. It is not very clear if he meant it in the literal sense in that the MPs are without their heads or without brains! 

 

However, Ronnen Sen now informs us and the MPs, that the adjective was actually directed at the press, which very cleverly and deftly deflected it to the members of Parliament. May be, the phrase was directed at his personal assistant who was seen moving in and out of his room; restless and jittery while Sen addressed the Press. The media, as often is the case and its won’t, misconstrued and misdirected this inoffensive and well-meaning observation, unnecessarily brought in members of Parliament and equally quoted the whole episode “out of context”. 

 

Given our worthy ambassador Ronnen Sen’s long experience and attendant skills in diplomacy, there must be some agreeable and winning content in this expression, which the members of Parliament, in their limited understanding of diplomacy, have misread and misunderstood and taken uncalled for offence. After all Ronnen Sen tells us and the Privileges Committee of Parliament that he often uses this very endearing phrase for his wife, while she goes about doing household chores. Perhaps, every time he uses this expression of love for his wife she gives him a hug. This, of course, was my own conjecture on reading of this very diplomatic move of a husband towards his wife. 

 

Since there was some delay in serving breakfast, I entered the kitchen and found my wife shuffling around in trying to locate some item to scramble eggs. I figured out that here was a perfect chance for me to be a little diplomatic and say what Sen so often says to his dear wife. I made bold and told my wife that, “you are shuffling around like a headless chicken”. Having said that in a fairly endearing tone, I stood in cavalry style (cavalry officers have a unique style of standing, with one leg slightly bent) expecting her to rush to me and give a loving hug. 

 

Instead, she dispatched a raw egg, at high speed, which caught me square on the face, giving me no time to duck! You see, the Army never spared me for a diplomatic assignment in one of our embassies abroad and, therefore, my wife is not well versed in some of these diplomatic phrases and nuances of diplomatic language! 

http://www.tribuneindia.com/2007/20071105/edit.htm#5 

Why deterrence never worked

A classic case of diminishing returns
Harwant Singh

The decision of the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) presumably on the advice of the National Security Advisory Board (NASB — an unwieldy and poorly constituted body) to pull back the troops from the border has not come a day too soon. Continued deployment of troops in their battle locations had come to serve no useful purpose and was, in fact, turning into a case of diminishing returns. It is, perhaps, the time to analyse the effectiveness of our coercive diplomacy and deployment of defence forces to deter Pakistan from carrying out cross-border terrorism. How far were the objectives achieved? Was the very idea of deterrence, in the given situation, flawed? 

However, it may be recalled that in a lead article, “Dithering on deterrence” dated February 4, 2002, we had pointed out that “We can now fight the ‘war of lists’ of wanted personnel... and learn to live with cross-border terrorism.... We lacked resources, but more the vision and the will to create a powerful military which could put the fear of Allah into Pakistan and make it desist from continuing with proxy war against India,” which it engineered right from the eighties; starting with Punjab.
The initial decision to mobilise the defence services and their deployment for an offensive, consequent to the terrorist attack on Indian Parliament on December 13, 2001, was more a knee-jerk reaction than a part of a well thought-out and thought-through strategy . After all, India had been suffering unending cross-border terrorist attacks in J and K for close to 12 years. It was more the lack of suffering understanding of what could constitute coercive diplomacy and military deterrence and their synergy in the given circumstances that could result in a coherent and purposeful outcome. The so-called economic sanctions imposed on Pakistan, the denial of Indian airspace to civil flights, withdrawal of staff from our High Commission etc had no effect on its economy, nor was there any appreciable diplomatic fallout, nor were the operations of Pakistan Airlines seriously hampered. But a reciprocal action by that country for our civil flights denied us direct access to Kabul at a critical juncture when the future of Afghanistan was being reshaped and Indian help and presence had become essential. Though we do reach out to Kabul, but only by a circuitous route. While we removed the restrictions on Pakistani civil flights, the counter-restrictions continue for reasons to keep us as much out of the Kabul picture as possible.

The dictionary meaning of coercion implies that it must restrain by force, and consequently coercive policy must have the power to coerce. Similarly, deterrence must have the means to frighten, hinder, or prevent the opponent from doing something you do not want him to do. In simpler terms, it means that the one resorting to deterrence must have, not only the necessary wherewithal to apply a credible force, which when applied would inflict unacceptable damage on the opponent but also the essential will to do so. It must carry conviction with the one on whom deterrence is focused. In the event the desired corrections in the policies and actions etc of the opponent does not come about, consequent to the application of deterrence, then the manifestation of the application of force would undeniably surface. The entire gambit of mobilisation and deployment of Indian defence forces must be looked through the prism of these elementary features of deterrence and its application. Mere resort to rhetoric, such as, “proactive policy”, “zero tolerance,” “ruthlessly dealing with terrorists,” “Aar par ki Larrai,” etc had failed to impress Pakistan. Therefore, it had convinced itself that the Indian leadership lacked the essential will to act firmly for one, and it did not have the necessary military superiority to severely punish Pakistan. While it may not be unreasonable to assume that Pakistan banked on the international community to refrain India from attacking, it depended more on its own ability to last out well, an Indian offensive.

Nearly a decade and a half of starving of the Indian defence forces of essential funds had substantially debilitated its offensive potential. Not only was modernisation given a goby, even replacement of obsolete and obsolescent equipment could not be carried out. Building up of necessary stocks of reserves of ammunition and other war-like stores up to minimum acceptable levels had not been possible. All this could not be lost on our adversaries. The addition of 320, state of the art T-80 tanks to Pakistan’s inventory, along with a whole range of other equipment in the early 1990s, vastly improved its potential to stall a possible Indian ground offensive. On the other hand, the Indian position saw only a downward slide due to the aging of existing holdings of equipment and want of replacement of wastages due to normal wear and tear.

While the IAF, as always, enjoyed marked superiority over the PAF, the unremitting frequency with which its frontline MiG-21 aircraft have been falling out of the sky threw up a range of unhelpful signals.

The Indian Navy has long been a neglected service. To offset the Indian superiority in tanks, aircraft, ground troops etc, Pakistan depends more on their counters in way of anti-tank, anti-aircraft capabilities and firepower etc. The essential information about most armies, down to units and their equipment profiles, is available in various international publications. So Pakistan, as also we, have been aware of each other’s military capabilities.

These unfortunate ground realities could not, as some of us expected, frighten Pakistan out of its wits once the Indian deployment for an offensive was put in place. In fact, General Pervez Musharraf made bold to declare that there was balance of power in South Asia. Consequently crossborder terrorism continued unabated, with the normal fluctuation in its frequency and intensity. When the attack on the families of Indian soldiers at Kaluchack took place and the Indian cup of patience at last seemed to overflow and our offensive appeared imminent, some of us who saw on TV, the discomfiture of General Pervez Musharraf felt that, at last, the military deterrence was having the desired effect, but any right-thinking Indian too was equally perturbed at the prospects of a war.

Around that time Pakistan’s representative at the UN had talked rather irresponsibly, of the certainty of use of nuclear weapons by his country, in the event of an Indian offensive. This posturing by Pakistan in itself had brought added pressure from the USA for reigning-in the jehadi elements operating in J and K, as also a possible threat of “taking out” of Pakistan’s nuclear capability, seemed to work. Viewed from this angle, the June, 2002, speech of General Musharraf can be rationalised. As time passed and there appeared no gains from the continued deployment of the Indian defence forces and no facesaving device appeared viable, General Musharraf was constrained to remark that it was not for him to provide the same. Finally, the successful conclusion of elections in J and K provided the figleaf and the much needed escape route for withdrawal of troops.

The nuclear factor had come into play in the nineties itself, as Pakistan was known to have covert capability in this field. At least on two previous occasions, it had threatened to use nuclear weapons to thwart a possible Indian offensive and the same had, in that country’s perception, worked. Therefore, at the initial stages of troop deployment in December, 2001, the Indian concern centred on the nuclear capability of Pakistan and the prospects of use of nuclear weapons by that country were factored into Indian calculations. However, a more detailed analysis by some of the defence experts (‘Military Build-up on Indo-Pak Border’ The Tribune dated January 16, 2002) obviously appeared to have resolved the Indian dilemma and made clear the fact that Pakistan would not risk taking recourse to such an action as it would certainly result in the decimation of that country.

Once Pakistan acquired the covert nuclear capability as a hedge against the so-called Indian military superiority, it was time for this country to think afresh and recast and redefine her strategic thinking. There was the need to reorient and realign defence policies and military strategy. Instead, our political leadership and the top brass in the defence services continued to prepare for the last war and that too half heartedly. We ought to have shifted the focus of our priorities to another area, which not only met our immediate concerns but also our long-term strategic security requirements. However, we continued to think in terms of more tanks, heavy guns, self propelled guns etc. While the Arun Singh Committee was quick to grasp the need for this reorientation, the more hidebound top brass continues to display rigidity in its thinking and resistance to change.

Mobilisation of the armed forces and their move back to the barracks, consumption of fuel, compensation for crop damaged, dislocation of over a million people, etc, would perhaps work out to nearly Rs 10000 crore. Large tracts of the border have been mined. Demining of the areas could lead to more casualties and most of the mines would be unsafe for future handling and will need to be replaced. Expensive equipment exposed to the elements would have suffered deterioration. Some of the highly secret troop dispositions have been revealed. Above all, deterrence as such is less likely to work in the future. All this failed to achieve any worthwhile results.

Finally, the elections in J and K and the formation of a new government there is not likely to bring about a sea change in the situation in that state as it relates to cross-border terrorism. The developments in Pakistan, more so the emergence of MMA as a political force in the crucial provinces does not augur well for that country, but more so for peace in J and K. India has to be prepared for the long haul. While we retain, nay enhance, out capabilities to deal firmly with cross-border terrorism in J and K, there should be no aversion to entering into a comprehensive dialogue with Pakistan on all issues, even if cross-border terrorism is not completely terminated. 

— The writer is a retired Lt-General.


http://www.tribuneindia.com/2002/20021109/edit.htm#4

The Siachen saga

The Siachen saga

Lieut-Gen Harwant Singh (retd) tells about the capture of Pakistani post Quaid in Siachen

The Saltoro range in Siachen glacier

THE conflict at Siachen appears to be coming to an end. While we await the closure of the Siachen chapter, one of the greatest feats of endurance, sacrifice and valour played out at those impossible heights and in terrible weather conditions, need recalling.

In April 1984, India occupied passes on the Saltoro to pre-empt Pakistan from doing so. Eventually, we had to occupy almost every peak to deny Pakistani troops from occupying the same. However, Pakistan discovered a vertical cliff the Indians had not occupied and which could only be scaled with the use of ropes and occupied it.

This rocky outcrop was at 21,153 feet and Pakistan named the post, "Quaid". Firing from this post on an Indian helicopter which was evacuating casualties damaged it and killed two soldiers and injured the third occupant. So the removal of Quaid became imperative.

A patrol consisting of one officer, one junior commissioned officer and seven jawans set out to find a route to Quaid along the rock face and ice walls and to obtain information concerning the post. Operating at night, it climbed the icefall forming the north face of the post and fixed the ropes for the attack group. The enemy at Quaid got alerted.

The officer leading the patrol decided to move forward but came under heavy fire. Four jawans and the officer were killed. The remaining four retraced their steps. One of them later died of wounds. At a great cost to itself the patrol did a commendable job in fixing the ropes and bringing back valuable information about the post.

A force of 60 volunteers was assembled to tackle Quaid. There is a saying, "never volunteer in the army". Yet even for the most dangerous tasks or near suicide missions, there are always some who do volunteer.

During 1971 war with Pakistan, my regiment was to send one half of it strength (around 25 tanks) deep into a sensitive sector of the enemy, inviting on itself a major enemy reaction. There was no coming back and it was a ‘do and die’ mission. The commanding officer assembled the troops and his officers, about 400 of them and briefly spoke of the mission and the expected casualties. He touched on the soldier’s ‘dharma’ and his duty. He talked of the regimental tradition and generations of men and officers who had so loyally served the regiment’s cause and were now focused on our actions at this hour of trial. He explained the essence of the regimental motto, that is, ‘Fortitude and Valour.’

With his riding crop he drew a line on the ground and asked 120 volunteers to cross over. For five or six seconds nothing happened. An eternity seems to pack itself into those momentous moments. Then, in firm steps, the troops crossed that line as one body; all 400 of them. Coming back to Quaid, the attacking troops had to move at night over dangerous terrain and were to be out in the open, without shelter, for nearly 96 hours in that bitter cold.

Ropes fixed by the earlier patrol could not be located due to heavy snowfall but daylight attempt revealed these. As the assaulting troops climbed to the top, enemy opened fire and the troops had to fall back to spend another day in the open.

Next a JCO and six soldiers inched forward towards ‘Quaid.’ and attacked with grenades and small arms. In the process, some soldiers were killed and the radio operator rolled down on the enemy side of the mountain. The attack had come to a halt.

Then another party led by junior commissioned officer Bana Singh, moving along a different and dangerous route closed in and threw grenades at ‘Quaid’. Some Pakistanis ran out of the bunker and attacked them.

There followed hand-to-hand fighting along slippery slopes. Some were bayoneted and in this melee, a few from both sides slipped and fell a few 100 feet to their death. Bana Singh and his remaining men took the post and cut the ropes to Quaid used by Pakistani troops to maintain the post. Quaid was finally in Indian hands. The bodies of the Indian officer and his patrol were recovered. The captured post was named, ‘Bana;’ after Naib Subedar Bana Singh who led the final assault. He was later awarded the Param Vir Chakra, the highest gallantry award of the mission.

While the war at Siachen, hopefully ends soon, the great deeds of valour, heroism and the stories of triumph of the human spirit over impossible odds, will be recounted for a long time.

http://www.tribuneindia.com/2006/20060716/spectrum/main4.htm

High time for harsh decisions

High time for harsh decisions
by Lt-Gen Harwant Singh (retd)

SPeaking to the full panel of the Planning Commission, the Prime Minister expressed serious concern at the rising subsidy bill. He was perhaps echoing the misgivings of Punjab’s Finance Minister Manpreet Badal who has been opposed to the idea of subsidies and sops. Since then, a number of economists too have spoken against sops.

Subsidies take away what should rightly go into priority spending, especially in education, health care and infrastructure, which in the long run usher in prosperity for all. Political parties promise sops which in some cases amounts to promissory notes for a set of voters to draw on their votes. This practice is a form of bribery or the spirit of  “code of conduct” to earn votes.

Not all commitments made in a political party’s manifesto can be implemented. For instance, the Shiromani Akali Dal is forgetful of the commitment made in its manifesto regarding issues related to sharing of Punjab’s river waters. Or the ‘Garibhi hatao’ in the Congress manifesto eventually ended up as ‘Garibh hatao’. This piece will confine to the issue of sops offered to the poor, and not so poor, of Punjab. 

Free electricity to farmers meant to help the poor agriculturists has in reality worked to their disadvantage. It has led to gross abuse for uses other than agriculture and has helped the richer farmers. For only they can afford deep boring and installation of heavy duty and expensive submersible pumps. This has also led to indiscriminate drawing of water by the rich, resulting in ever lowering of the water table, making it all the more difficult for the poor to reach it. This receding water level has had yet another fallout, in that certain species of trees are drying up. If this trend continues, in a couple of decades, parts of Punjab will turn into a desert. 

This sop to the farmers has resulted in electricity becoming more expensive for industry. Arm-twisting by the BJP has made the Chief Minister extend electricity at concessional rates to the householders as well. This will further increase the cost of electricity for industry and impose an additional burden on the exchequer. It will be an added disincentive for industry to come to Punjab and some existing units will be forced to opt out of the province. Eventually, this will result in unemployment for the children of poor farmers. A sop meant for the poor has actually worked against the poor.

The poor do need help and so there is some merit in giving them dal and atta at subsidised rates. Having made this commitment in the manifesto, the Akali Dal finds itself in a bind. To escape this trap, it would be better to convert this subsidy into food for work: retaining some content of subsidy in the programme.

The poor in the villages can be given work in cleaning up of clogged canals and water channels, building new roads and widening existing ones, clearing and deepening village ponds, digging wells to trap rain water to recharge ground water, planting of trees etc. Above all, it must be ensured that full benefits of welfare schemes reach the target groups and all seepages enroute are plugged.
The state’s debt burden is a whopping Rs 52,000 crore and is rising. There are large leakages in VAT and other revenue incomes. The bulk of the state’s revenues goes into maintaining over bloated and highly corrupt government machinery, leaving very little for education, healthcare, infrastructure and other developmental work.

Punjab’s GDP growth is 4. 5 per cent as against 12 per cent of Himachal Pradesh and 14 per cent of Haryana — the two weaker siblings of the triplet once known as East Punjab. A large number of government employees including teachers cannot be paid salaries regularly due to financial constraints. Soon the fallout of the Sixth Pay Commission will engulf the province, driving it further into debt. 

The state’s coffers are empty and yet the Chief Minister keeps doling out money for unproductive ventures and to self-serving groups. The state now wants to sell family silver (government land) to meet routine expenses. Education is in a mess. There is no public healthcare worth the name. No industry has come to the state. Realty projects are taking up valuable agricultural land and would create no jobs or wealth but result in jhuggi colonies of migrant labour on government land. The world over high rise buildings are preferred to save good agricultural land, but in Punjab there is a nexus between those owning land near big towns, authorities sanctioning the change of land use, passing housing projects and the builders.

Unemployment stalks the youth. They are simply unemployable. The education standard is so poor that they find it hard to even clear the written  entrance test for the officer cadre of the Army — a cadre to which youth from Punjab contributed in substantial numbers. Of the 600 cadets that passed out of IMA, Dehradun last December, only 17 were from Punjab. 

While there is a crying need to downsize the government’s workforce, no senior bureaucrat seems to retire; before he retires another job is created for him. More and more districts and divisions are being created which will be a heavy burden on the state exchequer. Police is far too bloated and top heavy. We must downsize the government machinery and deploy finances thus saved for education and development. All leakages in the revenue collection system must be plugged and the scourge of corruption tackled frontally. 

Only hard decisions and stringent measures can salvage Punjab’s deteriorating state of affairs. All Punjabis share Mr Manpreet Badal’s concerns with equal anxiety. He has the vision and will to set the state on the path of prosperity and financial wellbeing. He needs the people’s and the party’s wholehearted support. Mrs Bhattal’s jab that he is the right man in the wrong party is ill-founded, because he is the right man in any party.

The writer is a former Deputy Chief of Army Staff


http://www.tribuneindia.com/2008/20080120/edit.htm#5 

Fighting a ‘limited war’

It is a flawed concept
by Lt-Gen Harwant Singh (retd)

IT is not clear as to when the idea or the concept of a “limited war” was first evolved and articulated. Maybe it was the fallout from the procrastination, dithering and timidity in our response and an alibi for the missed opportunity of a suitable riposte to a major mischief by Pakistan at Kargil. Such response would have put an end to the slow-bleeding of India by Pakistan. Or was it the result of the fiasco of “Operation Parakaram” (mobilisation of Indian defence forces consequent to the attack on Indian Parliament) where we thought we could go in for a limited war and then backtracked on conjuring up the prospects of a larger conflagration?

It takes a minimum of two contestants to make war. Therefore, both must subscribe to the idea of a limited war. It cannot work when one of the contestants does and the other does not fall for it. Then there is the issue of both scale and duration of the conflict. Here again there is the problem of the two adopting the same concept and course of action. There is also the hazardous undertaking of forecasting and then chartering the future course of a war and preparing for just that one contingency. 

It is easy to start a war but difficult to conclude it on own terms. The German army, after nearly two decades of study, planning and preparation and detailed knowledge of every inch of the ground over which operations were to be conducted, prepared the Schlieffen Plan and catered for no other contingency. With over 350 army divisions, it undertook to over-run France in 40 days during World War I. The war lasted four years with disastrous consequences for Germany. The American war in Afghanistan is a case in point.

The second issue relates to a conflict between two nuclear-armed contestants. The parameters and compulsions for either side to transcend from a conventional war to a nuclear war are not that simple or easy to overcome. A whole range of considerations and possible consequences come into play, especially if the opponent has the wherewithal, the will and the capacity to completely devastate and lay waste the whole country. Consequently, in such a setting, the conflict will remain within the bounds of conventional warfare. Then there is the inevitable issue of reaching a stage (also sometimes called “threshold”) where the very survival, nay the existence, of the nation comes into play when a fatal decision to go in for the nuclear option can be considered. Sooner than later, world pressure is likely to prevail in ending the conflict.

Coming to the specifics of the Indo-Pak setting, neither side is willing to concede territory. This has led to extensive obstacles being created by both sides close to the border and these are effectively held. Consequently, major battles will be conducted within a few kilometres on either side of the border. Such was the case in 1965 and 1971 on the western sector. That has been and will remain the dominant reality of a conflict between these two neighbours. It is here along the plains of J and K and Punjab where the centre of gravity of the two countries lie, more so of Pakistan, and it is here that decisive battles, if and when they occur, will be fought.

The second and more important issue relates to meshing together the military and political aims of a war. These two cannot work in isolation or exclusion of one from the other. Clausewitz records that “war is continuation of policy”, but there has to be a “policy” to carry forward to war. Sometimes there can be a conflict or variance between the policy and the war aim. In such situations, it is the bounden duty of the military commander to lay bare before those who formulate national policy the full implications of pursuing a war which is at variance with military aim.

If in the opinion of the military commander, he is compelled to adopt a course other than what is in the national interest and the interest of his army, he should quietly make way for someone else. Had the then Army Chief in 1962 told some home-truths about the state of his Army and military infrastructure and offered to quit, the political leadership would have seen the reality and India could have been spared that humiliation and the Army the ignominy of a rout.

There are indeed innumerable instances where military commanders were able to carry their point and they proved eminently correct. The Russian army was required to defend Moscow against Napoleon’s advance. The Czar and his entourage insisted that the city must be defended. But, purely from the strategic military angle, Marshal Kutozov thought otherwise. Withstanding enormous pressure from the Czar and others, Kutozov did not defend Moscow and in the process saved Russia, its army and eventually brought about complete destruction of Napoleon’s army. During the invasion of Europe in World War II (Operation Overlord), as a political decision, the governments of the United States and Britain decided to keep “Strategic Air Command” outside the command of Eisenhower; the Supreme Commander of Operation Overlord. Eisenhower told them that in which case he would have to find someone else for command purposes.

As at Kargil, Pakistan had a distinct tactical advantage in its offensive at Chamb during 1965. Consequently, the Army Chief impressed upon the then Prime Minister the imperatives of wresting the initiative and opening another front against Pakistan across the international border and obtained his clearance for the same, though politically no one wanted a full-scale war. This was at a time when Pakistan enjoyed marked superiority in armour (qualitatively and quantitatively), and our edge in infantry and artillery was only marginal. In a span of just two weeks India was able to bring about the destruction of Pakistan’s armour and much else.

In 197,1 the political compulsions and the policy demand was to march into East Pakistan in May-June to relieve the unbearable pressure of influx of millions of refugees. The strategic military compulsions were quite different. The Army Chief had become the subject of a malicious whispering campaign. When the then Prime Minister told him that she was under great pressure from her Cabinet to march the Army into East Pakistan, Manekshaw told her that he could resign if that would help her. She had to then orchestrate diplomatic moves to gain international support, etc.
Weigh this against the meeting on May 18, 1999, where the Service Chiefs meekly accepted the orders from the PS to the Prime Minister (not the Prime Minister) without a whimper, detailing the defence forces not to use air power and permitting “hot-pursuit” of the enemy, only in the area of the ingress! Thus driving troops into suicidal frontal attacks up those impossible heights and slopes over a terrain where fire support was so much less effective.

It was left to a Pakistani brigadier to spell out through a newspaper article the course the Indian Army should have adopted rather than bash its head against the Kargil heights and suffer avoidable heavy casualties, thus discrediting generalship. In times of war the top military leader bears an enormous responsibility both to the nation and his army. He must fearlessly and forcefully advice the government on strategic military compulsions, and where he fails to carry his point he must act according to his own light and conscience. 

http://www.tribuneindia.com/2010/20100803/edit.htm#4