Why deterrence never worked

A classic case of diminishing returns
Harwant Singh

The decision of the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) presumably on the advice of the National Security Advisory Board (NASB — an unwieldy and poorly constituted body) to pull back the troops from the border has not come a day too soon. Continued deployment of troops in their battle locations had come to serve no useful purpose and was, in fact, turning into a case of diminishing returns. It is, perhaps, the time to analyse the effectiveness of our coercive diplomacy and deployment of defence forces to deter Pakistan from carrying out cross-border terrorism. How far were the objectives achieved? Was the very idea of deterrence, in the given situation, flawed? 

However, it may be recalled that in a lead article, “Dithering on deterrence” dated February 4, 2002, we had pointed out that “We can now fight the ‘war of lists’ of wanted personnel... and learn to live with cross-border terrorism.... We lacked resources, but more the vision and the will to create a powerful military which could put the fear of Allah into Pakistan and make it desist from continuing with proxy war against India,” which it engineered right from the eighties; starting with Punjab.
The initial decision to mobilise the defence services and their deployment for an offensive, consequent to the terrorist attack on Indian Parliament on December 13, 2001, was more a knee-jerk reaction than a part of a well thought-out and thought-through strategy . After all, India had been suffering unending cross-border terrorist attacks in J and K for close to 12 years. It was more the lack of suffering understanding of what could constitute coercive diplomacy and military deterrence and their synergy in the given circumstances that could result in a coherent and purposeful outcome. The so-called economic sanctions imposed on Pakistan, the denial of Indian airspace to civil flights, withdrawal of staff from our High Commission etc had no effect on its economy, nor was there any appreciable diplomatic fallout, nor were the operations of Pakistan Airlines seriously hampered. But a reciprocal action by that country for our civil flights denied us direct access to Kabul at a critical juncture when the future of Afghanistan was being reshaped and Indian help and presence had become essential. Though we do reach out to Kabul, but only by a circuitous route. While we removed the restrictions on Pakistani civil flights, the counter-restrictions continue for reasons to keep us as much out of the Kabul picture as possible.

The dictionary meaning of coercion implies that it must restrain by force, and consequently coercive policy must have the power to coerce. Similarly, deterrence must have the means to frighten, hinder, or prevent the opponent from doing something you do not want him to do. In simpler terms, it means that the one resorting to deterrence must have, not only the necessary wherewithal to apply a credible force, which when applied would inflict unacceptable damage on the opponent but also the essential will to do so. It must carry conviction with the one on whom deterrence is focused. In the event the desired corrections in the policies and actions etc of the opponent does not come about, consequent to the application of deterrence, then the manifestation of the application of force would undeniably surface. The entire gambit of mobilisation and deployment of Indian defence forces must be looked through the prism of these elementary features of deterrence and its application. Mere resort to rhetoric, such as, “proactive policy”, “zero tolerance,” “ruthlessly dealing with terrorists,” “Aar par ki Larrai,” etc had failed to impress Pakistan. Therefore, it had convinced itself that the Indian leadership lacked the essential will to act firmly for one, and it did not have the necessary military superiority to severely punish Pakistan. While it may not be unreasonable to assume that Pakistan banked on the international community to refrain India from attacking, it depended more on its own ability to last out well, an Indian offensive.

Nearly a decade and a half of starving of the Indian defence forces of essential funds had substantially debilitated its offensive potential. Not only was modernisation given a goby, even replacement of obsolete and obsolescent equipment could not be carried out. Building up of necessary stocks of reserves of ammunition and other war-like stores up to minimum acceptable levels had not been possible. All this could not be lost on our adversaries. The addition of 320, state of the art T-80 tanks to Pakistan’s inventory, along with a whole range of other equipment in the early 1990s, vastly improved its potential to stall a possible Indian ground offensive. On the other hand, the Indian position saw only a downward slide due to the aging of existing holdings of equipment and want of replacement of wastages due to normal wear and tear.

While the IAF, as always, enjoyed marked superiority over the PAF, the unremitting frequency with which its frontline MiG-21 aircraft have been falling out of the sky threw up a range of unhelpful signals.

The Indian Navy has long been a neglected service. To offset the Indian superiority in tanks, aircraft, ground troops etc, Pakistan depends more on their counters in way of anti-tank, anti-aircraft capabilities and firepower etc. The essential information about most armies, down to units and their equipment profiles, is available in various international publications. So Pakistan, as also we, have been aware of each other’s military capabilities.

These unfortunate ground realities could not, as some of us expected, frighten Pakistan out of its wits once the Indian deployment for an offensive was put in place. In fact, General Pervez Musharraf made bold to declare that there was balance of power in South Asia. Consequently crossborder terrorism continued unabated, with the normal fluctuation in its frequency and intensity. When the attack on the families of Indian soldiers at Kaluchack took place and the Indian cup of patience at last seemed to overflow and our offensive appeared imminent, some of us who saw on TV, the discomfiture of General Pervez Musharraf felt that, at last, the military deterrence was having the desired effect, but any right-thinking Indian too was equally perturbed at the prospects of a war.

Around that time Pakistan’s representative at the UN had talked rather irresponsibly, of the certainty of use of nuclear weapons by his country, in the event of an Indian offensive. This posturing by Pakistan in itself had brought added pressure from the USA for reigning-in the jehadi elements operating in J and K, as also a possible threat of “taking out” of Pakistan’s nuclear capability, seemed to work. Viewed from this angle, the June, 2002, speech of General Musharraf can be rationalised. As time passed and there appeared no gains from the continued deployment of the Indian defence forces and no facesaving device appeared viable, General Musharraf was constrained to remark that it was not for him to provide the same. Finally, the successful conclusion of elections in J and K provided the figleaf and the much needed escape route for withdrawal of troops.

The nuclear factor had come into play in the nineties itself, as Pakistan was known to have covert capability in this field. At least on two previous occasions, it had threatened to use nuclear weapons to thwart a possible Indian offensive and the same had, in that country’s perception, worked. Therefore, at the initial stages of troop deployment in December, 2001, the Indian concern centred on the nuclear capability of Pakistan and the prospects of use of nuclear weapons by that country were factored into Indian calculations. However, a more detailed analysis by some of the defence experts (‘Military Build-up on Indo-Pak Border’ The Tribune dated January 16, 2002) obviously appeared to have resolved the Indian dilemma and made clear the fact that Pakistan would not risk taking recourse to such an action as it would certainly result in the decimation of that country.

Once Pakistan acquired the covert nuclear capability as a hedge against the so-called Indian military superiority, it was time for this country to think afresh and recast and redefine her strategic thinking. There was the need to reorient and realign defence policies and military strategy. Instead, our political leadership and the top brass in the defence services continued to prepare for the last war and that too half heartedly. We ought to have shifted the focus of our priorities to another area, which not only met our immediate concerns but also our long-term strategic security requirements. However, we continued to think in terms of more tanks, heavy guns, self propelled guns etc. While the Arun Singh Committee was quick to grasp the need for this reorientation, the more hidebound top brass continues to display rigidity in its thinking and resistance to change.

Mobilisation of the armed forces and their move back to the barracks, consumption of fuel, compensation for crop damaged, dislocation of over a million people, etc, would perhaps work out to nearly Rs 10000 crore. Large tracts of the border have been mined. Demining of the areas could lead to more casualties and most of the mines would be unsafe for future handling and will need to be replaced. Expensive equipment exposed to the elements would have suffered deterioration. Some of the highly secret troop dispositions have been revealed. Above all, deterrence as such is less likely to work in the future. All this failed to achieve any worthwhile results.

Finally, the elections in J and K and the formation of a new government there is not likely to bring about a sea change in the situation in that state as it relates to cross-border terrorism. The developments in Pakistan, more so the emergence of MMA as a political force in the crucial provinces does not augur well for that country, but more so for peace in J and K. India has to be prepared for the long haul. While we retain, nay enhance, out capabilities to deal firmly with cross-border terrorism in J and K, there should be no aversion to entering into a comprehensive dialogue with Pakistan on all issues, even if cross-border terrorism is not completely terminated. 

— The writer is a retired Lt-General.


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