A half-baked attempt to resolve a complex dilemma
Harwant Singh
Those who have opposed the proposal for a CDS contend that the existing system has worked well and stood the test of time. The fact is that the system has simply not worked. It worked only during the first Kashmir war of 1947-48 while we were still operating within the structures created by the British. But in 1962, the IAF stayed out of the combat as if it was someone else’s war. It had a distinct advantage over the then Chinese limited capability ex-Tibet and would have been most effective against columns of troops and mules and the Chinese Line of Control. If the government was scared of employing the Air Force, then was the IAF straining at the leash. What was the IAF’s advice to the government? This staying out of the battle created deep suspicions.
In 1965, the war clouds had gathered in the month of March, consequent to the Runn of Kutch incident. The Army was mobilised during May-June. When the hostilities finally broke out in September, the Navy’s only aircraft carrier was on dry docks. The IAF was late in coming at Chhamb. In a recent statement, the then Air Chief, Air Chief Marshal Arjan Singh, disclosed that he did not know of the Army’s offensive in the Punjab sector till after it was launched. Can there be a more damning indictment of the existing system which the retired Air Force Chiefs want to perpetuate.
The IAF had told the Army that during the first seven days or so of the war, it should not expect much support from the IAF as it would be fully committed to winning the air battle. The outcome of the air battle was never clear, but throughout the war our offensive in the Jammu sector was subjected to heavy air attacks by the Pakistan air force while there was little air activity in the sector by the IAF. General Harbaksh Singh in his book on the 1965 operations, “War Despatches”, records Air Vice Marshal Sondhi’s assessment of the IAF’s performance, (page 176): “The manner and circumstances in which the IAF went into action in 1965 — in the Chhamb sector — are illustrative not only of the political hesitation that delayed the decision on the employment of the Air Force until it was all but too late, but also exemplified the Air Force’s own half-hearted participation before the desperate reaction of the Pakistan air force which led to an air war .... But the IAF missed a rare opportunity to demonstrate more fully to the Army that it exists otherwise than a fighting service for its own good.”
During 1971, from December 1 onwards, the Army was placed at the highest state of alert and attack from Pakistan was expected “any time”, yet when the offensive came on the afternoon of December 3, and the enemy air force struck at our forward air bases, no IAF plane took off to intercept the enemy and the air defence elements at our airfields were caught napping. All enemy air craft got back safely, leaving behind many destroyed on the Indian airfields. Evidently, the Army and the IAF were at different states of alert. During the Kargil war it took the IAF nearly three weeks to get its act together. This revived the 1962 suspicions all over again.
Obviously, in all this disconnect, there was no “single” guiding hand and central control. It has been a case of each to himself and with separate agendas. Can we still contend that the system has so far worked well and should continue! The truth is that, on many occasions, we came close to disaster because of this “disconnect”.
The usefulness of employing the IAF at Kargil has been adversely commented upon by Mr Amarinder Singh in his book, “A Ridge Too Far”. The engagement of targets along the high ridges at Kargil by our aircraft had its own problems: lack of joint training in army-air operations in high mountains, absence of a suitable aircraft for ground support operations, and to that was added the threat from the shoulder-fired Stringer missiles, forcing the aircraft to fly at great heights. There has been little joint training, leave alone joint planning and formulation of a doctrine for air-land battle. To offset to some extent the overwhelming preponderance of armour with the attacking force during “Ex-Brass Tacks”, as the defending commander, I was allotted an armed helicopter squadron from the IAF. Since the squadron was parked at the helidrome, next to my underground headquarters, I accompanied the flight commander on one of the missions to be horrified to see him engage own rather than the opposing tanks. The flight commander could not tell a T-72 tank from a Vijayanta.
Germany’s spectacular victories and rapid advances in Europe and the USSR during World War II were the result of close integration of mechanised forces and the Luftwaffe. It is a well-established fact that the highest profitable mobility is attained when air power, land and sea power are integrated. The ability of the aeroplane to operate on its own is limited. Ashley J. Tellis in his book, “Stability in South Asia”, purported to be a RAND Report prepared for the US army, writes, “If Pakistan initiates conflict, it has the advantage but only in a short war. If India initiates conflict it can surmount numerical but not operational deficiencies.” It goes on to record, “IAF does not contribute operationally. The Indian Navy is irrelevant except as a risk fleet.” The future national security set-up must be alive to the immense advantages accruing from the integration of the three services and the relevant place of each in the range of security threats to the country.
Ninetyfive per cent of the tasks of transport aircraft and helicopters with the IAF, during peace time and operations are related to the employment of the Army. Like most modern countries, the bulk of these assets should be a component of the ground forces or, at least, fully integrated with the appropriate ground forces element (Theatre Command). We are equally of the view, and which we projected to the Arun Singh Committee, that the Strategic Missile Group (Agni missile) should be an adjunct to the Strategic Air Command and that, to start with, we should set up a Strategic Naval Command for the islands (since ordered), a Northern Theatre Command and a Strategic Air Command. For Air Chief Marshal Mehra (retd) to claim that the Strategic Missile Command should be part of the IAF, because such is the practice in most other countries and be silent on the need for the IAF to shed most of the helicopter and transport assets to the Army, which is also the practice in those countries, is merely a case of cherry picking.
The lessons of high-tech wars of Iraq etc do not override the lessons of Kargil and the marching boot. The same success could not have attended the American effort, against a technologically capable or more determined opponent as it learnt to its discomfiture, in Vietnam. Therefore, India’s security parameters have to be seen in the peculiar nature of threats to it, and the measures and structures suitable to meet these.
After the 1971 war, Indira Gandhi had issued orders for creating the post of CDS (Manekshaw was to be the first CDS.) The then Defence Secretary, Mr B.K. Lal, along with Air Chief P.C. Lal, employing the “Yes Prime Minister” technique, sabotaged the instructions. Since then the IAF has persistently opposed this proposal. Surely, the IAF cannot hold national security to ransom. The proposal was finally watered down, and what emerged in 1985 was the Defence Planning Staff (DPS) which prepared policy papers nobody was interested in reading and became a parking slot for the officer who could not be usefully employed within the parent Service.
While the integration of the defence headquarters with the MoD is one part, the other is the setting up of a full-fledged and completely integrated CDS. The CDS concept is predicated on the premise of having integrated commands directly responsible to it. This would relieve the Service Chiefs of operational responsibilities and leave them free to concentrate on staff functions. The MoD, in its restructured and integrated form, should be divested of the internal management of the Services and should be concerned with issues of policy, planning, budgeting, procurement of major equipment, etc. The induction of Service officers in the restructured MoD will bring in the necessary technical expertise, improve and speed up the decision-making process.
In case this appointment is to be made rotational, the tenability between the Army and the two other Services should be in the ratio of 2:1:1. This has to be obviously so due to the size of the Army, its range of responsibilities and commitments and the nature of threats to national security.
Calumny and a whispering campaign of the most base type against the Defence Minister and Mr Arun Singh has been launched. Mr Jaswant Singh is perhaps the only politician to conceptualise national security in broader terms, encompassing geo-political and geo-strategic realities of the region. He has a deep understanding of Indian military history, the fundamentals of military power, its symbiotic relationship with economic, cultural, technological and foreign policy imperatives. Mr Arun Singh was the most successful Defence Minister with a clear grasp of national security issues and higher defence organisations, their potential and the ability to extract the maximum value from defence outlays. Attempts are being made to stall progress in the restructuring of the national defence set-up and in the process these two are being targeted as they are perceived to be the prime movers of this recasting of the national security model.
The writer, a retired Lieut-General, was the Deputy Chief of the Army Staff.
The Tribune
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