Bane of defence planning

Bane of defence planning
Synergy in spending is missing
by Lieut-Gen Harwant Singh (retd)

THE Budget allocation for defence for 2008-09 — Rs 105,600 crore — is 10 per cent higher than that for 2006-07. This amount may appear large, but considering the demands for the country’s security needs, it is insufficient. Equally, over the years, shortages have been piling up and modernisation was deferred. 

While the general inflation during the year may touch 5 per cent, in defence equipment it is generally one and a half to twice this figure. Add to this the fact that bureaucratic hassles seldom let acquisitions go through smoothly, and invariably a large amount lapses at the end of every financial year. 

The additional burden of the recommendations of the Sixth Pay Commission will further cut into the funds for capital expenditure for the year. The allocation in terms of the percentage of the GDP works out to less than 2.5 per cent. 

The bane of defence planning in India has been two-fold. One, there is no long-term joint defence planning encompassing all the three services and, two, no long-term assured financial support for defence is available. Nothing serves the latter assertion better than the Finance Minister’s palliative that, if required, more funds for defence will be made available. Ad-hocism is palpably obvious.
Admittedly, there are other compelling needs to be addressed. Abject poverty, illiteracy, abysmal state of health care, unemployment, etc, are the more pressing issues. However, it is the attitude and understanding of our political and intellectual elite which seem to be working under the assumption that progress and prosperity are not entirely inclusive of security and this then becomes an area of concern. 

Historically, too, we have never given national security the focus it demands. After Independence our attitude and policies have invariably ignored the need for strategic planning. However, the developments in the region, both in the fields of economics and security, will no more let an escapist attitude prevail; instead, there will be pressures of all kinds to create structures for strategic planning. 

In spite of limiting defence expenditure over the last 60 years, our economy has not been able to keep pace with many other countries whose baseline was much lower than ours at the start of this period. In fact, besides China, many other South Asian countries have left us behind by a wide margin. Even where allocations were as low as 1.8 per cent of the GDP as during the first 12 years of Independence and thereafter averaged between 2.3 per cent and 2.5 per cent, the economy moved at a painfully slow pace. It is the utilisation of the balance of 98.2-97.2 per cent of the GDP and the gains therefrom that merit a review and identifying pitfalls that have doggedly prevailed.
Unfortunately, defence expenditure on the procurement of equipment has been in terms of imports which have had a negative impact on the economy. Even that which is supplied by ordnance factories and defence PSUs has invariably been priced high, and the Services never got their money’s worth. Where the defence equipment is produced indigenously, the overall impact of defence expenditure on the economy is positive even if none of it is exported. In case the export of such equipment takes place, the impact is doubly positive. However, the national policies and the efforts of defence research and development (except, perhaps, for the Indian Navy) did not result in self-reliance and the country had to depend mostly on imports. Therefore, it has had a negative impact on economic growth, and we had to pay more for less. 

With the defence sector being opened up to private players and collaboration with foreign companies and technology tie-ups, the situation may improve to some extent, and here again competition is essential to keep the prices within reasonable limits. Even so, much of the profits will be taken away by the collaborators unless we quickly master the technologies and indigenise production.
India’s strategic vision must encompass its ambitions to become an economic power. It is essential to understand the need to create a secure environment for the fulfilment of such a lofty aim. To sustain the status of an economic power, the country will have to emerge as a regional military power and create peaceful conditions. In the field of national security, in all its facets, the doctrine of deterrence needs to be understood and capabilities to meet that end created. Development of deterrence is what will discourage adventurism by an adversary, have a sobering effect in the region and forestall any adverse situation for the country. 

There is the issue of judicious spending of financial allocations. Such spending and acquisition of new weapons, technologies and defence-related infrastructure have to be worked out to fit in the overall long-term strategic vision and security imperatives. In the absence of “jointness”, the Services tend to move along their own narrow tracks and are inclined to take a somewhat coloured view of the nature of future conflicts and their own role in these. Consequently, the capabilities thus built and infrastructure created could be disparate and unable to deliver the optimum dividend due to lack of synergy.

While the Prime Minister, the Defence Minister and every defence analyst pitches for the “jointness” or, in other words, the CDS system, the hold-up is inexplicable. Absence of unified and collective perceptions, prevalence of divergent strategic concepts and visualisation of the nature of future threats and long-term security needs remain blurred between the three Services. Consequently, all acquisitions are not fruitful and we don’t seem to get the bang we deserve for the buck we spend.
The army continues to be obsessed with the Western front and keeps arming itself as such, whereas the security environment and the demands of new challenges have undergone a paradigm shift. It is possible to set out many such examples. Equally, the pervasive tendencies of turf tending and lack of understanding of imperatives of other Services and the essence of naval power led a senior Air Force officer to project the view that the Indian Navy should do without aircraft carriers and the shore-based IAF assets can provide air support and air cover to the naval fleets! 

The issues of force structuring and equipment are related to the demands of the present, near future and long-term security requirements. Manpower can be adjusted as the demands shift or shrink, but equipment acquisitions, the infrastructure thus created and the overall capabilities cannot be realigned easily or in a reasonable time-frame. The assimilation and optimum exploitation of equipment take a couple of years and its life-span in our environment due to the paucity of funds and inability for early replacement could extend up to four decades.

The need for judicious use of financial allocations for defence cannot be over-emphasised. This can be possible only if there is long-term joint planning and assured financial support for such plans: at least covering five-year periods at a time. It is only under the CDS system that synergy and optimum utilisation of financial resources can create the most appropriate capabilities to face the security challenges of the future. The country cannot rise to a position of eminence in the international power play if the three Services have their own priorities, and joint planning, both in the acquisition of assets and operations, is missing.

http://www.tribuneindia.com/2008/20080317/edit.htm#4