Bane of defence planning

Bane of defence planning
Synergy in spending is missing
by Lieut-Gen Harwant Singh (retd)

THE Budget allocation for defence for 2008-09 — Rs 105,600 crore — is 10 per cent higher than that for 2006-07. This amount may appear large, but considering the demands for the country’s security needs, it is insufficient. Equally, over the years, shortages have been piling up and modernisation was deferred. 

While the general inflation during the year may touch 5 per cent, in defence equipment it is generally one and a half to twice this figure. Add to this the fact that bureaucratic hassles seldom let acquisitions go through smoothly, and invariably a large amount lapses at the end of every financial year. 

The additional burden of the recommendations of the Sixth Pay Commission will further cut into the funds for capital expenditure for the year. The allocation in terms of the percentage of the GDP works out to less than 2.5 per cent. 

The bane of defence planning in India has been two-fold. One, there is no long-term joint defence planning encompassing all the three services and, two, no long-term assured financial support for defence is available. Nothing serves the latter assertion better than the Finance Minister’s palliative that, if required, more funds for defence will be made available. Ad-hocism is palpably obvious.
Admittedly, there are other compelling needs to be addressed. Abject poverty, illiteracy, abysmal state of health care, unemployment, etc, are the more pressing issues. However, it is the attitude and understanding of our political and intellectual elite which seem to be working under the assumption that progress and prosperity are not entirely inclusive of security and this then becomes an area of concern. 

Historically, too, we have never given national security the focus it demands. After Independence our attitude and policies have invariably ignored the need for strategic planning. However, the developments in the region, both in the fields of economics and security, will no more let an escapist attitude prevail; instead, there will be pressures of all kinds to create structures for strategic planning. 

In spite of limiting defence expenditure over the last 60 years, our economy has not been able to keep pace with many other countries whose baseline was much lower than ours at the start of this period. In fact, besides China, many other South Asian countries have left us behind by a wide margin. Even where allocations were as low as 1.8 per cent of the GDP as during the first 12 years of Independence and thereafter averaged between 2.3 per cent and 2.5 per cent, the economy moved at a painfully slow pace. It is the utilisation of the balance of 98.2-97.2 per cent of the GDP and the gains therefrom that merit a review and identifying pitfalls that have doggedly prevailed.
Unfortunately, defence expenditure on the procurement of equipment has been in terms of imports which have had a negative impact on the economy. Even that which is supplied by ordnance factories and defence PSUs has invariably been priced high, and the Services never got their money’s worth. Where the defence equipment is produced indigenously, the overall impact of defence expenditure on the economy is positive even if none of it is exported. In case the export of such equipment takes place, the impact is doubly positive. However, the national policies and the efforts of defence research and development (except, perhaps, for the Indian Navy) did not result in self-reliance and the country had to depend mostly on imports. Therefore, it has had a negative impact on economic growth, and we had to pay more for less. 

With the defence sector being opened up to private players and collaboration with foreign companies and technology tie-ups, the situation may improve to some extent, and here again competition is essential to keep the prices within reasonable limits. Even so, much of the profits will be taken away by the collaborators unless we quickly master the technologies and indigenise production.
India’s strategic vision must encompass its ambitions to become an economic power. It is essential to understand the need to create a secure environment for the fulfilment of such a lofty aim. To sustain the status of an economic power, the country will have to emerge as a regional military power and create peaceful conditions. In the field of national security, in all its facets, the doctrine of deterrence needs to be understood and capabilities to meet that end created. Development of deterrence is what will discourage adventurism by an adversary, have a sobering effect in the region and forestall any adverse situation for the country. 

There is the issue of judicious spending of financial allocations. Such spending and acquisition of new weapons, technologies and defence-related infrastructure have to be worked out to fit in the overall long-term strategic vision and security imperatives. In the absence of “jointness”, the Services tend to move along their own narrow tracks and are inclined to take a somewhat coloured view of the nature of future conflicts and their own role in these. Consequently, the capabilities thus built and infrastructure created could be disparate and unable to deliver the optimum dividend due to lack of synergy.

While the Prime Minister, the Defence Minister and every defence analyst pitches for the “jointness” or, in other words, the CDS system, the hold-up is inexplicable. Absence of unified and collective perceptions, prevalence of divergent strategic concepts and visualisation of the nature of future threats and long-term security needs remain blurred between the three Services. Consequently, all acquisitions are not fruitful and we don’t seem to get the bang we deserve for the buck we spend.
The army continues to be obsessed with the Western front and keeps arming itself as such, whereas the security environment and the demands of new challenges have undergone a paradigm shift. It is possible to set out many such examples. Equally, the pervasive tendencies of turf tending and lack of understanding of imperatives of other Services and the essence of naval power led a senior Air Force officer to project the view that the Indian Navy should do without aircraft carriers and the shore-based IAF assets can provide air support and air cover to the naval fleets! 

The issues of force structuring and equipment are related to the demands of the present, near future and long-term security requirements. Manpower can be adjusted as the demands shift or shrink, but equipment acquisitions, the infrastructure thus created and the overall capabilities cannot be realigned easily or in a reasonable time-frame. The assimilation and optimum exploitation of equipment take a couple of years and its life-span in our environment due to the paucity of funds and inability for early replacement could extend up to four decades.

The need for judicious use of financial allocations for defence cannot be over-emphasised. This can be possible only if there is long-term joint planning and assured financial support for such plans: at least covering five-year periods at a time. It is only under the CDS system that synergy and optimum utilisation of financial resources can create the most appropriate capabilities to face the security challenges of the future. The country cannot rise to a position of eminence in the international power play if the three Services have their own priorities, and joint planning, both in the acquisition of assets and operations, is missing.

http://www.tribuneindia.com/2008/20080317/edit.htm#4 

Conscription need not be the solution

Conscription need not be the solution
by Harwant Singh

For a long time there has been a deficiency of eleven to twelve thousand officers in the Indian army. In a country plagued by endemic unemployment, such large deficiencies can only be explained in terms of the unattractiveness of military service in India. Since independence, the politico-bureaucratic combine have been working over time to render military service worthless and consequently it has become the very last option for the youth.

Both in terms of pay and status, the military has been brought down, in a sustained and systematic manner, and it has now hit rock bottom. On its part, the military has been pleading, both with the government and successive pay commissions, for a fair dispensation for the troops and officers in the defence forces, but to no avail.

In a desperate attempt the military tried to avail the services of an advertising agency, at a huge cost, to show case a career in the military, but this too seems to have drawn a blank. The fact is that no advertising agency can whitewash the obvious drawbacks of a career in the Indian military. Because no informed and discerning person can possibly miss the unenviable position in which the military has been placed. 

Therefore, as a last option, the army chief has fielded the idea of conscription to meet the shortfall. His concern is on two counts. One, endemic shortage in the officer cadre and second, those already in it want to troop out in large numbers. He could not have gone public on the issue without coming to the conclusion, after meeting failure on all fronts (government and successive pay commissions ) that there will continue to be lack of volunteers and that the only option left is conscription.
Considering constraints of training facilities, not more than two thousand per year would be conscripted, which for India is not even a drop in the ocean. However in a liberal democracy, the very idea of conscription does not appeal. Yet national security is not something that can be outsourced!

It is essential to know as to why suitable young men are not willing to join the military and those already in it want to leave in large numbers. There are far too many disadvantages, such as poor promotion prospects, inadequate pay and allowances, early retirement, long periods in non family stations in remote and uncongenial environments with attendant medical problems, running two establishments, disturbance in children’s education, risk to life in an unending fight against insurgents and all the other travails, attendant to life in the Indian military. All these can be clubbed under what may be called the ‘ X’ factor, which has to be duly compensated. Even glamour has gone out of military service.

Consider this. Only at the threat of resignation, were the service chiefs able to get, ‘running pay band’ for their officers as a compensation for extremely limited promotion avenues and early retirement etc, from the Fourth Pay Commission. The same with rank pay, in addition to basic pay, upto the rank of brigadier. Through a sleight of hand the rank pay was deducted from the basic pay, bringing these officers back to square one. The Fifth Pay Commission went the whole hog to further disadvantage the services.

This then is how the defence forces of the country have been dealt with by successive Pay Commissions with the tacit support from the government. No wonder the shortages, lower standards of intake not withstanding, persist. There is near exodus from the army and the IAF. Therefore, the question, who will soldier for the country!

During our meeting with the PM at Punjab Raj Bhavan, when I pointed out to him that inspite of promises from the President down to the defence minister for grant of ‘one rank one pension,’ only the other ranks upto havaldars have been given some monetary increase in their pension whereas JCOs and officers have been left out.

He was completely surprised. Since then JCOs have been given increase in their pension but officers have been again left in the cold; their case to be dealt by the Sixth Pay Commission. There is no defence services officer on the Sixth Pay Commission nor any one on the staff for the preparation of the report. 

There have been serious problems in the management of the officer cadre, be cause of its pyramidal structure, which is a service imperative. But any further tampering with it, by increasing numbers in the higher ranks, will be detrimental to the service. There is a strong case to enlarge the short service cadre and on completion of 5 years service there should be assured induction into state and central police, civil services and or professional training institutions, depending on qualifications, choice and suitability. There should be a statutory provision to this end. Such a course would be more in keeping with democratic values rather than conscription and at the same time resolve the perennial problem of cadre management and shortages. 

The rank and file in the military is equally if not more disadvantaged than the officer cadre. There are no shortages because of unemployment in the country. Even here the better material goes to state police, CPOs and other government avenues and only the left over seeks entry into military.
A soldier retires at the age of 34 to 38 years. There is no alternate job for him. His pension, because of lesser length of service and 33 years conditionality works out to less than half of that of a peon from the government. He is the same soldier to whom the PM gave the award of ‘Indian of the year’ at the NDTV award ceremony, only a few days earlier!

Responding to the army chiefs loud thinking on the issue of conscription, the defence minister stressed the need to create more facilities and better pay packets to make a job in the defence services more attractive rather than resort to conscription. Such false promises have been made by the politicians in the past as well. Perhaps Mr Antony is of a different genre.


http://www.tribuneindia.com/2008/20080128/edit.htm#7

Revamp the DRDO

Cut its size and retain the best
by Lt-Gen (retd) Harwant Singh

For a long time, it has been the contention of the armed forces that all is not well with the DRDO. There has been a demand for a science audit of its working. If you are a self-respecting and a proud Indian then at every Republic Day Parade your national pride must take a dip, because almost all of the military equipment on display – after over five decades of effort at self-reliance, indigenous development and production – is imported.

A thorough revamp and review of DRDO has finally been ordered by the Government. The credit for bringing this much delayed action must go to the Parliamentary Committee on Defence.
The sad story is that even after 58 years of effort, the state of the Defence Technology and Industrial Base is such that indigenous development of weapons and equipment capability continues to elude us and India remains the largest importer of defence equipment in the world.
We import even low technology equipment such as rifles (1,00,000 in 1993-94 and even later) snow clothing items, bullet proof jackets, and of course UAVs, tanks, guns, aircraft, anti-tank missiles, a range of other missiles, radars – the list is endless, because the efforts by the DRDO to develop these have been unsuccessful.

The DRDO budget has been 5 to 6 per cent of the defence budget with allocations for major projects such as LCA, Arjun tank, Integrated Guided Missile Development Programme (IGMDP), Advanced Technical Vehicle etc being over and above this budgeted figure. Much of this amount has gone into lavish civil works, seven star messes and foreign tours. There is absolutely no accountability in this organisation. While various projects have shown little or no progress, the project managers have continued to move up the promotion ladder.

There has been little understanding and mutual confidence between the DRDO and the users – the defence services. The DRDO has never spelt out its technological status in relation to the equipment to be developed or any of the necessary defence technologies. With the result the GSQRs (General Staff Qualitative Requirements – features and performance parameters of the desired equipment/weapon system) is prepared without proper interaction with the DRDO, and consequently is pitched higher than the latter’s technological potential. The DRDO never sought the scaling down of the GSQRs to a level which it can handle, in the full knowledge and belief that the project can be dragged on endlessly and that no one will be called upon to account.

Once the GSQR is in its hand, a closed-door activity commences with no further interaction with the users. This lack of interaction with the user during the developmental stage is best illustrated in the case of tank-tracks for the Arjun tank. The head of the then DRDO was a specialist in metallurgy and insisted on fitting the Arjun with an aluminum alloy track; perhaps with a view to reduce the weight.

Now even a grade 3 tank driver would have told him that a 50 ton (Arjun turned out to be nearly 60 tons) tank with a 1400 HP engine moving at high speed and taking sharp turns in rough terrain will rip open an aluminum alloy track. But we wasted more than 3 years and incurred much expenditure before this simple realisation dawned and finally a steel alloy track had to be imported.

There are innumerable other examples of such disconnect between the users and the DRDO. There have been efforts to develop systems where DRDO had no expertise whatsoever. Engines for the Arjun tank and the LCA are ready examples. In the case of Arjun, the development of the engine could have been outsourced to one of the country’s leading diesel engine manufacturers, instead of doing years of experimentation at a huge cost, ending in complete failure.

The DRDO in stand-alone mode has achieved little and will not be able to meet the future needs of the armed forces. It has shown little capability in even reverse engineering of comparatively simple equipment. It needs to have a strategic tie-up with the R&D of some advanced country.

This realisation dawned on the government and it formed an inter-governmental commission for military technology cooperation with the Russian government and later with some others for joint development of cutting-edge defence technologies. Cooperation in military technologies between two or more entities is the business of sharing and building on strengths of each other.

Given the present state of talent in the DRDO, it will turn out to be a one-sided affair ending in, essentially, transfer of technology and the attendant cost. Perhaps down-sizing and restructuring of DRDO has become unavoidable.

If the newly formed committee for recommending changes in DRDO is to make a positive impact on the future indigenous development of defence technologies, production of defence equipment within the country and export of defence equipment, it need to consider these measures:
Close down those establishments of DRDO which are busy re-inventing the wheel, and those whose tasks can best be done in the private sector; down size the DRDO and retain only the best talent. Offer VRS to the dead wood with which the DRDO is packed to the brim; do away with most of the Defence Ordnance Factories.

Restructure the MoD as an integrated organization consisting of bureaucrats, defence services staff, scientists and financial experts for better coordination, cutting out duplication and triplication of work, improved efficiency, speedy decision making, integrated defence planning and defence technology development.

Implement the Arun Singh Committee report as accepted by the cabinet and adopt the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) system. Place DRDO with the CDS for mutual confidence and better interaction with the services; bring about accountability at every level; where required, get foreign technical experts to work in India; make service in the DRDO really attractive.



http://www.tribuneindia.com/2007/20070319/edit.htm#6

Chiding the chiefs

Political leaders have undermined military morale
by Lt. Gen (retd) Harwant Singh

Both Jawaharlal Nehru and Krishna Menon were known to be impolite and in fact abrasive in dealing with the higher command of the military. They took little note of their advice on strategic issues, which finally led to the military high command becoming reticent. There occurred a yawning gap in the inter-action between them and the political executive. This was to eventually lead to the 1962 debacle with China and national humiliation.

Jaswant Singh’s upbraiding of the Chief of Army Staff on the latter’s clarifications during a TV interview on the Chinese patrols crossing the Line of Actual Control (LAC ) along the Tibet border is nothing new. Political leaders, even when holding positions in government, often indulge in criticising serving chiefs.

They are quite oblivious of the effect it would have on future interaction with the chiefs and of course the fall out on morale and discipline of the defence services. Jaswant comes from a family with a strong military tradition and is a former military officer from a famous cavalry regiment. Above all, he has been a defence minister. Therefore, his using intemperate language against the COAS for saying nothing more than what his minister said on the issue, is rather inexplicable.
When at a press briefing, during the mobilisation of the Indian defence forces, consequent to the attack on the Indian Parliament, the then COAS, General Padmanabhan., responding to a searching question from the press on the possible use of nuclear weapons by an opponent, gave an unambiguous, forthright and pointed reply.

It was entirely in line with the ‘Indian Nuclear Doctrine’ as spelled out in the document on the subject, prepared by the National Security Advisory Board (NSAB). The document is unclassified and in the public domain. More over, the Defence Minister himself had aired similar views a few days earlier Yet the Defence Minister, George Fernandes, went ahead to chide him and term his handling of the subject at the press conference as ‘cavalier.’

One cannot help but recall the earlier sordid and disgraceful act of sacking of the Naval Chief by the government, consequent to the machinations by the then defence secretary (who himself was severely indicted by the Delhi High Court in another case), and the gross mishandling of the case by George Fernandes.

But the present Defence Minister, A.K. Antony, is surely of a different genre. Yet he too thought no better of rebuking the naval chief on the latter’s objecting to Russia substantially jacking up the already agreed upon price, and paid for in 2004, for the Gorshkov aircraft carrier being refitted in Russia. The aircraft carrier is now expected to be delivered in 2011 instead of 2008, the date earlier agreed upon.

Obviously, our political class is not schooled in the handling of such delicate matters and the possible fallout, on the rank and file, of their publicly denigrating the service chiefs.
No wonder an army commander openly flouts his chief ’s orders and refuses to accept his posting, from one army command to another, kicking up much dust in the process. Therefore, when a TV anchor, at prime time, with two major-generals (Ashok Metha and Afzal Karim) in attendance, commenting on the dust kicked up by the army commander under reference, called the Chief of the Army Staff as ‘Thief of the Army Staff,’ it came as no surprise.

Military ethos does not permit even the ticking-off an appointment holder in the presence of his command, no matter how high-ranking an officer or dignitary attempting to do so may be. This public rebuke of the Chief of the Army Staff gravely undermines his position.

In reply to another question, in the same interview, General Padmanabhan quite rightly brought out the fact that keeping the morale of the army high was his business. With his own position discredited by his Minister, he would have found it difficult to sustain the morale of troops.
The place of the Chief of Army Staff is unique in the military scheme of things and he must be seen, by his officers and men, as infallible and beyond reproach. Any attempt to openly denigrate him is bound to seriously compromise his position and adversely affect the implicit faith and confidence the Service must have in him.

Admittedly the Indian political class, unlike in most other countries, has no military background or schooling in good manners, but self-education on matters military is possible; definitely by the defence minister, at the very least.

This brings us to the issue of service chiefs airing their views on issues directly related to their job and troops. When the British government decided to send troops for the invasion of Iraq, to join American forces, the Chief of Defence Staff of Britain, Sir Michael Boyce demanded an unequivocal statement from his government that the invasion of Iraq was lawful.

The armed forces were given an assurance that the conflict would not be illegal. Without it, Boyce felt, “his troops could have laid themselves open to charges of war crimes.” In India, the COAS asking for such an assurance from the Government before moving troops to Sri Lanka would have kicked up a storm.

Finally, Winston Churchill, speaking on the subject said: “The Indian Army is not so much an arm of the executive branch, as it is of the Indian people. Military professionals have the duty and obligation to ensure that the people and political leaders are counselled and alerted to the needs and necessities of military life. This cannot be done by adhering to the notion of the military profession as a silent order of monks isolated from the political realm.” 


http://www.tribuneindia.com/2008/20080328/edit.htm#6 

Why deterrence never worked

A classic case of diminishing returns
Harwant Singh

The decision of the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) presumably on the advice of the National Security Advisory Board (NASB — an unwieldy and poorly constituted body) to pull back the troops from the border has not come a day too soon. Continued deployment of troops in their battle locations had come to serve no useful purpose and was, in fact, turning into a case of diminishing returns. It is, perhaps, the time to analyse the effectiveness of our coercive diplomacy and deployment of defence forces to deter Pakistan from carrying out cross-border terrorism. How far were the objectives achieved? Was the very idea of deterrence, in the given situation, flawed? 

However, it may be recalled that in a lead article, “Dithering on deterrence” dated February 4, 2002, we had pointed out that “We can now fight the ‘war of lists’ of wanted personnel... and learn to live with cross-border terrorism.... We lacked resources, but more the vision and the will to create a powerful military which could put the fear of Allah into Pakistan and make it desist from continuing with proxy war against India,” which it engineered right from the eighties; starting with Punjab.
The initial decision to mobilise the defence services and their deployment for an offensive, consequent to the terrorist attack on Indian Parliament on December 13, 2001, was more a knee-jerk reaction than a part of a well thought-out and thought-through strategy . After all, India had been suffering unending cross-border terrorist attacks in J and K for close to 12 years. It was more the lack of suffering understanding of what could constitute coercive diplomacy and military deterrence and their synergy in the given circumstances that could result in a coherent and purposeful outcome. The so-called economic sanctions imposed on Pakistan, the denial of Indian airspace to civil flights, withdrawal of staff from our High Commission etc had no effect on its economy, nor was there any appreciable diplomatic fallout, nor were the operations of Pakistan Airlines seriously hampered. But a reciprocal action by that country for our civil flights denied us direct access to Kabul at a critical juncture when the future of Afghanistan was being reshaped and Indian help and presence had become essential. Though we do reach out to Kabul, but only by a circuitous route. While we removed the restrictions on Pakistani civil flights, the counter-restrictions continue for reasons to keep us as much out of the Kabul picture as possible.

The dictionary meaning of coercion implies that it must restrain by force, and consequently coercive policy must have the power to coerce. Similarly, deterrence must have the means to frighten, hinder, or prevent the opponent from doing something you do not want him to do. In simpler terms, it means that the one resorting to deterrence must have, not only the necessary wherewithal to apply a credible force, which when applied would inflict unacceptable damage on the opponent but also the essential will to do so. It must carry conviction with the one on whom deterrence is focused. In the event the desired corrections in the policies and actions etc of the opponent does not come about, consequent to the application of deterrence, then the manifestation of the application of force would undeniably surface. The entire gambit of mobilisation and deployment of Indian defence forces must be looked through the prism of these elementary features of deterrence and its application. Mere resort to rhetoric, such as, “proactive policy”, “zero tolerance,” “ruthlessly dealing with terrorists,” “Aar par ki Larrai,” etc had failed to impress Pakistan. Therefore, it had convinced itself that the Indian leadership lacked the essential will to act firmly for one, and it did not have the necessary military superiority to severely punish Pakistan. While it may not be unreasonable to assume that Pakistan banked on the international community to refrain India from attacking, it depended more on its own ability to last out well, an Indian offensive.

Nearly a decade and a half of starving of the Indian defence forces of essential funds had substantially debilitated its offensive potential. Not only was modernisation given a goby, even replacement of obsolete and obsolescent equipment could not be carried out. Building up of necessary stocks of reserves of ammunition and other war-like stores up to minimum acceptable levels had not been possible. All this could not be lost on our adversaries. The addition of 320, state of the art T-80 tanks to Pakistan’s inventory, along with a whole range of other equipment in the early 1990s, vastly improved its potential to stall a possible Indian ground offensive. On the other hand, the Indian position saw only a downward slide due to the aging of existing holdings of equipment and want of replacement of wastages due to normal wear and tear.

While the IAF, as always, enjoyed marked superiority over the PAF, the unremitting frequency with which its frontline MiG-21 aircraft have been falling out of the sky threw up a range of unhelpful signals.

The Indian Navy has long been a neglected service. To offset the Indian superiority in tanks, aircraft, ground troops etc, Pakistan depends more on their counters in way of anti-tank, anti-aircraft capabilities and firepower etc. The essential information about most armies, down to units and their equipment profiles, is available in various international publications. So Pakistan, as also we, have been aware of each other’s military capabilities.

These unfortunate ground realities could not, as some of us expected, frighten Pakistan out of its wits once the Indian deployment for an offensive was put in place. In fact, General Pervez Musharraf made bold to declare that there was balance of power in South Asia. Consequently crossborder terrorism continued unabated, with the normal fluctuation in its frequency and intensity. When the attack on the families of Indian soldiers at Kaluchack took place and the Indian cup of patience at last seemed to overflow and our offensive appeared imminent, some of us who saw on TV, the discomfiture of General Pervez Musharraf felt that, at last, the military deterrence was having the desired effect, but any right-thinking Indian too was equally perturbed at the prospects of a war.

Around that time Pakistan’s representative at the UN had talked rather irresponsibly, of the certainty of use of nuclear weapons by his country, in the event of an Indian offensive. This posturing by Pakistan in itself had brought added pressure from the USA for reigning-in the jehadi elements operating in J and K, as also a possible threat of “taking out” of Pakistan’s nuclear capability, seemed to work. Viewed from this angle, the June, 2002, speech of General Musharraf can be rationalised. As time passed and there appeared no gains from the continued deployment of the Indian defence forces and no facesaving device appeared viable, General Musharraf was constrained to remark that it was not for him to provide the same. Finally, the successful conclusion of elections in J and K provided the figleaf and the much needed escape route for withdrawal of troops.

The nuclear factor had come into play in the nineties itself, as Pakistan was known to have covert capability in this field. At least on two previous occasions, it had threatened to use nuclear weapons to thwart a possible Indian offensive and the same had, in that country’s perception, worked. Therefore, at the initial stages of troop deployment in December, 2001, the Indian concern centred on the nuclear capability of Pakistan and the prospects of use of nuclear weapons by that country were factored into Indian calculations. However, a more detailed analysis by some of the defence experts (‘Military Build-up on Indo-Pak Border’ The Tribune dated January 16, 2002) obviously appeared to have resolved the Indian dilemma and made clear the fact that Pakistan would not risk taking recourse to such an action as it would certainly result in the decimation of that country.

Once Pakistan acquired the covert nuclear capability as a hedge against the so-called Indian military superiority, it was time for this country to think afresh and recast and redefine her strategic thinking. There was the need to reorient and realign defence policies and military strategy. Instead, our political leadership and the top brass in the defence services continued to prepare for the last war and that too half heartedly. We ought to have shifted the focus of our priorities to another area, which not only met our immediate concerns but also our long-term strategic security requirements. However, we continued to think in terms of more tanks, heavy guns, self propelled guns etc. While the Arun Singh Committee was quick to grasp the need for this reorientation, the more hidebound top brass continues to display rigidity in its thinking and resistance to change.

Mobilisation of the armed forces and their move back to the barracks, consumption of fuel, compensation for crop damaged, dislocation of over a million people, etc, would perhaps work out to nearly Rs 10000 crore. Large tracts of the border have been mined. Demining of the areas could lead to more casualties and most of the mines would be unsafe for future handling and will need to be replaced. Expensive equipment exposed to the elements would have suffered deterioration. Some of the highly secret troop dispositions have been revealed. Above all, deterrence as such is less likely to work in the future. All this failed to achieve any worthwhile results.

Finally, the elections in J and K and the formation of a new government there is not likely to bring about a sea change in the situation in that state as it relates to cross-border terrorism. The developments in Pakistan, more so the emergence of MMA as a political force in the crucial provinces does not augur well for that country, but more so for peace in J and K. India has to be prepared for the long haul. While we retain, nay enhance, out capabilities to deal firmly with cross-border terrorism in J and K, there should be no aversion to entering into a comprehensive dialogue with Pakistan on all issues, even if cross-border terrorism is not completely terminated. 

— The writer is a retired Lt-General.


http://www.tribuneindia.com/2002/20021109/edit.htm#4

The Siachen saga

The Siachen saga

Lieut-Gen Harwant Singh (retd) tells about the capture of Pakistani post Quaid in Siachen

The Saltoro range in Siachen glacier

THE conflict at Siachen appears to be coming to an end. While we await the closure of the Siachen chapter, one of the greatest feats of endurance, sacrifice and valour played out at those impossible heights and in terrible weather conditions, need recalling.

In April 1984, India occupied passes on the Saltoro to pre-empt Pakistan from doing so. Eventually, we had to occupy almost every peak to deny Pakistani troops from occupying the same. However, Pakistan discovered a vertical cliff the Indians had not occupied and which could only be scaled with the use of ropes and occupied it.

This rocky outcrop was at 21,153 feet and Pakistan named the post, "Quaid". Firing from this post on an Indian helicopter which was evacuating casualties damaged it and killed two soldiers and injured the third occupant. So the removal of Quaid became imperative.

A patrol consisting of one officer, one junior commissioned officer and seven jawans set out to find a route to Quaid along the rock face and ice walls and to obtain information concerning the post. Operating at night, it climbed the icefall forming the north face of the post and fixed the ropes for the attack group. The enemy at Quaid got alerted.

The officer leading the patrol decided to move forward but came under heavy fire. Four jawans and the officer were killed. The remaining four retraced their steps. One of them later died of wounds. At a great cost to itself the patrol did a commendable job in fixing the ropes and bringing back valuable information about the post.

A force of 60 volunteers was assembled to tackle Quaid. There is a saying, "never volunteer in the army". Yet even for the most dangerous tasks or near suicide missions, there are always some who do volunteer.

During 1971 war with Pakistan, my regiment was to send one half of it strength (around 25 tanks) deep into a sensitive sector of the enemy, inviting on itself a major enemy reaction. There was no coming back and it was a ‘do and die’ mission. The commanding officer assembled the troops and his officers, about 400 of them and briefly spoke of the mission and the expected casualties. He touched on the soldier’s ‘dharma’ and his duty. He talked of the regimental tradition and generations of men and officers who had so loyally served the regiment’s cause and were now focused on our actions at this hour of trial. He explained the essence of the regimental motto, that is, ‘Fortitude and Valour.’

With his riding crop he drew a line on the ground and asked 120 volunteers to cross over. For five or six seconds nothing happened. An eternity seems to pack itself into those momentous moments. Then, in firm steps, the troops crossed that line as one body; all 400 of them. Coming back to Quaid, the attacking troops had to move at night over dangerous terrain and were to be out in the open, without shelter, for nearly 96 hours in that bitter cold.

Ropes fixed by the earlier patrol could not be located due to heavy snowfall but daylight attempt revealed these. As the assaulting troops climbed to the top, enemy opened fire and the troops had to fall back to spend another day in the open.

Next a JCO and six soldiers inched forward towards ‘Quaid.’ and attacked with grenades and small arms. In the process, some soldiers were killed and the radio operator rolled down on the enemy side of the mountain. The attack had come to a halt.

Then another party led by junior commissioned officer Bana Singh, moving along a different and dangerous route closed in and threw grenades at ‘Quaid’. Some Pakistanis ran out of the bunker and attacked them.

There followed hand-to-hand fighting along slippery slopes. Some were bayoneted and in this melee, a few from both sides slipped and fell a few 100 feet to their death. Bana Singh and his remaining men took the post and cut the ropes to Quaid used by Pakistani troops to maintain the post. Quaid was finally in Indian hands. The bodies of the Indian officer and his patrol were recovered. The captured post was named, ‘Bana;’ after Naib Subedar Bana Singh who led the final assault. He was later awarded the Param Vir Chakra, the highest gallantry award of the mission.

While the war at Siachen, hopefully ends soon, the great deeds of valour, heroism and the stories of triumph of the human spirit over impossible odds, will be recounted for a long time.

http://www.tribuneindia.com/2006/20060716/spectrum/main4.htm

Fighting a ‘limited war’

It is a flawed concept
by Lt-Gen Harwant Singh (retd)

IT is not clear as to when the idea or the concept of a “limited war” was first evolved and articulated. Maybe it was the fallout from the procrastination, dithering and timidity in our response and an alibi for the missed opportunity of a suitable riposte to a major mischief by Pakistan at Kargil. Such response would have put an end to the slow-bleeding of India by Pakistan. Or was it the result of the fiasco of “Operation Parakaram” (mobilisation of Indian defence forces consequent to the attack on Indian Parliament) where we thought we could go in for a limited war and then backtracked on conjuring up the prospects of a larger conflagration?

It takes a minimum of two contestants to make war. Therefore, both must subscribe to the idea of a limited war. It cannot work when one of the contestants does and the other does not fall for it. Then there is the issue of both scale and duration of the conflict. Here again there is the problem of the two adopting the same concept and course of action. There is also the hazardous undertaking of forecasting and then chartering the future course of a war and preparing for just that one contingency. 

It is easy to start a war but difficult to conclude it on own terms. The German army, after nearly two decades of study, planning and preparation and detailed knowledge of every inch of the ground over which operations were to be conducted, prepared the Schlieffen Plan and catered for no other contingency. With over 350 army divisions, it undertook to over-run France in 40 days during World War I. The war lasted four years with disastrous consequences for Germany. The American war in Afghanistan is a case in point.

The second issue relates to a conflict between two nuclear-armed contestants. The parameters and compulsions for either side to transcend from a conventional war to a nuclear war are not that simple or easy to overcome. A whole range of considerations and possible consequences come into play, especially if the opponent has the wherewithal, the will and the capacity to completely devastate and lay waste the whole country. Consequently, in such a setting, the conflict will remain within the bounds of conventional warfare. Then there is the inevitable issue of reaching a stage (also sometimes called “threshold”) where the very survival, nay the existence, of the nation comes into play when a fatal decision to go in for the nuclear option can be considered. Sooner than later, world pressure is likely to prevail in ending the conflict.

Coming to the specifics of the Indo-Pak setting, neither side is willing to concede territory. This has led to extensive obstacles being created by both sides close to the border and these are effectively held. Consequently, major battles will be conducted within a few kilometres on either side of the border. Such was the case in 1965 and 1971 on the western sector. That has been and will remain the dominant reality of a conflict between these two neighbours. It is here along the plains of J and K and Punjab where the centre of gravity of the two countries lie, more so of Pakistan, and it is here that decisive battles, if and when they occur, will be fought.

The second and more important issue relates to meshing together the military and political aims of a war. These two cannot work in isolation or exclusion of one from the other. Clausewitz records that “war is continuation of policy”, but there has to be a “policy” to carry forward to war. Sometimes there can be a conflict or variance between the policy and the war aim. In such situations, it is the bounden duty of the military commander to lay bare before those who formulate national policy the full implications of pursuing a war which is at variance with military aim.

If in the opinion of the military commander, he is compelled to adopt a course other than what is in the national interest and the interest of his army, he should quietly make way for someone else. Had the then Army Chief in 1962 told some home-truths about the state of his Army and military infrastructure and offered to quit, the political leadership would have seen the reality and India could have been spared that humiliation and the Army the ignominy of a rout.

There are indeed innumerable instances where military commanders were able to carry their point and they proved eminently correct. The Russian army was required to defend Moscow against Napoleon’s advance. The Czar and his entourage insisted that the city must be defended. But, purely from the strategic military angle, Marshal Kutozov thought otherwise. Withstanding enormous pressure from the Czar and others, Kutozov did not defend Moscow and in the process saved Russia, its army and eventually brought about complete destruction of Napoleon’s army. During the invasion of Europe in World War II (Operation Overlord), as a political decision, the governments of the United States and Britain decided to keep “Strategic Air Command” outside the command of Eisenhower; the Supreme Commander of Operation Overlord. Eisenhower told them that in which case he would have to find someone else for command purposes.

As at Kargil, Pakistan had a distinct tactical advantage in its offensive at Chamb during 1965. Consequently, the Army Chief impressed upon the then Prime Minister the imperatives of wresting the initiative and opening another front against Pakistan across the international border and obtained his clearance for the same, though politically no one wanted a full-scale war. This was at a time when Pakistan enjoyed marked superiority in armour (qualitatively and quantitatively), and our edge in infantry and artillery was only marginal. In a span of just two weeks India was able to bring about the destruction of Pakistan’s armour and much else.

In 197,1 the political compulsions and the policy demand was to march into East Pakistan in May-June to relieve the unbearable pressure of influx of millions of refugees. The strategic military compulsions were quite different. The Army Chief had become the subject of a malicious whispering campaign. When the then Prime Minister told him that she was under great pressure from her Cabinet to march the Army into East Pakistan, Manekshaw told her that he could resign if that would help her. She had to then orchestrate diplomatic moves to gain international support, etc.
Weigh this against the meeting on May 18, 1999, where the Service Chiefs meekly accepted the orders from the PS to the Prime Minister (not the Prime Minister) without a whimper, detailing the defence forces not to use air power and permitting “hot-pursuit” of the enemy, only in the area of the ingress! Thus driving troops into suicidal frontal attacks up those impossible heights and slopes over a terrain where fire support was so much less effective.

It was left to a Pakistani brigadier to spell out through a newspaper article the course the Indian Army should have adopted rather than bash its head against the Kargil heights and suffer avoidable heavy casualties, thus discrediting generalship. In times of war the top military leader bears an enormous responsibility both to the nation and his army. He must fearlessly and forcefully advice the government on strategic military compulsions, and where he fails to carry his point he must act according to his own light and conscience. 

http://www.tribuneindia.com/2010/20100803/edit.htm#4

Dangers of Dantewada

Groping in the dark proving costly
by Lt-Gen Harwant Singh (retd)

THE massacre at Dantewada was not only a great tragedy but possibly an event of far-reaching consequences. The scale of the tragedy is dismaying. The fact that the police party was ill trained, lacked coordination with local police and poorly led is an issue which needs no elaboration, but the larger issue is the state of Central Police Organisations (CPOs).

Why the CRPF with a strength of 210 battalions depend on the military for training when by now they should have had, along with other CPOs like the BSF, the ITBP, etc.) their own training schools? The higher hierarchy in this and other CPOs have no ground level experience in counter-insurgency operations. Small wonder, there is little central policy or doctrine and no accountability.

The government seems to be groping in the dark. One proposal is to raise another police force exclusively to deal with Maoists. Another one is to shift some RR units from Jammu and Kashmir for this task and/or raise more RR units. Equally weird is the idea to induct Remotely Piloted Planes to locate Maoists in thick jungles and much else. Yet another is to have a Central body to control and co-ordinate all anti-Maoist operations in the Red Corridor. 

Shifting RR battalions from J&K appears unlikely. If new units are raised, their command and control will have to rest with the military. So, willy-nilly army will get sucked into anti-Maoist operations. The Army’s hands are already more than full and landing it with this additional commitment will have serious implications for national security. Placing these units under the CRPF control will not work.

The CPOs often operate in companies and not as full units and there lies a serious drawback This arrangement creates functional problems in command and control, performance and cohesiveness. There is little unit spirit when companies operate in mixed groups and can seldom meet serious challenges. Such an arrangement may work in duties at election times, but combating insurgency is a different ballgame.
The ease with which Maoists have been raiding prisons, police stations, taking away police weapons and attacking CPO camps does not speak well of the morale of the police. There is little motivation and leadership appears indifferent. For the Centre to pass the buck to states will not wash because higher leadership of the state police is from the Central cadre so also that of CPOs. It is no more a mere law and order case. The Home Minister may, as a first step, bring in accountability of higher police set-up: much else will, thereafter, fall in place.

As for naming of these CPOs as ‘paramilitary’, there is nothing about them that even remotely resembles the military, except perhaps their dress. The law of the land forbids any one to copy and wear any item of uniform that resembles that of the military. Here most brazenly the uniform and accruements are copied with impunity. This creates identity confusion and the military’s impact on terrorists and miscreants gets diffused. 

The CPOs have none of the military’s ethos, traditions, skills, spirit and leadership. On their own and with the right leadership, they can be first-rate police force. There is little to be gained in aping the military in dress, form and formulations. CPOs have little to claim as paramilitary and dislike being called police. Resultantly, they fall between two stools. 

The military has been ambushed on many an occasion but never at such a scale. Its casualty ratio between troops and officers in counter-insurgency operations is in the region of 1 to 13.4. That is for every 13/14 men killed there is an officer casualty and figure for officers in the last decade and a half is by now well over 560. These are commissioned officers ranging from Lieutenants to Colonels and in a few cases even higher rank officers. The military has been combating well trained and motivated insurgents in the North East and J&K. Whereas Maoists are a ‘ragtag’ force in its present state. To achieve results, police leadership will have to be up front. 

The Indian state has been painfully slow in waking up to the Maoist threat. Even the Prime Minister’s wake-up call had gone unheeded. Over time conditions have been allowed to deteriorate resulting in large-scale disaffection amongst vast sections of marginalised and dispossessed population, whom all development and poverty alleviation schemes have simply bypassed. Whose small land holdings have been taken over by mining mafias, hydel projects, MNCs and some others whose forest rights have been dissolved, leaving them no means of livelihood? Added to that has been the gradual withdrawal of governance at district level and the all-pervasive corruption.

As administration shrank and poverty alleviation schemes and development plans were hijacked by corrupt officials and colluding politicians, in district after district, disaffection and deprivation spread. District officials seldom stirred out and often functioned from within their high security residences and offices and on return to Delhi, became experts in dealing with Maoist movement. Given such conditions, the Maoists kept enlarging their foothold and spread the field of activity while Delhi slept.
The media hype over the Dantewada incident portends ill for the developing situation. A kind of hysteria has been created where elimination of Maoists has become the top priority without regard to means and methods. Terms like revenge, enemy and war are being bandied about. What may follow are extreme excesses by the police: provincial and CPOs. 

Arrests, interrogations, torture and torching of villages, dislocations, fake encounters could become a daily occurrence. Custodial deaths too will become a common feature, more so when senior leadership stays away from the field. Police brutalities can push more people into the Maoist fold. However, the Home Minister is expected to exercise a sobering influence on the anti-Maoist operations.

There is talk of accelerating development of these areas. If the same set of government machinery is to undertake this task, on which it so miserably failed in the past, how is it expected to do better this time? Government officials are loathe at venturing into these areas. So one proposal is to first bring the affected districts under control, restore law and order and then start developmental work. Yet another view is to start rapid development (whatever it means) as pockets are cleared of Maoists, because time is at a premium.

In the proposed development plans, it may perhaps be possible to make roads, healthcare centres, hospitals and schools (doubtful though) but the larger problem which makes a substantial difference is the creation of jobs, gainful employment and economic activity for the vast majority. That is an area which takes a lot of planning and time. So it is possible that the Maoist problem will not go away in a hurry and police retaliations, consequent to the hype created by the media, may exacerbate the already deteriorating situation. 

A new legislation to deal with the Maoists needs to be brought in where this CPO(s) have the authority to operate in various Maoist affected states. It should be placed under a Central authority which co-ordinates its actions and intelligence work with the state police. 

The answer lies in splitting the CRPF into two, with about 150 battalions forming the core of the anti-Maoist group, which should be given intensive training in counter-insurgency operations and provided young and competent leadership at platoon, company and battalion level. Perhaps IPS officers with less than 10 years of service be made to spend two to three years leading platoons and companies with anti-Maoist outfits. 


http://www.tribuneindia.com/2010/20100515/edit.htm#4 
 

Decoding the Drag

India can’t be complacent on national security
by Lt-Gen Harwant Singh (retd) 

THERE can be no greater proof of failure of India’s foreign policy than the reality of our unsatisfactory relations with all our immediate neighbours. From Pakistan in the West to Nepal and China in the North, Burma and Bangladesh in the East and Sri Lanka in the South, our relations with these countries vary from hostility to indifference.


China’s influence in countries on our periphery has been on the increase. In addition, China has this ‘String of pearls policy’. Though it is a nightmarish situation, India’s security establishment seems to sleep well. The Maoists’ problem and the one in Kashmir are security challenges being addressed in a cavalier fashion. Evenif one is to discount the problems in the North-East, the overall security scene is disquieting.

We have been decidedly and overwhelmingly complacent on the issue of national security. Not only has our foreign policy failed to create friendly environment on our periphery but grossly neglected the emerging threats.

This policy suffered further setback when distant Japan, Australia and some South East Asian countries acquiesced to China’s claim that Arunachal Pradesh is a disputed territory. China has been calling it South Tibet and not a part of India.Moreover, China has declared Jammu and Kashmir a disputed territory and started stapling visas of visitors from that state. More recently, it has reaffirmed its stand on this issue by denying visa to a senior army officer posted in Jammu and Kashmir and who was leader of a military delegation to China.

This stance of China and reportedly inducting large body of troops into Gilgit region of the Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir (POK) is to give a fillip to the ongoing turmoil in the Kashmir valley, besides controlling any unrest in this part of POK. While China occupied large tracts of territory in Ladakh, Pakistan illegally acceded the Shaksam valley in PoK to it. China is also reported to be improving the Karakoram highway and setting out to build a high-speed railway line to Gwadar port on the Gulf of Oman, for transporting oil to Tibet and Xinjiang province from where it can be ferried to mainland China. 

There are suggestions flying thick and fast in the media that India must strongly protest against this Chinese move into PoK. But, protest to whom? China will summarily dismiss such protests and going to the United Nations will merely resurrect the old ghosts of Jammu and Kashmir. At best India can deny visa facility to Chinese, but what of the massive trade we have with that country?China’s policy keeps time on its side while complacency is our forte. Even keeping time on its side, China has been assiduously and with single-mindedness creating overall military capabilities and military infrastructure in Tibet and spreading its influence in countries on our periphery. It has with equal zeal and purpose followed the policy of using Pakistan as a proxy and a cheap option to tie down India locally. 

Then, there is the ‘String of pearls policy’ to squeeze India from all sides. China is building its naval strength at a furious pace and making forays into the Indian Ocean. We have slept through more than half a century, ignoring the emerging security scene and the gathering storms all around and within India.

Not only have we been complacent but decidedly negligent of the emerging security threats, both internal and external. At 2 per cent of GDP for defence as against 7 per cent of China out of GDP, twice the size of ours, India’s lack of concern for its security ought to appear alarming, even to one with impaired vision and the dimwitted.

In the real world, economic strength in the absence of military power is unsustainable. The gunboat diplomacy and wars of nineteen century were to capture markets and enhance influence and commerce for economic gains. The power play of the 21st century is going to be no different except that the form, formulations and contours of policy and coercive techniques will undergo a change.
For long we have been indulging in a puerile debate on the issue of ‘development versus defence,’ as if the two are mutually exclusive and in no way reinforce each other. The mandarins in Delhi have been smug in a world of make believe. To quote Arun Shourie, “Corresponding factors that keep us from growing as fast as our potential are precisely the ones that weaken our defence. The same holds for constituents of defence: the choice is not, ‘valour or high technology,’ cyber warfare or conventional warfare or nuclear capability but capabilities across the broad spectrum.”

China has developed the Gwadar port and it will have a strong naval presence there. This port is at the mouth of straight of Hurmoz through which oil supplies from the Middle East flow to India. The strategic importance of this move by China does not seem to have fully dawned on the Indian security establishment. 

The Chinese Navy will also have berthing facilities at the Sri Lankan and Burmese ports. Radars at Coco Island keep watch over the naval ship movement from mainland to Andaman and Nicobar Islands and India’s missile launches from the Balasore missile range in Orissa.
India has helplessly watched developments in Nepal. It is with China’s help that the Sri Lankan government was able to decimate the Tamil Tigers. China, even with a late start, has galloped ahead, leaving us far behind in the fields of economy, science and technology and military capabilities.

It is not our case that the developments on the Tibet border and in POK are the harbinger of an early conflict, but these do not bode well for India. These developments need to be taken as a wake-up call and shake ourselves out of our complacency and stupor. Activating a few airfields and adding some roads or two mountain divisions and deploying two squadrons of fighter aircraft or lodging a protest will not do. These are knee-jerk reactions and reminiscent of our actions leading to the 1962 war with China.

India as a nuclear and emerging economic power, in the midst of potentially unstable regimes and with ambitions to exercise influence for the stability and security of the region and to safeguard vital national interests, cannot have military capabilities which in no way match those of the potential adversaries. Equally, an antiquated and potentially dysfunctional decision-making and operational system in the defence apparatus is anathema to the successful conduct of defence and foreign policy. India’s ability to meet future security challenges is highly suspect and this state of affairs cannot prevail any longer without seriously jeopardising national security.

There is, therefore, the requirement of evolving a comprehensive and long term national security policy taking into account the current and future security concerns and synergising these with foreign policy. Thereafter, we must work assiduously to develop military capabilities backed by diplomatic thrusts to meet the security challenges of the future and be in a position to exercise influence in our immediate neighbourhood. We need to double our efforts to enhance our economic strength and create compatible defence capabilities.

The writer is a former Deputy Chief of Army Staff 

[Tribune India]

FLARE-UP ALONG LoC

                                    Pakistan’s nefarious designs

by Harwant Singh

BORDER skirmishes and firings on the Line of Control (LoC) in Jammu and Kashmir are routine occurrences. Of late, the exchange of artillery fire, including that from heavy artillery, has become a common feature of the activity there. Infiltration by insurgents from across the border has been going on for over a decade. The Indian Army has, by and large, contained the situation within manageable levels. However, the currently developing situation in the Turtik-Batalic-Kargil-Dras sector is not an ordinary or routine occurrence and has all the portents of escalating into something more serious.
 
From the military point of view, the most unfortunate feature of the foreign-inspired trouble in J and K has been that the initiative has always been with Pakistan’s ISI and the infiltrators. They have been constantly shifting their place of infiltration and area of operations to suit their plans, and at the same time force the Indian Army to always remain in a reactive mode. Or what Field Marshal Montgomery was so fond of saying, “Make them dance to your tune.” Consequently, insurgent activity has been shifting from the Kashmir valley to Doda, back to the valley, into the Kargil sector, onto the Poonch-Rajouri sectors and then back to the Kargil-Dras areas with the Indian troops always reacting to these developments or merely carrying out fire-fighting operations. Both at the strategic and tactical levels, a commander who is always reacting to the enemy moves not only places himself at a great disadvantage but is also destined to end up in failure.

The Deosai mountain range, stretching all the way from Gilgit and the Hunza valley, joins the Zanskar range at Kargil. The terrain in the Kargil sector is higher, more rugged and precipitous than the Hindu-Kush mountains, and equally devoid of cover. The LoC in the area of Dras-Kargil runs more or less parallel to the Srinagar-Leh road and along the more difficult heights. Per force there are large gaps among Indian posts, and the infiltration in small groups is comparatively easy. In winter, many defended posts and observation points are vacated due to heavy snow and inadequate logistic support back-up. Therefore, should the opponent decide to move in and occupy some of these vacated positions during this period, his presence would be known only when our own troops move forward to reoccupy these on the melting of the snow. The uninitiated may opine that why should there be gaps for the insurgents to sneak in or, in other words, the border not sealed or posts vacated during winter. Well there is a saying that mountains eat up troops, and to this can be added that high mountains simply gobble them up. For a post of 10 men at 15000-18000 feet another 30 to 40 are required to sustain them logistically. To evacuate one casualty from such a post, a relay team of nearly 16 men would be required. In winter, this problem would multiply.
 
But the more relevant feature at this juncture of the on-going operations is that once a position is occupied along the crest line by the aggressor retaking it poses serious problems. Dislodging the defender is difficult due to the lack of cover and the fact that the option is invariably restricted to the availability of a single approach. Moreover, the attacker’s artillery fire is less effective against the posts along the crest or those slightly below it on the reverse slope. These are important issues which must determine our reactions and influence the choice of options. Any attempt to try to retake such positions directly would be foolhardy and very costly in terms of casualties. Though the above is elementary and fairly well known to need repetition, Pakistan has been relearning this basic lesson at great cost on the Saltaro range in the Siachen glacier area the recourse to an indirect approach or wresting the initiative by striking in an area of own choosing is always the better option.
 
The more disturbing aspect of the present development appears to be the active and direct and large-scale involvement of the Pakistan army and that the infiltrators are apparently seasoned Taliban and retired military personnel. This type of development in J and K has been on the cards all along and noted in these columns more than once. If the authorities have allowed themselves to be influenced by the assumption that future operations would relate to only fighting low-level insurgency or the Prime Minister’s short but ride to Lahore, or that the declaration named after that town has ushered in an era of peace, better understanding and goodwill between the two countries, they have only themselves to blame.
 
There was a news item in the national Press that the Indian Army was going in for heavy reduction in its strength, and money thus saved would be used for modernisation. The force structuring is determined by a number of factors; to note a few, current commitments, force levels of potential adversaries and its anticipated accretions, long-term national security perspective, etc. The force level is not an issue over which a government should try to bargain. Government policies and national security issues cannot be reduced to the level of dealings at a shopkeeper’s premises. For years we had to resist this approach of the government to which the present hierarchy appears to have succumbed. While on the one hand, no modernisation of any magnitude is possible with this kind of saving, on the other, the Kargil-Dras type of incursions will get repeated elsewhere and our overall conventional deterrence will be further debilitated. The Army’s current commitments are manpower-intensive.
 
There was perhaps some pulling out of troops from the Dras sector and other places for eventual thinning out in J and K. While the developments in the Dras-Kargil sector catching us off guard can be attributed to a major failure of intelligence, the other disturbing developments have been the shift in the perception of our security policy in J and K and visualisation of the nature of future operations for the Indian Army.
 
The fact that the IAF has gone into action clearly demonstrates the Indian resolve to meet the challenge squarely and in unequivocal terms. At this point of time there is no information regarding the nature of targets struck by our planes. The use of the IAF where a large tract of Indian territory has been surreptitiously occupied by Pakistan, and when there are attempts to redraw the LoC in this area, is legitimate, notwithstanding the ramifications. But the prior announcement of the possible use of the Air Force could have resulted in the deployment of shoulder-fired SAMs (surface-to-air-missiles — Stringer variety) similar to those used in the Afghan war against the Russian air force. How effective these strike have been will be known only after some time. However, air strikes on small and scattered groups of men hiding among boulders on high mountain ridges are of doubtful efficacy and, therefore, may not be the best option. At some stage logistic support bases may have to be struck and the supply lines interdicted. Pakistan has been taxing India’s patience and forbearance, and the present incursion may be to check how far it can go in its nefarious designs in J and K. The challenge posed by Pakistan has to be met boldly, and the initiative must be wrested. It should be made clear that if it does not pull out from these positions, we retain the option to strike elsewhere, both on the ground and in the air, at a place of our own choosing.
 
The very purpose of the National Security Council (NSC) is to draw up long-term national security perspective and, besides a whole range of other issues, have contingency planning against all possible developments, and evolve a conflict management mechanism. If the NSC has not done any work in this field, then our response in the evolving situation will be an ad-hoc one and jerky, with the loss of control and events developing a dynamism of their own or as presaged by the opponent. Of late, the Indian defence planners have remained over-focused on the nuclear dimension of national security, and relegated the more pertinent and relevant conventional conflict contingency or its deterrent potential. Confused thinking and perceptions of influence of nuclear deterrence in the India-Pakistan context per se on the one hand and the nature of future security demands on the Army on the other seem to cloud the thinking of the top hierarchy.
 
General Sundarji, speaking of the India’s defence policy related to J and K, once remarked that it hinges on two factors. One, distinct superiority in our conventional capability and the other that any intervention in J and K by Pakistan would invite unacceptable punishment elsewhere. Appearing in a TV news programme related to the Kargil-Dras developments, the National Security Adviser appeared overawed by the nuclear dimension and the exaggerated fear of the prospect of internationalisation of the Kashmir issue, and pledged to think hard to grapple with the ongoing problem. Weak signals expose us to a whole range of blackmail.
 
(The author, a retired Lieut-General, was a Deputy Chief of Army Staff)




The Tribune May 29, 1999

Another gameplan to fool ex-servicemen?

Another gameplan to fool ex-servicemen?
by Lt-Gen Harwant Singh (retd)

 
EX-Havaldar Ruldoo Ram, now in his seventies, is a veteran of many wars. In 1947-48, he fought in the Kashmir War and was hit by an enemy bullet in the leg. Later he took part in the 1962 and 1965 wars. He also fought the insurgents in the North East. He lives with his daughter-in-law and grand children in a remote village in Himachal Pradesh.
 
He was retired early. Relentless inflation, since he retired, has left his pension with little purchasing power. His son Naik Ram Dev, his only child, had died in the Kargil conflict. Experience had made him somewhat cynical. He no more cared for the false promises of the government. He had endlessly discussed the subject of ‘one rank one pension’ and the unfair 33-year conditionality, the Fifth Pay Commission had introduced, was meekly accepted by the military high command, and later approved by the government. 
 
The issue of ‘one rank one pension’ was first taken up in 1982. Since then, nearly a million ex-servicemen have died, in the vain hope of getting a better deal. Their number is decreasing by six to seven thousand every month. In the next 15 to 20 years, nearly all those ex-servicemen, to whom ‘one rank one pension’ is of concern will disappear from the pension list. Therefore, for the Government of India, it is a case of decreasing expenditure at the annual rate of 5 to 6 per cent. The demand for ‘one rank one pension’, in any case, involves a small amount of money and is poor compensation for early retirement, harsh and risk-filled service environment, turbulence in married life and children’s education, extremely limited promotional prospects and the added disadvantage of 33-year conditionality. Early retirement itself imposes a bar on higher pension, which otherwise would accrue due to longer service, as is the case with the civil employees.
 
Ruldoo Ram asks what could be the compulsions, which prompted the government to suddenly appear sympathetic to the ex-servicemen’s cause over which it showed little concern in the past? A ludicrous case where Brigadiers get more pension than Major-Generals is yet to be resolved by the government. Then how does it hope to fool the ex-servicemen through this new gameplan?
Ruldoo Ram’s native wisdom told him that it must be some unthinking babu who had put out the news that the issue of ‘one rank one pension’ had finally been closed by the government. Then some wily politician must have realised the folly of such an announcement when the State Assembly elections were just around the corner. Obviously, it was the prospect of losing the ex-servicemen and their families’ votes in the coming elections which made the government change its mind and reopen the case. Ruldoo Ram was not the one to be taken in by such plays.
 
He says it is a case of dangling a carrot before the ex-servicemen till election time and then jettisoning it. The babus will once more make the politicians bite the dust. They would simply frighten the politicians with the certainty of a similar demand by the civil servants. It is perhaps too much to expect the politicians to grasp the simple fact that the terms and conditions of service of the civil servants are totally different from those of servicemen. Those who retire at 58 cannot claim equality with those who retire in their thirties, forties or early fifties. 
 
Does the government not realise that the basic principle of dealing with the troops is, not to raise false hopes and feed them promises, not intended to be fulfilled? It is a dangerous game to play and sure to result in loss of confidence in the system.
 
While Ruldoo Ram was immersed in a discussion with his colleagues, his daughter-in-law brought tea for them. As they took their first sip, their eyes met. His eyes were moist, partly from embarrassment and a bit out of sorrow. There was no sugar and little milk in the tea; his meagre pension could do no better. In fact, there was nothing sweet left in Ruldoo Ram’s life.


[Tribune India]

Raw deal for veterans

Demystifying one rank one pension
by Lt-Gen Harwant Singh (retd)

Veterans recently went to Rashtrapati Bhavan to return the sixth pack of medals to the President of India. But the President could not be there to receive the medals, so they came back disappointed. For a veteran, his medals are his most valued and cherished possession. These are heirlooms for their families.
 
Medals are earned under difficult conditions. Some by laying down life during war and in fighting insurgents, others for gallantry in the face of the enemy and yet some others for wounds suffered during operations. For veterans to part with their medals is an extreme step of desperation, caused by frustration and distress. Why have the veterans been driven to such a state of anguish!
Successive Central Pay Commissions (CPCs) repeatedly and viciously lowered the pay and status of defence personnel. To mention just two cases, DIG of police, whose pay and status was in between that of a Lieutenant-Colonel and Colonel now stands equated with a Brigadier for pay etc. DIG rank comes after 14 years service while that of a Brigadier after 26-28 years. So absurd has been the dispensation that a Brigadier was given more pension than a Major-General. The Sixth Pay Commission introduced a dozen more anomalies.
 
The Fourth Pay Commission granted rank pay up to the rank of Brigadiers. Through sleight of hand, the Ministry of Defence deducted the amount of rank pay from the basic pay. Later, the Supreme Court has finally set it right. The Supreme Court had also noted, in an indirect manner, the untenability of granting different pensions to persons of the same rank, irrespective of their date of retirement. 
 
The Armed Forces Tribunal (AFT) at Chandigarh has drawn the government’s attention to the Supreme Court’s point and has given the Central Government four months to resolve the issue. Left to bureaucracy, nothing much can be expected.  Therefore, the veterans decided to continue their struggle for One Rank One Pension (OROP). 
 
Successive Presidents, Prime Ministers, Defence Ministers and the chairperson of the Congress party, at various times, accepted the grant of OROP. However, the bureaucracy has been frightening the political executive that giving OROP to the defence services will open a Pandora’s box. Every other government employee will ask for the same. This is patently false and mendacious contention.
In all, 83 per cent of defence services personnel retire between the ages of 34 and 37 years. Another 5 to 12 per cent retire at the ages between 44 and 52 years. Only 0.35 per cent retire at the age of 60. While all civil employees serve up to the age of 60 years, they step up to the top of their respective pay bands, get all the three Assured Career Progressions (ACPs) and consequently not only draw increasing pay but end up with much higher pension.
 
The 83 per cent of military personnel who retire at 34-37 age, that is after 17 years service, do not qualify for even the second ACP which comes into play only after 20 years service. Since some may not grasp the import of this gross injustice, more appropriately a mischief, spelling out the monetary position would be in order, but a little later.
 
Subsequent to the ham-handed dispensation of the Sixth Central Pay Commission which drew strong response from the defence services headquarters, the government appointed a Committee of Secretaries to go into these anomalies. In the Sixth Central Pay Commission, the villain of the piece was the IAS officer on this Commission. 
 
Now when the Committee of Secretaries was constituted to address the anomalies, the same IAS officer also formed part of this committee. Thus, it became a case where the prosecutor also formed part of the jury! The committee endlessly dragged its feet and finally omitted OROP in its recommendations.
 
A comparison of the total amount drawn in terms of pay and pension by a soldier and pay by his counterpart in the civil by the time both reach the age of 60 years is Rs 33.3 lakh more for the civil servant; this figure at the age of 70 is Rs 42.670 lakh. At age 75, it is Rs 47.310 lakh. In the case of a Havaldar, his equivalent in the civil, at age 60, would get Rs 20.261 lakh more and this figure is Rs 26.639 lakh at age 70 and at 75 it is Rs 29.828 lakh. In the case of a Subedar, these figures at ages 60, 70 and 75 years are Rs 13.979 lakh, Rs 18.911 lakh and Rs 21.277 lakh respectively, more for the civil servant.  
 
A soldier retiring at 35 years of age will live through at least four Central Pay Commissions and suffer their dispensations for retirees. Whereas his counterpart in the civil will not only continue to benefit from successive CPCs while still in service for an additional 25 years, but on retirement will be effected by just one CPC, assuming 70 years as the average age expectancy. Therefore, even if OROP is granted, defence personnel will continue to suffer these gross disadvantages. 
Similar figures are available for officers. The disparities are due to early retirement, delayed and extremely limited promotions in higher ranks. All these features are service imperatives. Within the defence services, earlier retirees are further disadvantaged. A soldier who retired prior to January 1, 2006 will get far less pension than a soldier who retired after this date. For a Havaldar who retired prior to this date, his pension is less than a Sepoy who retired after this date.
The ad-hoc compensation promised to the other ranks is completely inadequate and fails to address the core issue of OROP. Similar situation prevails in the case of officers. Only one with severely impaired vision, limited intelligence and/or deep seated bias can miss the incongruity in this working.
 
The above disparities are independent of X factor which apply to only defence personnel. About 15 per cent of soldiers get the opportunity to live with their families for a period of one to two years in their entire service. In the case of others (including officers), only 40 to 50 per cent of their service, they live with their families. Then there are other travails of service such as harsh living conditions in uncongenial and high altitude areas which results in approximately 5000 of them being annually boarded out on medical grounds. Thousands live with ailments and continue to serve.
Then there is the curtailment on fundamental rights and harsh military law to contend with. Entry into the officer cadre has become the last career choice for the country’s youth. Consequently, huge shortages persist. 
 
Few seem to realise the strong bonding that exists between the veterans and the serving. There is continued interaction between units and their retired personnel and that is how units sustain the regimental spirit and traditions.
 
During leave, the serving come in contact with the retired and the dissatisfaction of the later gets passed to the serving. Therefore, there is the danger of spill-over effect of this disenchantment and disgruntlement of the veterans passing on to the serving. It will indeed be a sad day for the country when this distress is fully transferred to the serving.
 
The demand for OROP is fair and just and is only a part-compensation for early retirement, extremely limited promotions and a miniscule recompense for a hard and risk filled career. The political executive ought to realise the injustice being done to the soldier and accept in good grace, what is fair and what is just.


[Tribune India]