Siachen Problem

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The Siachen question
A way out can be found
by Lieut-Gen Harwant Singh (retd)

TIMES change, people change, the world has changed, policies are being realigned, free trade, etc, is the current mantra. But there is little shift in the stance of the hawks and doubting Thomases on the Indian side, be it any move towards the resolution of the J and K problem or the nuclear deal with the United States. It has been projected in these columns that a pullout from the Saltoro Range will be a Himalayan blunder and a monumental folly.

Some defence analysts have tried to project the Siachen Glacier and the Saltoro Range as an area of great strategic importance. To the West of it is the road linking Gilgit with Tibet (China,) and to the North- East is the important Karakoram Pass. To the North is the Shaksgam Valley, ceded to China by Pakistan. The Siachen glacier region would facilitate a link-up between Pakistan and China, they contend.

The Gilgit-Tibet road is nearly 250 kilometres across the world’s most forbidding terrain. The Karakoram Pass from the Glacier is across a group of first magnitude peaks in the world, which only a small mountaineering expedition can hope to traverse. The Shaksgam valley across the Indra Col and the Karakoram Range is inaccessible from the Glacier region. The route to the Karakoram Pass emanates from the Nubra Valley, and is well away from the Siachen Glacier. Another is along the Shyok River. Pakistan already has a link-up with China along the Gilgit-Tibet road and areas to the North of the Karakoram range.

It would be incorrect to contend that currently there are no casualties due to climate and weather at the Glacier/Saltoro range. Innumerous afflictions, other that due to enemy fire, continue to beset troops. Indian troops have endured great hardships and afflictions heroically for 22 years. They have the leadership and the perseverance to live with these for another 50 years and more, without a demur. But must they!

There is an upswing in the Indo-Pak relations, including people-to-people contacts. The futility of confrontation is realised by both sides. Opportunities are beckoning them to grasp the emerging economic possibilities in trade and commerce and to better their lot. Neither country can afford reckless expenditure on wasteful and avoidable deployment of troops.

The genesis and the background to the dispute over the Cease-Fire Line ( CFL) beyond Point NJ 9842 on the Saltoro Range and attempts to resolve this issue in the past have been recalled, far too often in these columns, and therefore need no repetition.

Of all the disputes between India and Pakistan relating to J and K, the peaceful resolution of the Siachen imbroglio is less intractable and could be the harbinger of improved relations between the two neighbours. The answer to the question of “we only giving concessions and not the other party” lies in the fact that it is this type of attitude which results in strained relations with all our neighbours. The Indian position recently spelled out by the Prime Minister is that there can be no redrawing of boundaries in J and K. It implies the status quo as far as the CFL goes. So, linking the AGPL with the CLF can be of no avail.

The issue of J and K has defied resolution for the last six decades. So, if de-linking the Siachen from the larger issue of J and K can throw up an opportunity to move forward, then it needs to be grasped. Presently the agreement to demilitarise the Siachen region has hit a roadblock on the issue of authentication of ground positions of troops of the two countries. While India insists that before the troops from the two countries pull back from their positions, the same should be delineated on the maps and authenticated by the two sides. Pakistan baulks from such an agreement. Consequently, India has reason to suspect the intentions and motives of Pakistan. Mutual suspicion runs deep in both countries.

We accuse Pakistan of perfidy and violation of the Shimla Agreement at Kargil, while Pakistan holds us to a similar act in occupying the Saltoro Range in 1984. Though India had evidence of Pakistani intentions to occupy the area and merely pre-empted it at the Saltoro Range, Pakistan projects a different position. Past does carry lessons for the future, but there is little to be gained by being a prisoner to the past. After all, the ceasefire along the CFL in J and K and at the AGPL on the Saltoro Range has held out since November 2003 and that should give a measure of confidence to both sides.

The Pakistani public has been made to believe that its troops are in part occupation of the Siachen Glacier. Authentication of the positions of the troops of the two sides on the maps will expose that lie. Pakistan’s reluctance to authenticate the AGPL must be seen against these compulsions.

India suspects that Pakistan will occupy the vacated positions on the Saltoro Range. In such an eventuality it would be both difficult and costly for the Indian troops to evict them from those positions. If one is to surrender to suspicion and mistrust, then even if positions are authenticated, mischief by Pakistani troops is still possible. They could occupy the heights vacated by Indian troops, an agreement notwithstanding. So, authentication of positions by itself is of little help in case of bad faith. What will help is the conviction in Pakistan, the inevitability of violent Indian military reaction to any move to occupy the vacated positions.

As an alternative to the authentication of the positions held by both sides, we could instead show our positions to the international Press. Mark the AGPL on the ground and take satellite pictures and publish these. Draw up an agreement with Pakistan to demilitarise the area and insert a provision in the agreement that in the event of occupation of the vacated positions of the opponent, by either side, it will confer the right on the other to take recourse to such actions, including military action, anywhere, to redress the situation. That would throw up many suitable military options to the aggrieved party. Some system of joint control over the demilitarised zone can also be worked out.

Heaping calumny and ascribing bad intentions will not do. Equally, we need not be the self-appointed champions of democracy for other countries. During periods of a democratic set-up in Pakistan, our relations have never been any better or moves to resolve the areas of disputes more purposeful. We may debate to no purpose whether an end to cross-border terrorism should precede an improvement in relations with Pakistan, or follow it.