Corruption in the Army: not as bad as it seems

Harwant Singh

TEHELKA's revelations have thrown up a whole range of issues, such as the selection and evaluation system of military equipment, the role of middlemen, probity of defence officials connected with purchase, political influence of the ruling party in these transactions and the extent of executive accountability of the Defence Minister and perhaps the government as a whole in these sleazy deals.


It has been known for a fairly long time that there are pockets of corruption and malfeasance in the defence services. But in scope, spread and scale it pales in front of what is prevalent in almost every facet of civil life. The military stands out in that corruption is unacceptable and is looked down upon and where detected, positive and purposeful action is initiated. On an average, 30 to 35 court marshals are held every year in corruption cases or for any infringement of financial regulations and those found guilty are sent to prison and/or cashiered. The future of many more found lacking in integrity is sealed. Yet, Tehelka selected the military to home on to and only defence deals became target when behind every conceivable deal or government transaction there is a stinking scandal. Be that as it may, we need to look into the issue exposed in the disclosures. For any transaction between two parties there has to be someone to facilitate the deal or, at best, represent the seller. How else can a foreign peddler of military or other goods to be sold to a government agency navigate his way through the bureaucratic jungle of the Government of India, where you and I can easily loose our way.

The Delhi scene was dominated by a handful of arms agents with the right political connections. They were ipso facto linked to be party in power. Then, in the 1980s, finding the proposition very lucrative, some retired defence officers joined the business. It was soon discovered that they were trying to cut into the business of regular ‘official’ agents. To put an end to this, Rajiv Gandhi (as an act of needless hypocrisy) imposed a ban on defence agents and, as a follow up to it, exemplary punishments were meted out to Larkin, Law and Jasbir. An old Army Headquarters telephone directory found in his possession was enough to send Lt-Col (retd) Jasbir Singh to prison. This ban on defence agents is ridiculous because unofficially they regularly interact with MoD officials to exchange information, discuss requirements and product pricing and at times even establish liaison with trials.

Remember Win Chadha in a group photograph with the trial team at the School of Artillery, Deolali? Hundreds of defence agents operate in India; about 80 as regular suppliers in Delhi itself. Ironically, our Supply Missions attached to our embassies in the UK and Washington, etc, officially continue to make purchases of defence equipment, especially for the DRDO, through Indian agents based in India. Defence PSIs that supply equipment to the military also openly use the services of agents of foreign companies. Many seem to infer from the Tehelka revelations that our systems and methods of evaluation and selection of military equipment leave scope for manipulation and fudging, resulting in malpractices and corruption on the part of those operating the system. Once the requirement for a particular type of weapon, equipment or ammunition—which cannot be developed by the DRDO—is accepted, it is made known to suppliers directly or through our embassies. A trial directive is made out based on the relevant General Staff Qualitative Requirement. Offers are vetted and equipment subjected to user trials as per the trial directive. Trials are normally conducted independently by at least three different Army commands (because of vastly differing terrain and climate conditions under which the equipment is to be deployed) and their findings and views in the chain of command recorded. At the same time DGQA, DRDO, EME and the respective user Directorate, record their independent findings and views. Often all or some of these activities are carried out concurrently, depending on the number of pieces made available for trials. The General Staff evaluation and recommendations are the final view of the Army and based on the trials and opinion of the commands and others and the Army Headquarters’ own inputs. Therefore, purchase of inappropriate equipment cannot take place. At the same time, no fudging in trial reports and General Staff evaluation is possible, nor can any one in the MoD later fool around with it. But, the MoD can put a case on hold for years or jettison it altogether, as has happened in a number of cases, and that is where speed money or Enron’s ‘education’ factor comes into play. In the case of the Bofors gun, it is believed that the MoD asked the Army Headquarters to have a fresh look at it’s preference of guns as it did not feel ‘safe’ to go in for the Bofors gun without change of preference in it’s favour, though this gun was always acceptable to the Army and the final selection would have rested on pricing, transfer of technology, ammunition supply, spares etc.

It would be seen that trial and evaluation procedures, methods and systems are sound and transparent enough. A dishonest operator can and will always find ways and means to influence the final decision basing on other related factors. Many a story from even the Akbar-Birbal episodes would prove the point. The focus should be to catch the wrongdoer, punish him swiftly and not further complicate the existing lengthy procedures. The presence of agents should not overly worry us. No agent can corrupt an honest officer or politician. Under normal circumstances, the Indian Army does not buy weapons, equipment and ammunition without proper evaluation and trials. In fact, the efficacy of the weapon, equipment and ammunition concerned in our setting, in terms of terrain, tactical environments, battle field milieu and shelf life, etc., has to be established and the same has to conform to our long-term equipping policy before the trial and evaluation is accepted or undertaken.

But any system is as good as those who operate it. Given the ingenuity, propensity and capacity of the Indian mind for corruption and the very remote possibility of being trapped, accompanied by the comforting feeling that even if caught an obliging investigating agency and a clever lawyer can get one off the hook, makes malfeasance and corruption a low risk but a highly profitable under-taking. While the system of selection of equipment is elaborate and fair, the “goodwill factor” and speed money or “education” of the babus and politicians concerned often help in smoothing the rough edges. Since the final “go-ahead” signal for purchase and price negotiations is in the hands of the MoD, that is where the maximum scope for corruption rests. At times, though not too frequently, conditions are contrived or get generated, as in the case of the Kargil conflict, to circumvent the mandatory requirement of trials and evaluation or seek the purchase of equipment which otherwise would not have been accepted. At other times, misplaced enthusiasm or officers’ petty loyalties to own arm or service comes into play to equip it with what is perceived to be the latest and most modern equipment. It is here as elsewhere that the General Staff of the Army has to step in to check inappropriate acquisition of weapons and equipment. That is one reason why only General Staff cadre officers need to occupy key positions of ADG, Weapons and Equipment, and ADG, Perspective Planning, etc.

Unfortunately, and for some unknown reason, this has not been the case, more so during the past one decade. The Indian Army’s inventory does have a fair sprinkling of ammunition and equipment purchased without due consideration and evaluation. It would be relevant to mention a few cases. In the seventies, APDS ammunition for T-54/55 tanks was purchased without trials. In subsequent trials it completely failed and became dead inventory. Perhaps the 155mm Krasnopol ammunition (possibly some other items as well) purchased in the wake of the Kargil conflict for Rs 150 crore may fall in the same category. The Army never considered this type of ammunition cost effective, because cheaper and better methods of engagement of targets have always been available. I recall that at one time there was great pressure to buy ‘influence anti-tank mines’ from France. In this case the E-in-C branch’s interest was guided by a desire to acquire the latest but the MoD had some other angle to the deal; not difficult to guess! While these had somewhat passed the trials, their efficacy in our setting could not be established. So I had declined to buy these. The next Deputy Chief, too, held the same view. But in his absence of 10 days’ leave the deal was clinched. When the MoD develops an interest in a particular item, files move at high speed. These mines bought at great expense are perhaps a dead inventory now. Stentor radars, Gaz navigation vehicles, tank fire-control system (TFCS) for Vijayant tanks, to mention only a few cases, fall in the same category. During the Sri Lanka operations, the then DGMO, in the presence of the COAS, demanded that we should acquire the hand-held radio sets in use with the LTTE, which were available in the Singapore market, for our infantry deployed in Sri Lanka as these were better than those with us (incidentally provided by Punwire, Chandigarh, and were giving reasonably good service). It was explained to the DGMO that those with the LTTE were not “military hardened” and that purchase could be undertaken provided he gave in writing that the requirement was operationally so urgent that it could not await trials. The demand was never repeated. In another case a joint secretary in the MoD called up to say that a company in Singapore had out-board motors (OBMs) which could be purchased to meet the Army’s long-standing shortage and possible floods that year and that trials need not be carried out. His interest in the purchase was obvious and the suggestion never accepted. These instances are noted to point out that the existing systems do have the necessary checks and balances.
The political party in power at the Centre has often used defence deals, and almost all other deals, to rake in funds for the party and, in the process, private pockets also get lined. When greed gets the better of judgement, slush money goes into private pockets as it happened in the case of the Bofors gun deal. When the cover gets blown and the sleaze and muck comes out in public view, at a scale uncovered by Tehelka, the minister concerned cannot escape responsibility. Much has been said about his good work in the ministry, both by himself and others. The facts point to the contrary. The anomalies arising out of the Fifty Pay Commission recommendations have not been resolved to this day, even after years of efforts of the Army Headquarters. I asked a PSO at the headquarters as to why the issues are not being progressed with the RM directly, he said the bureaucracy has placed him in quarantine and he does not see him, while we continue to put up with the ridiculous situation where a Brigadier gets more pension than a Major General. A jawan gets less than half the lowest pension given to a civil employee in this country and a cook with the Indian Antarctica team gets more than twice as much in allowances compared to a jawan at Siachen, whom the minister claims to have visited 18 times, ostensibly to boost his morale or perhaps to get publicity for himself. A jawan or an officer loosing his leg at Siachen from frostbite or those who suffered similar injuries during Kargil or elsewhere in J and K, get less disability benefits than a civil employee loosing it in a terrorism incident while proceeding even on LTC. The babus from his ministry that he sent to Siachen never went beyond Leh. Troops do not air their problems out of deference for rank and discipline, but they expect their officers to know these on their own, resolve the difficulties and look after their interests. However, the efforts of their officers at Delhi were always stonewalled by the MoD. The Defence Minister personally dishing out hospitals, compression chambers, etc, indirectly undermines the position of Army top brass as they are seen to be ineffective on their own. In the case of the sacking of Admiral Bhagwat, the minister could not reasonably justify his action and had merely become a handmaiden to the then Defence Secretary against whom the Delhi High Court had to pass some very damning strictures. The government’s dithering in accepting his resignation and later appointing him the NDA convenor is an affront to public opinion and political cussedness of a kind.

It can be said with a fair degree of fairness that in this all-pervasive climate of corruption in the country, only certain components of the defence services are in this game, that too marginally. That is one of the reasons why Tehelka’s expose and Army officers’ involvement in the murky dealings as portrayed in the tapes have caused, within the officer cadre of the Army, widespread shock, disgust and consternation. In one voice, the demand for the involved officers to face the full rigours of the military law has been raised. As opposed to this, every other group exposed in these tapes is working overtime to pull excuses and cover tracks. The investigating agency has given a wake-up call and provided an excellent opportunity to the Army (and the other two services as well as the nation) to ruthlessly root out corruption in every area of its’ functioning. The Army Chief has already set about the task in the right earnest and let others down the ladder join him in this crusade.

Finally, a more serious issue has emerged out of this crisis. For days the government suffered from inaction, if not paralysis, when faced with the Tehelka disclosures. A swift action to force the politicians concerned to resign, place affected officers under suspension and initiate investigation would have vastly mitigated the fall-out; instead, the Cabinet dithered and looked for excuses where none existed. If such a situation can palsy the system’s ability to act decisively, then how can it handle more time-sensitive exigencies arising in a nuclear scenario!


http://www.tribuneindia.com/2001/20010325/edit.htm#2

Dithering on deterrence

Will cross-border terrorism ever end?Harwant Singh

OVER a decade of insurgency and years of cross-border terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir and other places in India reached an unacceptable point on December 13, 2001 with the attack on the Indian Parliament complex. India’s cup of patience overflowed, and the government felt that enough was enough. It called for some strong action as mere rhetoric, such as, “hot pursuit”, “zero tolerance”, etc, had simply failed to produce results. After all, if America could hunt out the Al-Qaeda cadres and liquidate the Taliban, then why could India not do something similar, though on a smaller scale. But there were obvious faultlines in this course of action.


Nevertheless, we went ahead with a series of actions at the diplomatic level. The Samjhauta Express and the Lahore-Delhi bus service were terminated. Restrictions were placed on visa facilities. The staff at the Indian High Commission in Pakistan was reduced and the High Commissioner recalled, and Pakistan was told to do likewise. Some barriers on trade between the two countries were raised. We pleaded with America to put pressure on Pakistan to terminate cross-border terrorism. Later, leaders from various political parties were despatched to different capitals to apprise them of Pakistan’s direct involvement in cross-border terrorism.

To further pressurise Pakistan, India mobilised its armed forces, moved troops even from the North-East and deployed the offensive formations as well. It was all part of coercive diplomacy and a plan to throw up clear signals that India has the will and the resolve to apply the full potential of its military power to dissuade Pakistan from continuing with cross-border terrorism. This message could not have got across effectively if we had initiated diplomatic steps alone and relied on the USA to put pressure on Pakistan, or merely committed the defensive formations. The aim obviously was to deploy the unfettered power of the Indian war machine, in its full range and scope, to bring into play the complete deterrence potential. All this had to be backed by an unmistakable and demonstrative resolve of the Indian political leadership that it was serious about mounting an offensive in the event Pakistan failed to mend its ways. Unless India convinced Pakistan that it was determined to tighten the screws, the exercise of mobilising troops and bringing offensive formations in their concentration areas was futile.

The military build-up did seem to create the desired effect, and discernible signals of course correction from Pakistan were in the air. Then the Indian Communications Minister and BJP spokesperson informed the international community, the visiting British Prime Minister, Mr Tony Blair, and the nation that the Indian deployment was “two hundred per cent defensive”. Mr Mahajan’s message unhesitatingly neutralised the coercive and deterrent value of the forward concentration of the country’s strike formations by exposing the Indian defensive mindset and the inability to appear firm. It, in fact, attempted to placate Pakistan and tell the British Prime Minister that the Indian deployment was purely defensive in character and that it had to take these steps due to its fears of an attack from the enemy. So that is Mr Mahajan’s and, in fact, India’s concept of deterrence. Instead of Pakistan calling India’s bluff, this country seems to have done it itself.

Then came the famous speech of January 12 by General Musharraf, essentially for the benefit of the USA and some other western countries. He appeared set to chart a new course, away from fundamentalism, jehadi culture and the climate of violence in Pakistan. It had in the past nurtured the Taliban, who in turn provided a favourable environment for the growth and spread of Al-Qaeda. So, yet another U-turn by General Musharraf, this time within Pakistan, away from religious fundamentalism and terrorism, was music to the US ears. Jehadi culture being bred in Pakistan could, directly or indirectly, reach the far off shores of America, so any move to arrest and eliminate this climate of terrorism was in the US interest. The speech was welcomed in India too, though it had very little to offer in specific terms. Mr Mahajan’s assertions that Indian troop deployment was “two hundred per cent defensive” must have had some bearing on General Musharraf’s speech as it pertained to issue effecting India. Thus Pakistan’s moral, political and diplomatic support to the “freedom struggle in Kashmir” was to continue. Yet there was hope that Pakistan would put an end to cross-border terrorism. We had to only wait for the results on the ground.

Mr Selig Harrison, Director of National Project at the Centre for International Policy in Washington, considered extremely influential among the think-tanks, is sceptical about General Musharraf putting an end to infiltration in J and K. He is of the opinion that General Musharraf has attempted to put up a smoke-screen of action with respect to Kashmir by talking of a crackdown on indigenous groups within Pakistan. Indian Service chiefs in a recent deposition before a parliamentary committee have stated that there is no decrease in infiltration into J and K. The data related to terrorist activity along the LoC is quite disturbing. For the month of January during the years 2000, 2001 and 2002 incidents on the border numbered 16, 153 and 412 (till January 23). RDX seizures were 14kg, 159kg, 225kg and AK-47 figures for the same month being 86, 74 and 112. Infiltration will continue because we thoughtlessly dithered on deterrence.
Two more events of significance took place. One, when the Chief of Army Staff conveyed to Pakistan through a Press conference India’s unequivocal and firm position on the nuclear issue, etc, the Defence Minister decided to publicly denigrate him. Second, the government in its infinite wisdom sacked the commander of the more potent offensive corps, allegedly at the behest of the US Secretary of State, Gen Colin Powell. The corps commander had allegedly carried out movements, though within own territory, but close to the border. Pakistan appeared to have protested to America against forward movements of Indian troops. The sacking of the GoC, 2 Corps, is being linked to this chain of events. The government utterly failed to come clear on this issue and, therefore, the rumour mill did roaring business. The recent statement by the Defence Minister, as part of damage control exercise, that the move of the GoC 2 Corps, is a normal posting has come a bit too late, and does not seem to wash. In any case, the damage has already been done. Together, these two incidents pointed to serious faultlines in the politico-military set-up in the country.

Strike formations are held well back and there is no possibility of their moving close to the border unless they are actually on their way to mounting an offensive, consequent to the start of a war. So, the story of the elements of this corps moving too close to the border simply does not jell. If some movement had taken place in the rear, for whatever reason, the act of sacking the corps commander, besides its debilitating effect on the morale of the army, amounts to an apology to Pakistan for the mistake of an erring corps commander. These two events — the denigration of the Army Chief and sacking of the GoC, 2 Corps — have sent out wrong signals to Pakistan on our ability to deter it from cross-border terrorism.

Clausewitz’s dictum that “Surprise is the most powerful element of victory” is all the more relevant to the Indian setting, where operations would be launched under conditions of parity. Consequently, Indian success in any future war will greatly depend on the surprise it is able to achieve. Surprise is easier achieved at the tactical level than at the strategic plane. Surprise at the strategic level will be contigent on the secrecy of the place and timings of the employment of our strike formations. In a war situation, Pakistan’s C-in-C would give his right arm to know which strike formations of the Indian Army would be launched where.

Pakistan’s C-in-C need not put himself to such great trouble. The Indian Press will tell him all. It tells us that X strike corps from Y station has been moved to Z location to be employed in A sector and much more. The whole scheme of defence reporting has been turned on its head. Young and raw journalists have been let loose and are constantly snapping at the heals of the Army with little or no idea as to what is defence news and what could mean a breach of security. The ban on their movements in the border districts has not come too soon, as some damage has already been done. But their compatriots continue to do their bit from the rear. Sensationalism is not good reporting on defence matters. A TV programme anchor, reporting on the Kargil war, tells us ad nauseam that she is “reporting from the bunker”, little knowing that a war cannot be reported from inside a bunker.

If the aim of this expensive exercise (besides turning a few million people into refugees) of mobilisation of the military was, ostensibly, to put pressure on Pakistan and deter it from undertaking cross-border terrorism, then that purpose stands defeated on our own accord. First by Mr Mahajan’s assertions of our adopting purely defensive posture; second by chiding the Army Chief and then, finally, by the sacking of a corps commander. We can now fight the “war of lists” of wanted persons by each country and learn to live with cross-border terrorism. This means we will continue to bleed. We lacked resources, but more vision and the will to create a powerful military which could have put the fear of Allah into Pakistan and to make it desist from continuing with the proxy war against India. The other possibility was to have looked afresh at the Indus Water Treaty, as suggested in these columns on August 22, 1998. The commencement of work on the tunnel to divert the waters of the Chenab itself was enough to bring Pakistan on the right track.

Finally, we seem to depend more and more on America to put pressure on Pakistan to stop cross-border terrorism. While India will have to fight its own battle, America will directly or indirectly get increasingly involved with the Kashmir problem. It already wants the FBI to investigate the shoot-out at the American Information Centre at Kolkata. While the Indian government agreed to this proposal, it was the firm stand by the West Bengal government which stopped this transgression of the Indian sovereignty.

The writer, a retired Lieut-General, was a Deputy Chief of Army Staff. 


http://www.tribuneindia.com/2002/20020204/edit.htm#3

Women in Army

Yes, but not in combat roleby Lt. Gen (retd) Harwant Singh

INTENSE competition amongst the press and TV channels makes them pick up the most innocuous incidents and stories and sensationalise these to no end. Headlines appear and chat shows and surveys are organised, opinions obtained and instant reactions demanded, leaving little scope for sober, deliberate and rational examination of issues. The vice chief of the army was quoted out of context and the defence minister took the exceptionable step of making him tender a public apology. Sushma Swaraj lost no time in leaping on to the bandwagon. Gauging the public mood the defence minister went overboard and talked of inducting women into the combat arms of the army in the hope of drawing some political mileage out of the issue.


Speaking to a group of air force officers, Pranab Mukherjee forgot, or perhaps, did not know, the rank of the Chief of Air Staff or his name. Possibly, he does not know much about combat either; the extreme violence, brutality, privation, suffering; limbs being torn apart, scattering of pieces of flesh, burning alive and bayonets piercing bodies is all part of combat. It is into this hell that the Indian defence minister wants to push our women.

It was General Rodrigues who, as the Chief of Army Staff, opened the gate to women for entry into the officer cadre and to start with, only in certain wings of the army and in the WSES category. It was a wise decision and these women have done well and measured up to the expectations. In a recent order the government has done well in bringing their service conditions, pay and allowances at par with male short service commissioned officers.

There have been a few teething problems with lady officers, but nothing abnormal or alarming. One of them had preferred a false TA/DA claim and had to face the wrath of military law. The presiding officer of the General Court Marshal was a woman, of the rank of a brigadier. Yet the accused and the press tried to bring in extraneous issues, little realising that a false TA/DA claim in the defence services can send the accused to prison for a few years, while the lady in point was merely dismissed from service. There is no gender bias whatever. Quite the contrary, women are shown the highest respect and deference.

It is not to say that there have been no administrative problems in the management of lady doctors in the army. The DG Army Medical Corps once told me that he could not post lady doctors to remote areas where she would be the sole female or to units as medical officers. Thus the load of field postings and to remote areas was borne entirely by male doctors. Once married, they want to be posted along side their husbands, which, very often is not possible.

Women have done well in most fields and in some, even excelled men, such as in civil services, the corporate world and the police. However, the army is a different ball game altogether, more so the combat element of it. Then there are the stresses, strain and pressures peculiar to the defence services. In fact these start from the day one enters the academy. Some break down within days of joining.

Our company at the IMA was free of ragging of new entrants and the relations between seniors and juniors were friendly. So there was no pressure or stress, off parade hours. Yet some cadets could not take the pressure of the routine schedule of the initial few weeks and would throw up their hands and ask for release. As a senior, I tried to persuade one such cadet to hang on and to put up with the pressure for a few more days as the tempo by then would considerably ease, but his will-power had deserted him and he was totally finished. This run-away cadet from the IMA later became the defence secretary. The point is that military service is quite different from the civil services.

Not many are aware of the conditions under which those in the combat arms have to operate and live. During training and combat, physical stress apart, these women will have to share small tents, bivouacs or bunkers with the men. Sharing a blanket with a soldier may have to be accepted. Then there is the issue of isolation and loneliness for these women. Using common toilet facilities with no privacy what-so-ever is another feature during training and combat. Wounded are attended by companions and the unit medical officer. Wounds can be anywhere on the body. Remember women entrants into the IAF had refused to be subjected to medical tests by male doctors.

Then there is the other angle of working conditions, where constant body contact is unavoidable. The potential for allegation of sexual harassment is inbuilt into the situation. Take the case of a modern tank, particularly the type that the Indian army is equipped with. The space within the fighting compartment is extremely restricted. Thus in the ‘closed down’ mode, as it would be in combat and during training, the tank commander’s knees grip the arm pits of the gunner.
I do not know of a tank commander who can carry on with his onerous duties and the main job of locating the enemy and engaging him while there is a woman between his knees (as young officers these women will have to function as tank gunners too). Or a gunner who can shoot straight at the enemy tank while he sits straddled between the knees of his young lady tank commander. So this will not work, Mr Mukherjee. Combat apart, such working conditions alone make the entry of women in the armoured corps, one of the two combat arms of the army, inappropriate.

Admittedly there is a case for induction of women into the defence services in increased numbers. However, their entry into the combat arms, if at all, needs rational examination, attitudinal changes in Indian society and time.


http://www.tribuneindia.com/2006/20060818/edit.htm#6

The unrest in Kashmir

Blame failures at the political levelby Lt-Gen Harwant Singh (retd )

IT was the winter of 1963 when the holy relic at the Hazratbal Shrine in Srinagar went missing. News spread like wildfire and a huge crowd assembled in Srinagar town. A police station, tehsil headquarters and Bakshi Ghulam Mohammed’s hotel, then under construction, were set on fire. The fire-fighting vehicles that were called to the scene were also attacked. Then the military’s fire-fighting vehicles accompanied by a fully armed platoon were sent to the area. The civil administration simply panicked and handed over the city of Srinagar to the Army.


The Army moved two of its battalions from Baramullah and made them camp at the centre of the town. The 300-odd vehicles which had only recently returned from Ladakh were moved at midnight towards Baramullah and then brought back at day-break, giving the impression that the whole division had been moved to Srinagar.

While crowds continued to gather in the town for the next couple of days, no untoward incident took place. Troops with their officers were out day and night to show their presence and appeared determined to take firm action to deal with any mischief. Till then the military’s presence had a salutary effect on the mobs, which unfortunately has been eroded due to its excessive use for such tasks. Since then much water has flowed down the Jhelum; the political scene, too, has undergone a sea change; crowds have become more restive, and hardliners multiplied. Politics in the valley has become of the very base variety.

There is no apparent reason or rationale for the present turmoil in the valley. There is a functional government, as caring and efficient as any in the country. Unemployment is a permanent feature all across India, more in many other parts of the country. Employment opportunities everywhere have not been able to keep pace with population explosion. Two decades of violence is not the state’s doing but that of Pakistan and the hardliner separatists. Frustration in the ranks of the political parties now out of power and others who stoke fires of discontent at every turn of events, aided and abetted by Pakistan, is the primary cause of the ongoing trouble.

In crowd control, when all other means fail and fire has to be opened as a last resort, the governing principal is to shoot to incapacitate, not to kill. How then has the police and the CRPF been shooting to kill? This form of fire has been leading to a cascading cycle of protests and more killings. Police officers who should be there to ensure that policemen exercise restrain are not to be seen and have left the field to hawaldars and inspectors.

Intelligence agencies, whose performance has invariably been poor, failed to gather information concerning stone pelting, a new form of protest involving young men and others behind this nefarious activity. There are reports of regular payments having been made to stone-pelters. It is likely that quite a few killings are the result of fire from terrorists hiding in the surrounding buildings. Ingenious are the ways of mischief-makers.

While India has poured hundreds of millions of rupees into the state and is continuing with the practice, most of it has been finding its way into corrupt pockets and the balance mainly deployed in the valley. Thus, people below poverty line in the valley are only 4 to 5 per cent. There has been complete political freedom, and free and fair elections have been regularly held.

Yet thousands have died at the hands of terrorists. Fathers of both Mirwaiz Umar Farooq and Sajjad Lone were murdered by terrorists. Mehbooba Mufti’s sister was kidnapped, and her rescue in exchange for the release of some terrorists was the starting point of the turmoil in the valley. Yet they have never uttered a word against the terrorists and insurgents. It is only the security forces who are the whipping boys for them.

Those of us who have spent many years in J and K, both at the grassroots level and among higher echelons, have maintained that there are no moderates in the valley. On August 13, after the Friday prayers, the Mirwaiz realised that it was an opportune moment to take off the moderate mask and declared that he wanted no financial package, no jobs, no autonomy and no Indian military, but only “azadi”!

Farooq Kathwari, a US-based Indian, was invited to India in 1999 to put forward his proposal for the “way forward”, thus indicating a change in the Indian strategic perspective. The Kathwari Plan pointed to a quasi-independent state, which eventually would have led to independent Greater Muslim Kashmir. The Regional Autonomy Report of the National Conference envisaged a division of the state along the same lines as General Musharraf did later on. However, such a proposal is incompatible with the secular character of India. That is why Article 370 remains a transitory provision.

Considering the stand taken by the desparate groups in the valley, no useful talks are possible. Nor can the sops being offered by the Prime Minister work. It is time New Delhi got real and dealt firmly with the situation. We have allowed this problem to simmer for too long.

The idea of open or soft borders in J and K is fraught with serious security implications, more so when the Americans pull out of Afghanistan and the Taliban regain their foothold in that country. Thereafter their focus, that of jihadi groups and the ISI will shift to J and K. Soft borders in J and K can only be considered when we have soft borders elsewhere with Pakistan. Equally, the proposal for greater autonomy or quasi-independence will have a domino effect elsewhere in India and may eventually lead to Balkanisation of the country: a long-term aim of some of our adversaries.

India has failed to draw the people of the valley into the national mainstream and this has been the principal failure at the political level. Article 370 has been the main stumbling block towards this assimilation. If hardliners and other anti-national elements do not give up their nefarious activities, then India must seriously consider abrogation of Article 370. The nation must show the resolve to bite the bullet and integrate the people of J and K into the national mainstream.

Attempts are on to water down the Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA). The Army Chief has already expressed his views on the subject, and the others who have a long experience of counter-insurgency operations warn us that this watering down of the Act will render the military ineffective. We must keep in view the long-term implications of any step that we take.

http://www.tribuneindia.com/2010/20100823/edit.htm#4

Career in the military

Selling soap and Army not the sameby Lt-Gen Harwant Singh (retd)

THE Indian Army has contracted an advertising agency for Rs 7.5 crore to woo the country’s youth to pursue a career in the Army. The agency, using the soap selling techniques and advertising skills, promises a great lifestyle of glamour, excitement, waltzing in grand officers’ messes with beautiful ladies, playing polo, riding fine ponies, paragliding and golfing all the way, and much more. The agency goes on to ask the prospective candidate, “do you have it in you,” to take it all!


This desperate, perhaps ill-advised and expensive step, to hire an ad agency, had to be taken because few suitable candidates are opting for a career in the Army. This has led to paucity of officers though the Army has been accepting lower levels of performance at the selection centres.
Advertising agencies may deliver when it comes to promoting sale of soap, toothpaste and other consumer items. Promoters of housing schemes with fancy sketches are able to attract many a gullible buyer. But an informed consumer takes a number of other factors into consideration before making a choice. For him packaging, visibility, quality, cross-checking with friends, newspaper reports, other options and cost play an important part. All these issues come into play in varying degrees in arriving at the final decision. A prospective candidate would take all these issues into consideration before making a bid for a career in the Army.

There is no glamour left in a military career and this point is too obvious for any one to miss. Military officers no longer travel in uniform or wear it outside cantonments because the uniform has lost its glamour, charm, and regrettably, even the respect and deference due to it. No one ever visits a government office wearing a uniform, because he would be cold-shouldered and his work never done. As a military officer, one is loathe to grease palms and nothing gets done in a government office by clean hands.

Golf and polo will remain a distance dream for the vast majority. What the Army will provide are, ample opportunities to develop leadership skills, camaraderie, initiative and a competitive spirit. There would be clean, healthy and orderly environment of a cantonment life to enjoy. It will keep one physically fit and mentally alert. Playing robust games with troops will be compulsory. Army career provides an opportunity to see this great country, its nooks and corners. One will get to see and feel national integration at its best. But in a materialistic world, all this does not take one far, when a frugal lifestyle and a limited budget is the ultimate reward.

Long separation from families, not seeing children grow up and ensure good education for them, repeated tenures in high altitudes, postings to uncongenial and remote areas and a lonely life at the posts are all part of a military career. Risk, stress and pressures of counter-insurgency operations lead to a multitude of medical and related problems, which are integral to Army life. No advertising agency can whitewash these basic drawbacks of service in the Army.

A cardinal principle of military leadership is not to make false promises. Breaching this time-honoured adage has it own perils, especially in the military. What the advertising agency promises is neither true nor can be delivered. Those few, who are tempted by the rosy picture painted by an advertising agency, will soon be disenchanted and become a liability to the service.
As economies look up and job opportunities and choice of professions increase, the competition shifts from amongst the employee to the employer. It is absurd for government employees, to ask for parity (in terms of pay, perks etc) with those in the corporate world, as the bureaucracy in Delhi are busy preparing such a case to present to the Sixth Pay Commission.

The Army has to compete with the Civil Services in the job market. Since service in the Army has marked disadvantages, it has to be made more attractive than Civil Services in terms of pay, perks and pension to compensate for all the handicap of a military career.

What the Indian Army faces today has been the experience of other armies too. However, those armies did not lower intake standards nor resort to cheap gimmicks of advertising through ad-agencies. Instead, they have opted to live with shortages and insisted that the government make the service attractive by compensating for all the disadvantages a career in the Army suffers from. In Britain, the top brass simply dug its heels and made the government relent on making the military service more attractive than the civil service. After all there is no compromise possible on the issue of national security.

The military’s top brass has to get real, take heart and tell the government that a career in the military has to be made attractive to draw the right material into the officer cadre. Nothing short of that will work. Long separation from families, education of children, running of two establishments, extremely limited promotion avenues, early retirement and stress and risk factors have to be adequately compensated.

 The issue of “running pay band” for the Army officers, to compensate for lack of promotion avenues was taken up with the Fourth Pay Commission. In this case, the officer who misses on promotion continues to get increments in his pay and allowances, based on the length of service. General K. Sundarji, during his visits to my division prior to Operation Brass Tacks, told me that he had given his resignation to the Chairman, Chiefs of Staff Committee to use it, in case, “running pay band” was not accepted. Another Army Chief had to take a similar step to get free rations for the officers.

The Fifth Pay Commission took away the provision of “running pay band” and there was not a whimper from the Service Chiefs. Unless they impress upon the government the need for a substantial compensation in terms of pay, allowances and pension for their officers, for all the disadvantages a career in the Army suffers from, the Army will not be able to attract officers. The nation will either have to live with the shortages or accept lower standards and in both cases will have to accept the related fallout on the country’s security. No country can aspire to be a world power with a second-rate military.

The writer is a former Deputy Chief of the Army Staff

http://www.tribuneindia.com/2006/20061126/edit.htm#1

Why deterrence never worked

A classic case of diminishing returnsHarwant Singh

The decision of the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) presumably on the advice of the National Security Advisory Board (NASB — an unwieldy and poorly constituted body) to pull back the troops from the border has not come a day too soon. Continued deployment of troops in their battle locations had come to serve no useful purpose and was, in fact, turning into a case of diminishing returns. It is, perhaps, the time to analyse the effectiveness of our coercive diplomacy and deployment of defence forces to deter Pakistan from carrying out cross-border terrorism. How far were the objectives achieved? Was the very idea of deterrence, in the given situation, flawed? However, it may be recalled that in a lead article, “Dithering on deterrence” dated February 4, 2002, we had pointed out that “We can now fight the ‘war of lists’ of wanted personnel... and learn to live with cross-border terrorism.... We lacked resources, but more the vision and the will to create a powerful military which could put the fear of Allah into Pakistan and make it desist from continuing with proxy war against India,” which it engineered right from the eighties; starting with Punjab.


The initial decision to mobilise the defence services and their deployment for an offensive, consequent to the terrorist attack on Indian Parliament on December 13, 2001, was more a knee-jerk reaction than a part of a well thought-out and thought-through strategy . After all, India had been suffering unending cross-border terrorist attacks in J and K for close to 12 years. It was more the lack of suffering understanding of what could constitute coercive diplomacy and military deterrence and their synergy in the given circumstances that could result in a coherent and purposeful outcome. The so-called economic sanctions imposed on Pakistan, the denial of Indian airspace to civil flights, withdrawal of staff from our High Commission etc had no effect on its economy, nor was there any appreciable diplomatic fallout, nor were the operations of Pakistan Airlines seriously hampered. But a reciprocal action by that country for our civil flights denied us direct access to Kabul at a critical juncture when the future of Afghanistan was being reshaped and Indian help and presence had become essential. Though we do reach out to Kabul, but only by a circuitous route. While we removed the restrictions on Pakistani civil flights, the counter-restrictions continue for reasons to keep us as much out of the Kabul picture as possible.

The dictionary meaning of coercion implies that it must restrain by force, and consequently coercive policy must have the power to coerce. Similarly, deterrence must have the means to frighten, hinder, or prevent the opponent from doing something you do not want him to do. In simpler terms, it means that the one resorting to deterrence must have, not only the necessary wherewithal to apply a credible force, which when applied would inflict unacceptable damage on the opponent but also the essential will to do so. It must carry conviction with the one on whom deterrence is focused. In the event the desired corrections in the policies and actions etc of the opponent does not come about, consequent to the application of deterrence, then the manifestation of the application of force would undeniably surface. The entire gambit of mobilisation and deployment of Indian defence forces must be looked through the prism of these elementary features of deterrence and its application. Mere resort to rhetoric, such as, “proactive policy”, “zero tolerance,” “ruthlessly dealing with terrorists,” “Aar par ki Larrai,” etc had failed to impress Pakistan. Therefore, it had convinced itself that the Indian leadership lacked the essential will to act firmly for one, and it did not have the necessary military superiority to severely punish Pakistan. While it may not be unreasonable to assume that Pakistan banked on the international community to refrain India from attacking, it depended more on its own ability to last out well, an Indian offensive.

Nearly a decade and a half of starving of the Indian defence forces of essential funds had substantially debilitated its offensive potential. Not only was modernisation given a goby, even replacement of obsolete and obsolescent equipment could not be carried out. Building up of necessary stocks of reserves of ammunition and other war-like stores up to minimum acceptable levels had not been possible. All this could not be lost on our adversaries. The addition of 320, state of the art T-80 tanks to Pakistan’s inventory, along with a whole range of other equipment in the early 1990s, vastly improved its potential to stall a possible Indian ground offensive. On the other hand, the Indian position saw only a downward slide due to the aging of existing holdings of equipment and want of replacement of wastages due to normal wear and tear.
While the IAF, as always, enjoyed marked superiority over the PAF, the unremitting frequency with which its frontline MiG-21 aircraft have been falling out of the sky threw up a range of unhelpful signals.

The Indian Navy has long been a neglected service. To offset the Indian superiority in tanks, aircraft, ground troops etc, Pakistan depends more on their counters in way of anti-tank, anti-aircraft capabilities and firepower etc. The essential information about most armies, down to units and their equipment profiles, is available in various international publications. So Pakistan, as also we, have been aware of each other’s military capabilities.

These unfortunate ground realities could not, as some of us expected, frighten Pakistan out of its wits once the Indian deployment for an offensive was put in place. In fact, General Pervez Musharraf made bold to declare that there was balance of power in South Asia. Consequently crossborder terrorism continued unabated, with the normal fluctuation in its frequency and intensity. When the attack on the families of Indian soldiers at Kaluchack took place and the Indian cup of patience at last seemed to overflow and our offensive appeared imminent, some of us who saw on TV, the discomfiture of General Pervez Musharraf felt that, at last, the military deterrence was having the desired effect, but any right-thinking Indian too was equally perturbed at the prospects of a war.

Around that time Pakistan’s representative at the UN had talked rather irresponsibly, of the certainty of use of nuclear weapons by his country, in the event of an Indian offensive. This posturing by Pakistan in itself had brought added pressure from the USA for reigning-in the jehadi elements operating in J and K, as also a possible threat of “taking out” of Pakistan’s nuclear capability, seemed to work. Viewed from this angle, the June, 2002, speech of General Musharraf can be rationalised. As time passed and there appeared no gains from the continued deployment of the Indian defence forces and no facesaving device appeared viable, General Musharraf was constrained to remark that it was not for him to provide the same. Finally, the successful conclusion of elections in J and K provided the figleaf and the much needed escape route for withdrawal of troops.

The nuclear factor had come into play in the nineties itself, as Pakistan was known to have covert capability in this field. At least on two previous occasions, it had threatened to use nuclear weapons to thwart a possible Indian offensive and the same had, in that country’s perception, worked. Therefore, at the initial stages of troop deployment in December, 2001, the Indian concern centred on the nuclear capability of Pakistan and the prospects of use of nuclear weapons by that country were factored into Indian calculations. However, a more detailed analysis by some of the defence experts (‘Military Build-up on Indo-Pak Border’ The Tribune dated January 16, 2002) obviously appeared to have resolved the Indian dilemma and made clear the fact that Pakistan would not risk taking recourse to such an action as it would certainly result in the decimation of that country.

Once Pakistan acquired the covert nuclear capability as a hedge against the so-called Indian military superiority, it was time for this country to think afresh and recast and redefine her strategic thinking. There was the need to reorient and realign defence policies and military strategy. Instead, our political leadership and the top brass in the defence services continued to prepare for the last war and that too half heartedly. We ought to have shifted the focus of our priorities to another area, which not only met our immediate concerns but also our long-term strategic security requirements. However, we continued to think in terms of more tanks, heavy guns, self propelled guns etc. While the Arun Singh Committee was quick to grasp the need for this reorientation, the more hidebound top brass continues to display rigidity in its thinking and resistance to change.

Mobilisation of the armed forces and their move back to the barracks, consumption of fuel, compensation for crop damaged, dislocation of over a million people, etc, would perhaps work out to nearly Rs 10000 crore. Large tracts of the border have been mined. Demining of the areas could lead to more casualties and most of the mines would be unsafe for future handling and will need to be replaced. Expensive equipment exposed to the elements would have suffered deterioration. Some of the highly secret troop dispositions have been revealed. Above all, deterrence as such is less likely to work in the future. All this failed to achieve any worthwhile results.

Finally, the elections in J and K and the formation of a new government there is not likely to bring about a sea change in the situation in that state as it relates to cross-border terrorism. The developments in Pakistan, more so the emergence of MMA as a political force in the crucial provinces does not augur well for that country, but more so for peace in J and K. India has to be prepared for the long haul. While we retain, nay enhance, out capabilities to deal firmly with cross-border terrorism in J and K, there should be no aversion to entering into a comprehensive dialogue with Pakistan on all issues, even if cross-border terrorism is not completely terminated.— The writer is a retired Lt-General.




http://www.tribuneindia.com/2002/20021109/edit.htm#4

AFSPA doesn’t need change

Harsh law helps in the fight against insurgentsby Lt-Gen Harwant Singh ( retd )

HUMAN rights activists and some political parties, both in J and K and the North-East, have been demanding scrapping of the Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA). Under pressure from these groups, the government is considering removing or amending some of the provisions in the Act which are considered offensive. It is also being projected that of the 160-odd cases taken up for the prosecution of military personnel involved in human rights violations. The Government of India has not given sanction even in one case.


As a result of prolonged agitation in Manipur, the government appointed Justice Reddy Commission to examine the need for abrogating the AFSPA. The commission did recommend that the Act should be scrapped and in its place some provisions such as immunity to security personnel against arrest be incorporated in the Unlawful Activities Act. While these recommendation(s) were not accepted, the need for making the Act humane appeared acceptable. The Prime Minister announced this while speaking at a function at the Kalinga Fort in Imphal.

The AFSPA, was promulgated to combat Naga insurgency in the North-East more than half a century ago. Later, when insurgency surfaced in J and K, its application was extended to that state too. Causes of insurgency in the North-East lay in complex and intractable politico-socio-economic areas, which led to the feeling of alienation among the people of the region. The underlying causes for the insurgency in J and K are altogether of a different genre. When appropriate measures are not taken in time in a comprehensive and vigorous manner, disenchantment and disaffection can spread among most sections of society. Where terrain favours insurgency and outside help is at hand, the problem can take a virulent form, making the task of the security forces all the more difficult.

It is not to argue that there have been no human rights violations by security forces, but invariably the issues have been sensationalised out of proportion by the media, more so by TV channels. Intense competition among them adds urgency to such news. Added to this is the lack of knowledge and understanding of the very nature of the fight against a brutal insurgency. The vicious nature of counter-insurgency operations carried out by the Indian Army is best judged by the fact that it has lost over 560 officers and more than 8500 troops in these operations.
Two incidents, one from the North-East and another from J and K which received vide publicity, would make the issue of false propaganda apparent. It may be recalled that a few years ago the incident of death of Manorma coincided with the extension of the AFSPA in Manipur. Secessionist elements linking the two incidents levelled all manner of allegations against the military (Assam Rifles). Manorma was a PLA member involved in terrorist acts of laying IEDs (improvised explosive devices) spread over a period of two years, leading to the death of six civilians and two military personnel. At the time of her arrest, a transmitter and grenade were recovered from her. While two independent autopsies ruled out rape and torture, the charge of rape against the security personnel was persistently being made out in the media. The nature of her bullet injuries confirmed the escape story.

The second, an equally sensational case, relates to the death of two women at Shopian in J and K, which kicked up great uproar in the valley and saw political skullduggery of the worst kind. The charge of murder and rape was pinned on the security forces. Local doctors, who performed the initial autopsies, confirmed rape and murder. Yet when these bodies were exhumed and an independent group of doctors performed the second set of autopsies, murder and rape were ruled out and death was attributed to drowning. In J and K the causes of alleged disaffection are entirely political. It suits the political class and fundamentalist to sustain the climate of uncertainty, and some in Delhi too have vested interests in continuing with this state of affairs.
In an insurgency environment, miscreants and their sympathisers are always out to discredit the security forces and that way they give further boost to the alienation of the people by portraying security forces as oppressive and anti-people. Where the exchange of fire between the security forces and insurgents take place in populated areas, civilians do sometimes get in the line of fire. In such situations often the insurgents inflict casualties on innocents caught in the crossfire in the sure belief that the blame for such casualties will invariably be pinned on the security forces.
The military, when called upon to combat insurgency, does not have even police powers. Without the AFSPA the military would be rendered toothless. It would find itself dragged into unending litigation on often trumped-up charges. Since action against insurgents is carried out at the section/platoon and even company level, an alleged fake encounter or human rights violation, the case in a civil court will tie all of them up for years in legal battle: some as accused and others as witnesses. Faced with such a prospect, too much caution and prevarication will come into play and success will invariably elude the military.

In a counter-insurgency setting the environment is akin to a war zone, yet in the midst of own people where either one kills first or gets killed. When death lurks around every corner and is only one false step away and such a state prevails for long periods, it can turn men into monsters. It is only the iron discipline and effective leadership, which is up-front and shares the same set of dangers as the men, that retraint is exercised and excesses don’t take place.
Counter-insurgency operations are a messy affair and under certain circumstances, collateral damage is inevitable. Sometimes this can be due to the error of judgment and at other times because of the need for immediate elimination of insurgents. In an insurgency environment, the line between an insurgent and a peaceful citizen can be hazy, especially where intelligence is poor or faulty, which is often the case. An insurgent can just drop a weapon in a bush and pose as a peaceful citizen. Troops often face such dilemmas.

It would be incorrect to contend that troops never indulge in human rights violations. Though Indian troops are God-fearing, religious and refrain from inhuman acts, there have been a few cases of killings, torture and custodial deaths, both in the North-East and J and K. The military authorities do not accept the violation of human rights by their officers and troops even against insurgents. Every case of alleged violation of human rights is fully investigated through the military’s own internal mechanism. During the last 15 years, 1400 cases of violation of human rights were reported against the Army. From detailed investigations of these, it transpired that only 54 had some substance. This resulted in a large number of court-marshals where the punishment ranged from life imprisonment to termination of services. As many as 37 officers were punished.

Abrogating the AFSPA or removing some of its key provisions in an attempt to make it “humane” could place the security forces at a great disadvantage in their fight against a vicious insurgency. Any watering down of the Act will result in de-motivating the troops whose lawful actions may expose them to decades of litigation in civil courts. Violent nature of counter-insurgency operations, the Army’s own casualties and its action against those found violating human rights should give some comfort to the votaries of human rights. Human Rights activists target only the military. The nation should be aware of the sacrifices made by our troops daily to combat this scourge. Altering the basic structure of the AFSPA in an effort to make it “humane” will place the troops in a most unenviable position and will be a de-motivating factor in the fight against insurgency.




http://www.tribuneindia.com/2010/20100426/edit.htm#4

India’s win in ’65 war

Chavan to blame for flaws in directionby Lt-Gen Harwant Singh (retd)

Y.B. Chavan

AUTOBIOGRAPHIES are rarely completely objective and therefore, seldom reflect the true record of the author’s actions and deeds, more so those that are less edifying, whereas personal diaries are less likely to suffer from such infirmities. Even so, some attempt at justification of one’s actions are inevitable; sometimes for self assurance and where there is the possibility of the diary being reduced in a book form, then it falls in the same genre as autobiography.


Where reliance is placed on hearsay, the contents may not be accurate and thus tend to misrepresent events and actions. R. D. Pradhan as private secretary to Y.B. Chavan has relied heavily on Chavan’s diary for his book. (I. Ramamohan Rao’s article, “How India won the 1965 war: Y.B. Chavan’s diary reveals the inside story”, Perspective, June 17).
Certain important developments relating to the 1965 war with Pakistan, gleaned from the diary do not bear close scrutiny and on others. Chavan projects himself as if he took time sensitive decisions all on his own, without clearance from the Cabinet.

Chavan took over as Defence Minister soon after Indian army had a drubbing from the Chinese. It is during Chavan’s watch that on one side Pakistan was being armed to the teeth by the Americans and on the other, Indian army was being starved of contemporary equipment and drawn into fruitless arguments by his ministry to have 17 instead of 21 divisions as projected by the army.

Thus, when the war started on September 1, 1965, Indian army, according to Gen Harbaksh, was in no position to engage Pakistan in an all out war. India had 608 tanks of World War II vintage (180 Centurions and 90 AMXs were of mid forties period), 625 artillery pieces of all calibers and 35 infantry brigades. As against these, Pakistan had 765 tanks, which included 352 Patton tanks (state of the art tank of that period), 552 artillery pieces of all types, but of higher calibre and better range, 26 infantry brigades and 9000 Razakars. Pakistan had two armoured divisions against one of India. How did this disparity in force equation come about? Chavan’s diary and Pradhan as his then private secretary skip this intriguing poser.

Pakistan launched a full-scale offensive in the early hours of September 1, 1965, and yet the Indian Air Force, according to Chavan, went into action at 4.45 p.m. and, that too, when Gen Chaudhuri and Air Chief Arjun Singh came to his office and sought his approval. Why this delay of more than 12 hours? Who was in charge of the war during that critical period of over 12 hours? Why was Chavan’s permission required for deploying air power when the enemy had already launched a full scale offensive?

Obviously, there continued to be serious flaws in the overall direction of war, for which Chavan must bear responsibility. Yet Pradhan holds out Chavan’s clearance for deploying IAF as very prompt.

Chavan does not appear to be adequately informed about the progress of operations. Pradhan tells us (obviously gleaned from Chavan’s diary) that the IAF’s going into action late in the afternoon of September 1 saved the nation from a major catastrophe. Where as Gen Harbaksh in his book, War dispatches, records that the IAF on that day did little damage to the enemy and instead took heavy toll of own troops. It destroyed all the artillery ammunition, one vehicle carrying tank ammunition, damaged three AMXs tanks and one armoured recovery vehicle.
Coming to the more contentious issue of Gen Chaudhuri’s proposal to pull back Indian troops behind the river Beas, Chavan’s recordings in his diary are based on hearsay or mere gossip or perhaps it is Pradhan’s own addition. There are many versions to this story. Now Pradhan tells us that this proposal was dropped after heated discussions between Chaudhuri and Harbaksh.
Reference to this story first appeared in print in Gen Harbaksh’s second book, In the line of duty, while there is no mention of it in his first book, War dispatches, written soon after the war. Harbaksh’s Chief of Staff, Maj-Gen Joginder Singh in his book Behind the scene makes no mention of it.

Order to fall back on Beas gained currency after Gen Chaudhuri and Joginder had died. There are any number of versions to this canard. Capt Amrinder Singh says that he heard a late evening telephone conversation between Chaudhuri and Harbaksh on the subject. K. Subramanyam writes that General Chaudhuri had sought Prime Minister Shastri’s permission to pull back troops behind Beas and that the PM refused the permission. Inder Malhotra has his own twist to the story. Harbaksh himself refers to the meeting with Gen Chaudhuri on September 10 at Ambala.
Now any one even casually acquainted with military operations will know that in the absence of any request from the field commander for a pull back, no higher commander will contemplate nor rush to the PM seeking permission for an act of such far reaching implications. For a moment if we are to assume that the situation on the front was so desperate (of which Harbaksh was unaware!) that withdrawal to a position in the rear was the only course left to continue the fight, the PM by refusing permission would merely court a bigger disaster.

Even if the army chief were to contemplate such a drastic step, he would surely discuss it with his Director Military Operations. The then DMO totally denied any such development. Gen Chaudhuri’s personal Staff Officer, Gen Sandhu, who always remained with him and took copious notes at all meetings and instructions of the army chief and immediately passed these to those who were to take action, emphatically denies contemplation of any such move by the chief.
Information flows from the front to higher headquarters in the rear, while orders flow in the opposite direction. So it is completely illogical for any one to argue that when the commander at the front is confident of holding the enemy in check, those in command in the rear would ask him to pull back and give such a dangerous turn to the conduct of battle.

Look at the issue from another angle. Troops at the front were fully embroiled with the enemy and under such conditions disengagement and taking positions in the rear could result in chaos if not a rout. So some fresh troops would have been required to take up positions in the rear and cover the withdrawal of troops engaged with the enemy. In this case at least one fresh infantry brigade was required to take up positions on the Beas. But there was no brigade available for such a task. There were no reserves.

Chaudhuri was a very capable general with a lifetime of study of the art of war. For Chavan or others to give credence to such fibs merely strains their own credulity. One would have expected the wartime Defence Minister’s diary to contain more informed and authentic record of events of that eventful period. He seems to contribute to the fog that continues to persist over this important period of Indian history. Like many before him, his diary disappoints.

The writer is a former Deputy Chief of Army Staff

http://www.tribuneindia.com/2007/20070708/edit.htm#1

Malfeasance in the military

It can be relied upon to apply the correctives by Lt-Gen Harwant Singh (retd)

FOR some time the military has been much in the news for almost all the wrong reasons. With the increasing number of scandals and scams being reported by the media, one cannot help but suffer the sinking feeling that the Indian military, too, along with almost every other constituent of the government is on the downward slide. Some may argue that the military can be no other than a mirror image of society from which it draws its manpower. Even so the ethos, the sense of honour and discipline in the military make it apart from society at large and as such can be relied upon to apply the correctives and stay on course.


It may be instructive to put in the right perspective some of the scams which have in the recent past drawn attention of the media and seem to tarnish the military’s fair image. Take the case of Sukna scandal. It relates to the issue of the No-Objection Certificate ( NOC ) to a private party for building a school on a piece of land outside the cantonment (not Army land). This NOC contravened a law that no civil construction can be allowed within 1000 yards of the cantonment boundary, but there has to be a notification to that end by the civil authority. In this case,there was no notification. Even so, the NOC issue was taken as an improper act and disciplinary action initiated against the officers concerned, including three general-rank officers.

In the Tehelka episode, one senior officer was put behind the bars and the career of another general came to an end for merely accepting dinner from a Tehelka team. Some others suffered various degrees of punishment. As against this, those from the Ministry of Defence and involved in the case are yet to be punished. The additional secretary who accepted a gold chain from the Tehelka team was soon promoted. One defence secretary charge-sheeted in the Bofors case, instead of facing proceedings against him, was given the assignment of a Lt-Governor, placing him outside the reach of the long arm of the law. Another defence secretary was indicted by the Delhi High Court for altering the annual confidential report (an official document) of an air force officer. He was merely shifted to another ministry. Then there was the case of a defence secretary who on his own went ahead and entered into a dubious deal for the purchase of one lakh rifles for the Army for which no ammunition was available in the world market. Nothing happened against him. It would be interesting to note that none of these cases were brought to light by any internal mechanism of the Ministry of Defence. This was done by outside agencies.
In the case of some other scandals and fake encounters by Army men, which have been in public domain, action was taken and those involved were arrested, including a few senior-level officers, while some others were given a range of punishments. A number of cases reported later have not seen timely disposal, as the officers concerned have been seeking relief from civil courts, resulting in delays. They may be able to buy time, but in no way will they escape the wrath of the military law.

In the high-voltage case relating to the Adarsh Housing Society flats in Mumbai, the malfeasance is far more serious than the Sukna scam. In this particular case, the land (named Khukhri Park) was given to the Army by the civil administration a few decades earlier in exchange for some land of the Army elsewhere, taken by the civil administration to make a bypass, etc. Since this land was given to the Army, in the first place it should have come on the land records of the Defence Estates Department (a department of the MoD). This was obviously not done and the land remained on the records of the civil administration, though ipso facto the land belonged to the military and was in its possession. There is no provision under which this piece of land could be given to anybody, even to Kargil widows/heroes, without sanction from the Union Cabinet in Delhi. Putting the label of “Kargil war widows/heroes” on the Adarsh Housing Society appears to have been a later-day innovation.

It was the implied ambiguity in the ownership of the land which was exploited by RC Thakur, a functionary in the Defence Estates Office ( DEO ) at Mumbai. Though the military was the de-facto and de-jure owner of this land, slip-up, intentional or otherwise by the Defence Estates office, in not taking it on its records was of little consequence. While the military land records are maintained by the Defence Estate Office, it is the Army Commander who is the custodian of all kinds of military land within his command.

The sub-area commander of the military station at Colaba (who later came back as area commander after an NDC course), the subsequent area commanders and some others most shamefully collaborated in this nefarious scheme. They also roped in some of their greedy seniors. Not to be left out, those in the politico-bureaucratic set-up who were to give various clearances for the project picked up slices of the cake for themselves, friends and relatives. Eventually they formed the majority. Some others who could and were equally desperate for that piece of cake too joined in. Since this building was originally meant to have only six floors, its foundation would have been laid to cater to that requirement. Therefore, how could the building with the same foundation be raised to 30/31 floors? The mischief runs deeper.

From the large number of cases that have been brought to light, the impression seems to prevail that the military, too, has gone under. With officer-strength of over 35,000, even dozens of cases should not cause any alarm. The environment in the country is conducive to corruption, and an increasing number of Army men are not able to resist the temptation. It would be interesting to note that only the military organisations that come in contact or deal with the civilian contractors and wheeler-dealers of civil organisations are affected by the corroding influence of corruption. All the others in the military abide by high standards of integrity and honesty.

Therefore, it would be seen that it is the military’s own internal mechanism which invariably brought these cases to light and then proceedings were launched against the suspects. One can be certain that in the Adarsh Housing Society case, too, those whose actions are still governed by the military law (military law continues to operate in the case of an individual up to two years after retirement ) will face the military’s music.

While the military can be relied upon to routinely deal with the rot that seems to be creeping into its system, more vigorous and determined efforts will have to be made by the top brass to dig out every suspected case of corruption and misconduct and promptly dealt with. The exaggerated notion of scale and scope of privileges which supposedly go with higher ranks needs to be curbed. The present Army Chief is known for high integrity, probity and moral values and will surely clean up the Augean stables.

The writer is a retired Deputy Chief of the Army Staff.




http://www.tribuneindia.com/2010/20101222/edit.htm#4

Laws for defence forces

A sure recipe for indisciplineby Lieut-Gen Harwant Singh (retd)

THE Parliamentary Committee on Defence has proposed a “makeover” for the defence forces laws, to make them less harsh and oppressive and more democratic in the interest of the morale of the troops. It also wants the three Services to have a common law and do away with separate Acts to bring about uniformity in the dispensation of justice. These recommendations, if implemented, will have far-reaching consequences.


Defence forces have so far escaped political meddling and remained somewhat isolated. That is why they are still fully operative and responsive. They can deliver on time and almost at no notice. Ethos, traditions and continued good leadership have sustained them through many wars after Independence. For the Indian Army, there has been a continuous stressful period of “no war, no peace” in between. In all this, the rules, regulations and the defence forces laws have played no less significant a role. For a layman, it is near-impossible to understand how all these factors coalesce to create that chemistry spirit and morale which make troops give up their most precious possession, their lives, by rushing into a hail of bullets and exploding shells on a simple word, “move”, from their commanders.

When troops are subjected to prolonged periods of stress and danger, and they suffer heavy casualties, discipline can give way to disorder and eventual mass desertions, as it happened, first, to the French army and there to the redoubtable German army during World War I. Indiscipline is highly contagious and if not stemmed with the greatest promptitude (as the French under Marshal Petain were able to do) it can spread like wildfire. That is why powers are vested in commanding officers and formation commanders.

Military law and the summary powers were evolved over centuries of experience of organising armies, maintaining their discipline and leading them into battle. War by its very nature is an extraordinary situation and, therefore, calls for a law quite apart from the civil law, which operates in a totally different setting. When ethos, tradition and good leadership are operative, military law merely provides a backdrop. Military law, except for some cosmetic changes in the fifties and the abolition of field punishments and induction of the requirement of recording, “speaking order” by a court martial in 1992, has remained unchanged and operated efficiently for the last 100 years and more essentially because it is based on sound principles of fair play and justice, and the situation under which the army has to operate has, by and large, remained unaltered.

Of course, there can be in an odd case aberrations in the application of the military justice system and for any higher court to rubbish the entire system would be unfair and unjust. Civil courts’ own justice system is a total mess. earlier higher civil courts had opined that the court martial should give a “speaking order”. Now members of court martial are akin to a jury, except that they are well versed with the working of the military, its methods and military law. Jury is neither competent nor ever required to record a “speaking order”. The recording of a speaking order has resulted in the Judge Advocate branch officer on the court marshal, who is there only in an advisory capacity relating to points of law and no more has come to exert unwanted influence on the court because he is the only one trained and capable of writing a speaking order.
There was a time not long ago when if an officer or a soldier in the defence services committed an offence or seriously defaulted, he made a clean breast of it and that resulted in some leniency in dealing with the case. Such conduct is nowhere to be seen now. Any one who is caught doing something wrong has the standard defence of being victimised and targeted. No one ever admits his wrong-doings. But this then is in keeping with the national trait and practice in the civilian life.

Though the punishments ascribed against the various Acts of the military law may be severe, rarely is the full punishment awarded. Much of it acts as a mere deterrence and creates a salutary effect on the potential offender. It is the certainty of punishment and not the severity that finally comes into play. The Tehelka offenders from the army have all been punished but those from the Ministry of Defence are a happy lot as they continue to enjoy the money the Tehelka team gave them and the benefits of civil law. The Additional Secretary, who accepted a gold chain from the Tehelka team was soon promoted. His benefactors contented that he did not take the gold chain home but kept it in his office. Obviously, that contention is enough to render the civil law inoperative. Applying similar law to the military would render it an ineffective instrument of state power with disastrous consequences.

With the passage of time and changes in society’s perception of civil liberties, human rights and social environments, the laws must be altered to fit the changing circumstances. For the military, little has changed; in human behaviour, living with extreme stress and danger and the individual’s natural instinct for self-preservation. The contagious nature of ill discipline has remained the same. So military law, unlike civil law, could do with minimum changes.

The very nature of working in each Service is quite different and a common law is against common sense. Contention that the military law demoralises troops is based on incorrect inputs. Of the military’s cases that are taken up with high courts and the supreme court, only 5 to 7 per cent are struck down. Compare these to those of civil courts and the figures prove the fairness in the application of military law.

The commanding officer’s summary powers too seem to rankle the committee, little realising that he is the cutting edge of the military’s delivery system and unequivocally accountable for the discipline of his troops. He is a father figure in the unit. When all attempts to correct a habitual offender have failed and the possibility of ill discipline spreading in the unit exists, recourse to summary court marshal is taken. Most commanding officers, after punishing one of their men, remain sad and sullen for days. For them it is like punishing their erring child.

Making the Defence Services Tribunal contingent on the adoption of common law for the three Services is misconceived and a nonstarter. Three earlier attempts at working out a common law have failed. The tribunal must have a retired officer from each of the three Services as member so that cases pertaining to each Service are dealt with by a bench consisting of a judicial member (high court judge/JAG) and a member from the concerned Service.

Ill-disciplined troops are worthless, a menace and a danger to the nation. No other statute in the military’s law books has contributed more to maintaining discipline than the summary powers of the commanding officer. Taking away these powers of commanding officers will have yet another fallout. As in the civil courts, it will clog the military’s justice system, result in delays in the disposal of urgent cases and deliver the final fatal blow to the discipline in the military. Bringing military law in tune with the civil law will have grave consequences for the military and eventually for the country and its security.




http://www.tribuneindia.com/2006/20060925/edit.htm#4

Quarrelling over Kargil

Antiquated decision-making system must go

by Lieut-Gen Harwant Singh (retd)

THE controversy and quarrel over Kargil has been one of the most futile and unproductive inter-service exercises. However, Kargil does throw sufficient light on the prevailing set-up to take note of the discord and delay in the decision-making process that could seriously jeopardise national security. The Air Chief’s ruminations and the issue of helicopters versus air power, lack of lateral flow of information do bring out, in stark reality, the unsavoury fact that the Air Force and the Army have been operating in water- tight compartments. These episodes do throw up important lessons, which require unbiased and objective assessment and need to be assimilated for better understanding and future inter-service working.


The Kargil sector had been free from jihadi and terrorist activity essentially because the local population is Shia, Buddhist and Droks, with only a sprinkling of Sunnis. Intelligence reports of the period pointed to some concentration of jihadi elements opposite this sector. At that point of time, the Indian Army was heavily committed in counter-insurgency operations in other parts of J and K. The requirement of reinforcing the Kargil sector was neither necessary nor were there troops to spare for this task. No one need be apologetic about this ground reality.

The Kargil sector has no strategic importance and the terrain does not favour offensive operations from either side of the Line of Actual Control (LAC). With the opening of an alternate route to Leh, from Manali, the importance of the Srinagar-Leh road had considerably reduced. Moreover, the LAC in this sector is clearly delineated and well recognised by both sides. Further, it has been India’s avowed position that any attack by Pakistan across the LAC in J and K will be taken as an attack on India and that India will respond accordingly. Given these circumstances and ground realities, no large-scale mischief by Pakistan could be expected. According to the circumstances then prevailing, Pakistan was neither spoiling for nor was it in a position to risk a war with India.

In view of this and the slip-ups in the collation and analysis of the limited intelligence reports then being made available, the Kargil sector required no special attention. Large gaps between the posts along 164 km of the front from Chor Batla to the Mushko Valley, across very difficult terrain, susceptible to heavy snowfall and consequent frequent avalanches, could not be regularly patrolled during the winter months. During the previous years the Army had lost entire patrols under snow avalanches. As such, infiltration and occupation of gaps between the posts by jihadi elements was not immediately detected. Determining the full scale and extent of ingression was a time-consuming process.

Since they were initially reported to be only the jihadis who had infiltrated, there was nothing wrong in the deployment of attack helicopters to engage them. These helicopters could engage targets from a distance of four kilometres or so, keeping well away from the enemy’s small arms fire. They are required to engage enemy tanks, staying outside the range of the tank’s heavy machine guns. Therefore, tasking them to engage jihadi elements with cannons and missiles was not a very inappropriate commitment for them.

These helicopters do have some limited capability to evade a heat-seeking missile. In any case, jihadis were not expected to be equipped with shoulder- fired anti-aircraft missiles (Stinger-type missiles). Therefore, Air Headquarters’ sustained reluctance to deploy these and that “we know better” attitude cannot be justified. In the end, even a fighter aircraft was brought down by these alleged jihadis, negating Air Headquarters’ objection against using attack helicopters. An attack helicopter is entirely a ground support weapon system and considered the world over as integral to the Army’s fire support assets. To contend that the Indian Army is unaware of the capability and employment of this weapon speaks volumes of the chasm that exists between these two services, the exchange of polite letters between the two chiefs after the Kargil conflict notwithstanding.

If Air Headquarters felt so strongly against the deployment of armed helicopters, it could have instead offered the use of fighter aircraft and in which case both the Army and the Air Force together could have approached the government on this issue. Where was the question of escalation in the event of employment of air power over own territory (air space) against the enemy, which had infiltrated deep inside India. In any case, Pakistan had denied any involvement. After all, the Army’s heavy artillery was already relentlessly engaging the intruders.
On arriving at a consensus within the Chiefs of Staff Committee, the government could have been apprised and advised on the issue of deployment of air power. Further, it was necessary to have pointed out to the government that deploying the Air Force within Indian airspace against jihadis (or even if Pakistani troops were there) who had penetrated inside Indian territory, could not possibly provoke Pakistan to start hostilities against superior conventional forces (both ground and air) nor would it have started a nuclear conflagration just because we were engaging jihadis well within Indian territory. Therefore, this bogey of escalation and consequent inordinate delay in the decision to deploy the Air Force cannot be employed to dither and defer vital decisions. Nor can the obfuscation of the self-generated confusion created in the use of air power and not armed helicopters find justification in this dithering. No one has ever considered helicopters as an extension of artillery. Though they are, in reality, an extension of armour. They carry direct firing weapons (missiles and cannons) and, employing appropriate techniques, can operate even in the face of enemy anti-aircraft capability.

Fortunately, the enemy merely occupied the gaps between our posts and had no intention or the capability to progress operations any deeper into India. Consequently, it posed no threat to any vital areas in depth. Were the enemy to have the capability and the intention of driving deeper towards some vital objective, the semantics, mistrust and petty fogging within the Chiefs of Staff Committee, and the attendant delay, could have had grave consequences.

Time and again this discord and differing perceptions have surfaced. Be it the 1962 war against China or the wars against Pakistan, the Services have failed to function as a well-oiled machine and proof of this, if any, lies in the continuing spat between the two Service chiefs even seven years after the event. The existing arrangement of the Chiefs of Staff Committee with its conflicting views, “turf tending” and differing recommendations can merely confuse the political executive and result in delays and dithering which would prove disastrous in the event of grave national emergencies demanding quick responses.

The imperatives of single- point advise to the government, on defence matters, needs no further emphasis. A nuclear and emerging economic power with ambitions to exercise a sobering influence in the region, for its stability and security, cannot have an antiquated and potentially dysfunctional decision-making system within its defence apparatus.


http://www.tribuneindia.com/2006/20061018/edit.htm#4