Corruption in the Army: not as bad as it seems

Harwant Singh

TEHELKA's revelations have thrown up a whole range of issues, such as the selection and evaluation system of military equipment, the role of middlemen, probity of defence officials connected with purchase, political influence of the ruling party in these transactions and the extent of executive accountability of the Defence Minister and perhaps the government as a whole in these sleazy deals.


It has been known for a fairly long time that there are pockets of corruption and malfeasance in the defence services. But in scope, spread and scale it pales in front of what is prevalent in almost every facet of civil life. The military stands out in that corruption is unacceptable and is looked down upon and where detected, positive and purposeful action is initiated. On an average, 30 to 35 court marshals are held every year in corruption cases or for any infringement of financial regulations and those found guilty are sent to prison and/or cashiered. The future of many more found lacking in integrity is sealed. Yet, Tehelka selected the military to home on to and only defence deals became target when behind every conceivable deal or government transaction there is a stinking scandal. Be that as it may, we need to look into the issue exposed in the disclosures. For any transaction between two parties there has to be someone to facilitate the deal or, at best, represent the seller. How else can a foreign peddler of military or other goods to be sold to a government agency navigate his way through the bureaucratic jungle of the Government of India, where you and I can easily loose our way.

The Delhi scene was dominated by a handful of arms agents with the right political connections. They were ipso facto linked to be party in power. Then, in the 1980s, finding the proposition very lucrative, some retired defence officers joined the business. It was soon discovered that they were trying to cut into the business of regular ‘official’ agents. To put an end to this, Rajiv Gandhi (as an act of needless hypocrisy) imposed a ban on defence agents and, as a follow up to it, exemplary punishments were meted out to Larkin, Law and Jasbir. An old Army Headquarters telephone directory found in his possession was enough to send Lt-Col (retd) Jasbir Singh to prison. This ban on defence agents is ridiculous because unofficially they regularly interact with MoD officials to exchange information, discuss requirements and product pricing and at times even establish liaison with trials.

Remember Win Chadha in a group photograph with the trial team at the School of Artillery, Deolali? Hundreds of defence agents operate in India; about 80 as regular suppliers in Delhi itself. Ironically, our Supply Missions attached to our embassies in the UK and Washington, etc, officially continue to make purchases of defence equipment, especially for the DRDO, through Indian agents based in India. Defence PSIs that supply equipment to the military also openly use the services of agents of foreign companies. Many seem to infer from the Tehelka revelations that our systems and methods of evaluation and selection of military equipment leave scope for manipulation and fudging, resulting in malpractices and corruption on the part of those operating the system. Once the requirement for a particular type of weapon, equipment or ammunition—which cannot be developed by the DRDO—is accepted, it is made known to suppliers directly or through our embassies. A trial directive is made out based on the relevant General Staff Qualitative Requirement. Offers are vetted and equipment subjected to user trials as per the trial directive. Trials are normally conducted independently by at least three different Army commands (because of vastly differing terrain and climate conditions under which the equipment is to be deployed) and their findings and views in the chain of command recorded. At the same time DGQA, DRDO, EME and the respective user Directorate, record their independent findings and views. Often all or some of these activities are carried out concurrently, depending on the number of pieces made available for trials. The General Staff evaluation and recommendations are the final view of the Army and based on the trials and opinion of the commands and others and the Army Headquarters’ own inputs. Therefore, purchase of inappropriate equipment cannot take place. At the same time, no fudging in trial reports and General Staff evaluation is possible, nor can any one in the MoD later fool around with it. But, the MoD can put a case on hold for years or jettison it altogether, as has happened in a number of cases, and that is where speed money or Enron’s ‘education’ factor comes into play. In the case of the Bofors gun, it is believed that the MoD asked the Army Headquarters to have a fresh look at it’s preference of guns as it did not feel ‘safe’ to go in for the Bofors gun without change of preference in it’s favour, though this gun was always acceptable to the Army and the final selection would have rested on pricing, transfer of technology, ammunition supply, spares etc.

It would be seen that trial and evaluation procedures, methods and systems are sound and transparent enough. A dishonest operator can and will always find ways and means to influence the final decision basing on other related factors. Many a story from even the Akbar-Birbal episodes would prove the point. The focus should be to catch the wrongdoer, punish him swiftly and not further complicate the existing lengthy procedures. The presence of agents should not overly worry us. No agent can corrupt an honest officer or politician. Under normal circumstances, the Indian Army does not buy weapons, equipment and ammunition without proper evaluation and trials. In fact, the efficacy of the weapon, equipment and ammunition concerned in our setting, in terms of terrain, tactical environments, battle field milieu and shelf life, etc., has to be established and the same has to conform to our long-term equipping policy before the trial and evaluation is accepted or undertaken.

But any system is as good as those who operate it. Given the ingenuity, propensity and capacity of the Indian mind for corruption and the very remote possibility of being trapped, accompanied by the comforting feeling that even if caught an obliging investigating agency and a clever lawyer can get one off the hook, makes malfeasance and corruption a low risk but a highly profitable under-taking. While the system of selection of equipment is elaborate and fair, the “goodwill factor” and speed money or “education” of the babus and politicians concerned often help in smoothing the rough edges. Since the final “go-ahead” signal for purchase and price negotiations is in the hands of the MoD, that is where the maximum scope for corruption rests. At times, though not too frequently, conditions are contrived or get generated, as in the case of the Kargil conflict, to circumvent the mandatory requirement of trials and evaluation or seek the purchase of equipment which otherwise would not have been accepted. At other times, misplaced enthusiasm or officers’ petty loyalties to own arm or service comes into play to equip it with what is perceived to be the latest and most modern equipment. It is here as elsewhere that the General Staff of the Army has to step in to check inappropriate acquisition of weapons and equipment. That is one reason why only General Staff cadre officers need to occupy key positions of ADG, Weapons and Equipment, and ADG, Perspective Planning, etc.

Unfortunately, and for some unknown reason, this has not been the case, more so during the past one decade. The Indian Army’s inventory does have a fair sprinkling of ammunition and equipment purchased without due consideration and evaluation. It would be relevant to mention a few cases. In the seventies, APDS ammunition for T-54/55 tanks was purchased without trials. In subsequent trials it completely failed and became dead inventory. Perhaps the 155mm Krasnopol ammunition (possibly some other items as well) purchased in the wake of the Kargil conflict for Rs 150 crore may fall in the same category. The Army never considered this type of ammunition cost effective, because cheaper and better methods of engagement of targets have always been available. I recall that at one time there was great pressure to buy ‘influence anti-tank mines’ from France. In this case the E-in-C branch’s interest was guided by a desire to acquire the latest but the MoD had some other angle to the deal; not difficult to guess! While these had somewhat passed the trials, their efficacy in our setting could not be established. So I had declined to buy these. The next Deputy Chief, too, held the same view. But in his absence of 10 days’ leave the deal was clinched. When the MoD develops an interest in a particular item, files move at high speed. These mines bought at great expense are perhaps a dead inventory now. Stentor radars, Gaz navigation vehicles, tank fire-control system (TFCS) for Vijayant tanks, to mention only a few cases, fall in the same category. During the Sri Lanka operations, the then DGMO, in the presence of the COAS, demanded that we should acquire the hand-held radio sets in use with the LTTE, which were available in the Singapore market, for our infantry deployed in Sri Lanka as these were better than those with us (incidentally provided by Punwire, Chandigarh, and were giving reasonably good service). It was explained to the DGMO that those with the LTTE were not “military hardened” and that purchase could be undertaken provided he gave in writing that the requirement was operationally so urgent that it could not await trials. The demand was never repeated. In another case a joint secretary in the MoD called up to say that a company in Singapore had out-board motors (OBMs) which could be purchased to meet the Army’s long-standing shortage and possible floods that year and that trials need not be carried out. His interest in the purchase was obvious and the suggestion never accepted. These instances are noted to point out that the existing systems do have the necessary checks and balances.
The political party in power at the Centre has often used defence deals, and almost all other deals, to rake in funds for the party and, in the process, private pockets also get lined. When greed gets the better of judgement, slush money goes into private pockets as it happened in the case of the Bofors gun deal. When the cover gets blown and the sleaze and muck comes out in public view, at a scale uncovered by Tehelka, the minister concerned cannot escape responsibility. Much has been said about his good work in the ministry, both by himself and others. The facts point to the contrary. The anomalies arising out of the Fifty Pay Commission recommendations have not been resolved to this day, even after years of efforts of the Army Headquarters. I asked a PSO at the headquarters as to why the issues are not being progressed with the RM directly, he said the bureaucracy has placed him in quarantine and he does not see him, while we continue to put up with the ridiculous situation where a Brigadier gets more pension than a Major General. A jawan gets less than half the lowest pension given to a civil employee in this country and a cook with the Indian Antarctica team gets more than twice as much in allowances compared to a jawan at Siachen, whom the minister claims to have visited 18 times, ostensibly to boost his morale or perhaps to get publicity for himself. A jawan or an officer loosing his leg at Siachen from frostbite or those who suffered similar injuries during Kargil or elsewhere in J and K, get less disability benefits than a civil employee loosing it in a terrorism incident while proceeding even on LTC. The babus from his ministry that he sent to Siachen never went beyond Leh. Troops do not air their problems out of deference for rank and discipline, but they expect their officers to know these on their own, resolve the difficulties and look after their interests. However, the efforts of their officers at Delhi were always stonewalled by the MoD. The Defence Minister personally dishing out hospitals, compression chambers, etc, indirectly undermines the position of Army top brass as they are seen to be ineffective on their own. In the case of the sacking of Admiral Bhagwat, the minister could not reasonably justify his action and had merely become a handmaiden to the then Defence Secretary against whom the Delhi High Court had to pass some very damning strictures. The government’s dithering in accepting his resignation and later appointing him the NDA convenor is an affront to public opinion and political cussedness of a kind.

It can be said with a fair degree of fairness that in this all-pervasive climate of corruption in the country, only certain components of the defence services are in this game, that too marginally. That is one of the reasons why Tehelka’s expose and Army officers’ involvement in the murky dealings as portrayed in the tapes have caused, within the officer cadre of the Army, widespread shock, disgust and consternation. In one voice, the demand for the involved officers to face the full rigours of the military law has been raised. As opposed to this, every other group exposed in these tapes is working overtime to pull excuses and cover tracks. The investigating agency has given a wake-up call and provided an excellent opportunity to the Army (and the other two services as well as the nation) to ruthlessly root out corruption in every area of its’ functioning. The Army Chief has already set about the task in the right earnest and let others down the ladder join him in this crusade.

Finally, a more serious issue has emerged out of this crisis. For days the government suffered from inaction, if not paralysis, when faced with the Tehelka disclosures. A swift action to force the politicians concerned to resign, place affected officers under suspension and initiate investigation would have vastly mitigated the fall-out; instead, the Cabinet dithered and looked for excuses where none existed. If such a situation can palsy the system’s ability to act decisively, then how can it handle more time-sensitive exigencies arising in a nuclear scenario!


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