Chavan to blame for flaws in directionby Lt-Gen Harwant Singh (retd)
 Y.B. Chavan |
AUTOBIOGRAPHIES are rarely completely objective and therefore, seldom reflect the true record of the author’s actions and deeds, more so those that are less edifying, whereas personal diaries are less likely to suffer from such infirmities. Even so, some attempt at justification of one’s actions are inevitable; sometimes for self assurance and where there is the possibility of the diary being reduced in a book form, then it falls in the same genre as autobiography.
Where reliance is placed on hearsay, the contents may not be accurate and thus tend to misrepresent events and actions. R. D. Pradhan as private secretary to Y.B. Chavan has relied heavily on Chavan’s diary for his book. (I. Ramamohan Rao’s article, “How India won the 1965 war: Y.B. Chavan’s diary reveals the inside story”, Perspective, June 17).
Certain important developments relating to the 1965 war with Pakistan, gleaned from the diary do not bear close scrutiny and on others. Chavan projects himself as if he took time sensitive decisions all on his own, without clearance from the Cabinet.
Chavan took over as Defence Minister soon after Indian army had a drubbing from the Chinese. It is during Chavan’s watch that on one side Pakistan was being armed to the teeth by the Americans and on the other, Indian army was being starved of contemporary equipment and drawn into fruitless arguments by his ministry to have 17 instead of 21 divisions as projected by the army.
Thus, when the war started on September 1, 1965, Indian army, according to Gen Harbaksh, was in no position to engage Pakistan in an all out war. India had 608 tanks of World War II vintage (180 Centurions and 90 AMXs were of mid forties period), 625 artillery pieces of all calibers and 35 infantry brigades. As against these, Pakistan had 765 tanks, which included 352 Patton tanks (state of the art tank of that period), 552 artillery pieces of all types, but of higher calibre and better range, 26 infantry brigades and 9000 Razakars. Pakistan had two armoured divisions against one of India. How did this disparity in force equation come about? Chavan’s diary and Pradhan as his then private secretary skip this intriguing poser.
Pakistan launched a full-scale offensive in the early hours of September 1, 1965, and yet the Indian Air Force, according to Chavan, went into action at 4.45 p.m. and, that too, when Gen Chaudhuri and Air Chief Arjun Singh came to his office and sought his approval. Why this delay of more than 12 hours? Who was in charge of the war during that critical period of over 12 hours? Why was Chavan’s permission required for deploying air power when the enemy had already launched a full scale offensive?
Obviously, there continued to be serious flaws in the overall direction of war, for which Chavan must bear responsibility. Yet Pradhan holds out Chavan’s clearance for deploying IAF as very prompt.
Chavan does not appear to be adequately informed about the progress of operations. Pradhan tells us (obviously gleaned from Chavan’s diary) that the IAF’s going into action late in the afternoon of September 1 saved the nation from a major catastrophe. Where as Gen Harbaksh in his book, War dispatches, records that the IAF on that day did little damage to the enemy and instead took heavy toll of own troops. It destroyed all the artillery ammunition, one vehicle carrying tank ammunition, damaged three AMXs tanks and one armoured recovery vehicle.
Coming to the more contentious issue of Gen Chaudhuri’s proposal to pull back Indian troops behind the river Beas, Chavan’s recordings in his diary are based on hearsay or mere gossip or perhaps it is Pradhan’s own addition. There are many versions to this story. Now Pradhan tells us that this proposal was dropped after heated discussions between Chaudhuri and Harbaksh.
Reference to this story first appeared in print in Gen Harbaksh’s second book, In the line of duty, while there is no mention of it in his first book, War dispatches, written soon after the war. Harbaksh’s Chief of Staff, Maj-Gen Joginder Singh in his book Behind the scene makes no mention of it.
Order to fall back on Beas gained currency after Gen Chaudhuri and Joginder had died. There are any number of versions to this canard. Capt Amrinder Singh says that he heard a late evening telephone conversation between Chaudhuri and Harbaksh on the subject. K. Subramanyam writes that General Chaudhuri had sought Prime Minister Shastri’s permission to pull back troops behind Beas and that the PM refused the permission. Inder Malhotra has his own twist to the story. Harbaksh himself refers to the meeting with Gen Chaudhuri on September 10 at Ambala.
Now any one even casually acquainted with military operations will know that in the absence of any request from the field commander for a pull back, no higher commander will contemplate nor rush to the PM seeking permission for an act of such far reaching implications. For a moment if we are to assume that the situation on the front was so desperate (of which Harbaksh was unaware!) that withdrawal to a position in the rear was the only course left to continue the fight, the PM by refusing permission would merely court a bigger disaster.
Even if the army chief were to contemplate such a drastic step, he would surely discuss it with his Director Military Operations. The then DMO totally denied any such development. Gen Chaudhuri’s personal Staff Officer, Gen Sandhu, who always remained with him and took copious notes at all meetings and instructions of the army chief and immediately passed these to those who were to take action, emphatically denies contemplation of any such move by the chief.
Information flows from the front to higher headquarters in the rear, while orders flow in the opposite direction. So it is completely illogical for any one to argue that when the commander at the front is confident of holding the enemy in check, those in command in the rear would ask him to pull back and give such a dangerous turn to the conduct of battle.
Look at the issue from another angle. Troops at the front were fully embroiled with the enemy and under such conditions disengagement and taking positions in the rear could result in chaos if not a rout. So some fresh troops would have been required to take up positions in the rear and cover the withdrawal of troops engaged with the enemy. In this case at least one fresh infantry brigade was required to take up positions on the Beas. But there was no brigade available for such a task. There were no reserves.
Chaudhuri was a very capable general with a lifetime of study of the art of war. For Chavan or others to give credence to such fibs merely strains their own credulity. One would have expected the wartime Defence Minister’s diary to contain more informed and authentic record of events of that eventful period. He seems to contribute to the fog that continues to persist over this important period of Indian history. Like many before him, his diary disappoints.
The writer is a former Deputy Chief of Army Staff
http://www.tribuneindia.com/2007/20070708/edit.htm#1
No comments:
Post a Comment