Dithering on deterrence

Will cross-border terrorism ever end?Harwant Singh

OVER a decade of insurgency and years of cross-border terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir and other places in India reached an unacceptable point on December 13, 2001 with the attack on the Indian Parliament complex. India’s cup of patience overflowed, and the government felt that enough was enough. It called for some strong action as mere rhetoric, such as, “hot pursuit”, “zero tolerance”, etc, had simply failed to produce results. After all, if America could hunt out the Al-Qaeda cadres and liquidate the Taliban, then why could India not do something similar, though on a smaller scale. But there were obvious faultlines in this course of action.


Nevertheless, we went ahead with a series of actions at the diplomatic level. The Samjhauta Express and the Lahore-Delhi bus service were terminated. Restrictions were placed on visa facilities. The staff at the Indian High Commission in Pakistan was reduced and the High Commissioner recalled, and Pakistan was told to do likewise. Some barriers on trade between the two countries were raised. We pleaded with America to put pressure on Pakistan to terminate cross-border terrorism. Later, leaders from various political parties were despatched to different capitals to apprise them of Pakistan’s direct involvement in cross-border terrorism.

To further pressurise Pakistan, India mobilised its armed forces, moved troops even from the North-East and deployed the offensive formations as well. It was all part of coercive diplomacy and a plan to throw up clear signals that India has the will and the resolve to apply the full potential of its military power to dissuade Pakistan from continuing with cross-border terrorism. This message could not have got across effectively if we had initiated diplomatic steps alone and relied on the USA to put pressure on Pakistan, or merely committed the defensive formations. The aim obviously was to deploy the unfettered power of the Indian war machine, in its full range and scope, to bring into play the complete deterrence potential. All this had to be backed by an unmistakable and demonstrative resolve of the Indian political leadership that it was serious about mounting an offensive in the event Pakistan failed to mend its ways. Unless India convinced Pakistan that it was determined to tighten the screws, the exercise of mobilising troops and bringing offensive formations in their concentration areas was futile.

The military build-up did seem to create the desired effect, and discernible signals of course correction from Pakistan were in the air. Then the Indian Communications Minister and BJP spokesperson informed the international community, the visiting British Prime Minister, Mr Tony Blair, and the nation that the Indian deployment was “two hundred per cent defensive”. Mr Mahajan’s message unhesitatingly neutralised the coercive and deterrent value of the forward concentration of the country’s strike formations by exposing the Indian defensive mindset and the inability to appear firm. It, in fact, attempted to placate Pakistan and tell the British Prime Minister that the Indian deployment was purely defensive in character and that it had to take these steps due to its fears of an attack from the enemy. So that is Mr Mahajan’s and, in fact, India’s concept of deterrence. Instead of Pakistan calling India’s bluff, this country seems to have done it itself.

Then came the famous speech of January 12 by General Musharraf, essentially for the benefit of the USA and some other western countries. He appeared set to chart a new course, away from fundamentalism, jehadi culture and the climate of violence in Pakistan. It had in the past nurtured the Taliban, who in turn provided a favourable environment for the growth and spread of Al-Qaeda. So, yet another U-turn by General Musharraf, this time within Pakistan, away from religious fundamentalism and terrorism, was music to the US ears. Jehadi culture being bred in Pakistan could, directly or indirectly, reach the far off shores of America, so any move to arrest and eliminate this climate of terrorism was in the US interest. The speech was welcomed in India too, though it had very little to offer in specific terms. Mr Mahajan’s assertions that Indian troop deployment was “two hundred per cent defensive” must have had some bearing on General Musharraf’s speech as it pertained to issue effecting India. Thus Pakistan’s moral, political and diplomatic support to the “freedom struggle in Kashmir” was to continue. Yet there was hope that Pakistan would put an end to cross-border terrorism. We had to only wait for the results on the ground.

Mr Selig Harrison, Director of National Project at the Centre for International Policy in Washington, considered extremely influential among the think-tanks, is sceptical about General Musharraf putting an end to infiltration in J and K. He is of the opinion that General Musharraf has attempted to put up a smoke-screen of action with respect to Kashmir by talking of a crackdown on indigenous groups within Pakistan. Indian Service chiefs in a recent deposition before a parliamentary committee have stated that there is no decrease in infiltration into J and K. The data related to terrorist activity along the LoC is quite disturbing. For the month of January during the years 2000, 2001 and 2002 incidents on the border numbered 16, 153 and 412 (till January 23). RDX seizures were 14kg, 159kg, 225kg and AK-47 figures for the same month being 86, 74 and 112. Infiltration will continue because we thoughtlessly dithered on deterrence.
Two more events of significance took place. One, when the Chief of Army Staff conveyed to Pakistan through a Press conference India’s unequivocal and firm position on the nuclear issue, etc, the Defence Minister decided to publicly denigrate him. Second, the government in its infinite wisdom sacked the commander of the more potent offensive corps, allegedly at the behest of the US Secretary of State, Gen Colin Powell. The corps commander had allegedly carried out movements, though within own territory, but close to the border. Pakistan appeared to have protested to America against forward movements of Indian troops. The sacking of the GoC, 2 Corps, is being linked to this chain of events. The government utterly failed to come clear on this issue and, therefore, the rumour mill did roaring business. The recent statement by the Defence Minister, as part of damage control exercise, that the move of the GoC 2 Corps, is a normal posting has come a bit too late, and does not seem to wash. In any case, the damage has already been done. Together, these two incidents pointed to serious faultlines in the politico-military set-up in the country.

Strike formations are held well back and there is no possibility of their moving close to the border unless they are actually on their way to mounting an offensive, consequent to the start of a war. So, the story of the elements of this corps moving too close to the border simply does not jell. If some movement had taken place in the rear, for whatever reason, the act of sacking the corps commander, besides its debilitating effect on the morale of the army, amounts to an apology to Pakistan for the mistake of an erring corps commander. These two events — the denigration of the Army Chief and sacking of the GoC, 2 Corps — have sent out wrong signals to Pakistan on our ability to deter it from cross-border terrorism.

Clausewitz’s dictum that “Surprise is the most powerful element of victory” is all the more relevant to the Indian setting, where operations would be launched under conditions of parity. Consequently, Indian success in any future war will greatly depend on the surprise it is able to achieve. Surprise is easier achieved at the tactical level than at the strategic plane. Surprise at the strategic level will be contigent on the secrecy of the place and timings of the employment of our strike formations. In a war situation, Pakistan’s C-in-C would give his right arm to know which strike formations of the Indian Army would be launched where.

Pakistan’s C-in-C need not put himself to such great trouble. The Indian Press will tell him all. It tells us that X strike corps from Y station has been moved to Z location to be employed in A sector and much more. The whole scheme of defence reporting has been turned on its head. Young and raw journalists have been let loose and are constantly snapping at the heals of the Army with little or no idea as to what is defence news and what could mean a breach of security. The ban on their movements in the border districts has not come too soon, as some damage has already been done. But their compatriots continue to do their bit from the rear. Sensationalism is not good reporting on defence matters. A TV programme anchor, reporting on the Kargil war, tells us ad nauseam that she is “reporting from the bunker”, little knowing that a war cannot be reported from inside a bunker.

If the aim of this expensive exercise (besides turning a few million people into refugees) of mobilisation of the military was, ostensibly, to put pressure on Pakistan and deter it from undertaking cross-border terrorism, then that purpose stands defeated on our own accord. First by Mr Mahajan’s assertions of our adopting purely defensive posture; second by chiding the Army Chief and then, finally, by the sacking of a corps commander. We can now fight the “war of lists” of wanted persons by each country and learn to live with cross-border terrorism. This means we will continue to bleed. We lacked resources, but more vision and the will to create a powerful military which could have put the fear of Allah into Pakistan and to make it desist from continuing with the proxy war against India. The other possibility was to have looked afresh at the Indus Water Treaty, as suggested in these columns on August 22, 1998. The commencement of work on the tunnel to divert the waters of the Chenab itself was enough to bring Pakistan on the right track.

Finally, we seem to depend more and more on America to put pressure on Pakistan to stop cross-border terrorism. While India will have to fight its own battle, America will directly or indirectly get increasingly involved with the Kashmir problem. It already wants the FBI to investigate the shoot-out at the American Information Centre at Kolkata. While the Indian government agreed to this proposal, it was the firm stand by the West Bengal government which stopped this transgression of the Indian sovereignty.

The writer, a retired Lieut-General, was a Deputy Chief of Army Staff. 


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